Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the offense of partner of family member assault (PFMA), a felony. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and remanded for correction of the written judgment, holding (1) Defendant's attorney did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to the mental state instructions given at trial, as the district court properly instructed the jury in the applicable law on the mental state for the PFMA offense; and (2) an error in the district court's written judgment imposing terms and conditions of parole or conditional release required that the written judgment be amended. Remanded. View "State v. Birthmark" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of accountability for deliberate homicide, robbery, tampering with physical evidence, and burglary. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made during a custodial interrogation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant did not invoke his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent when he said "I don't really have anything to talk about" because he did not articulate a desire to remain silent sufficiently clearly that a reasonable officer in the circumstances would have understood Defendant's statements to be an invocation of his Miranda right to remain silent as required by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Berghuis v. Thompkins; and (2) the district court's finding that Defendant's Miranda waiver and subsequent statements to the police were voluntary was supported by substantial credible evidence, and its conclusions of law were correct. View "State v. Nixon" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of negligent homicide and two counts of negligent endangerment. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's challenge of a prospective juror for cause; (2) did not err by excluding Defendant's expert witness from testifying on complex partial seizures; (3) did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant's request to instruct the jury on DUI as a lesser-included offense of vehicular homicide while under the influence; and (4) erred by ordering Defendant to pay $600 in restitution to the State and an undisclosed amount to the victims and their family members for mental health treatment. Accordingly, the Court vacated the $600 restitution award to the State and reversed the open-ended restitution award for the victims' mental health treatment. Remanded for entry of an amended judgment specifying the amount for such treatment. View "State v. Jay" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of violating a permanent order of protection and tampering with a witness. Defendant's written sentence contained twenty-six terms and conditions that were not expressly stated during oral pronouncement of sentence. Defendant appealed, claiming his attorney was ineffective in ordering erroneous jury instructions and in failing to file a motion to conform the written sentence to the orally-pronounced sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) Defendant's counsel did not provide ineffective assistance with respect to proposed jury instructions; and (2) the district court's inclusion of five conditions in Defendant's written judgment and order were not sufficiently related to Defendant's charges nor were they reasonably related to the objectives of rehabilitation and protection of the victim and society. Remanded with instructions to strike the five conditions. View "State v. Andress" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of deliberate homicide, attempted deliberate homicide, and negligent homicide. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court violated his fundamental right to be present at all critical stages of the proceedings when he was absent from a sidebar conference after which the district court removed a juror from the pool of potential jurors. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the record sufficiently established that the only potential prejudice to Defendant arose from his loss of an opportunity to participate in the decision of whether the keep the disputed juror in the potential jury pool; and (2) the trial court mooted this potential prejudice when it announced that the juror had been removed from the potential jury pool by stipulation. View "State v. Wilson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexual assault, incest, and attempted sexual intercourse without consent. The victim was thirteen years old during the abuse and fourteen at the time of trial. During trial, the court allowed a child sex abuse expert to testify, but the expert did not discuss the specifics of Defendant's case and did not offer an opinion of whether the victim had been abused. Defendant appealed, contending that the expert's testimony improperly invaded the jury's obligation to assess the victim's credibility. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the expert's testimony did not impinge upon the jury's obligation to ultimately decide the victim's credibility; and (2) moreover, the district court alleviated any concern of unfair prejudice by giving the jury a cautionary instruction before Defendant testified. View "State v. Robins" on Justia Law

Two police officers observed Defendant in a bar holding a beer can. Believing that Defendant was younger than twenty-one years old, the officers asked how old Defendant was then asked for identification to verify Defendant's age. The officers subsequently told Defendant to accompany the officers outside. After Defendant provided a false first name and birthdate, the officers placed Defendant under arrest. After confirming that Defendant was under twenty-one years old, the State charged Defendant with minor in possession and obstructing a police officer. The city court granted Defendant's motion to suppress. The district court affirmed, determining the officers had violated Defendant's right against self-incrimination by requesting Defendant's name, birthdate, and identification. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the officers had sufficient particularized suspicion to approach Defendant and ask his age, but the officers improperly expanded their investigation by taking Defendant outside without additional articulable facts. View "State v. Driscoll" on Justia Law

Defendant's vehicle hit Brian Beaver from behind, and Beaver died from severe blunt force trauma to his head. Defendant was assigned a public defender for his criminal case. Eight days before his trial, Defendant provided the district court with a pro se motion for appointment of different counsel, claiming that appointed counsel's representation was deficient. Defendant also filed a request for a continuance so that he could retain private counsel. The court denied Defendant's request for substitution of counsel, determining that counsel was providing adequate representation. The court also denied Defendant's motion to continue, determining that Defendant had lacked diligence in seeking private counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion by finding that Defendant's counsel was providing effective assistance of counsel; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in determining that Defendant had not made a good faith, diligent effort to retain substitute counsel. View "State v. Holm" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of felony aggravated assault and misdemeanor unlawful restraint. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, raising twelve issues. The district court determined that Defendant's petition did not demonstrate any kind of error, cumulative or otherwise, and dismissed the petition. Defendant appealed pro se to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding that Defendant did not meet his burden of establishing that any error of his pre-trial and trial counsel prejudiced his right to a fair trial. View "Rukes v. State" on Justia Law

Wife petitioned the district court for dissolution of her marriage to Husband, who was incarcerated. Husband proceeded as a self-represented litigant, and the district court allowed Husband to appear telephonically at all hearings. When the final pretrial conference was held, Husband did not appear telephonically. Unbeknownst to the district court, Husband was experiencing medical problems that required surgery and hospitalization. After Husband was released from the prison infirmary, he mailed a motion to the district court requesting a sixty-day continuance. The district court received the motion, but after Husband failed to appear at a hearing to consider the motion, the court entered a default decree and declared the parties' marriage dissolved. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under these extraordinary circumstances, the district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant Husband's motion for a continuance. Remanded to allow Husband to appear at a final pretrial conference and trial. View "Eslick v. Eslick" on Justia Law