Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of felony sexual intercourse without consent, misdemeanor partner or family members assault, and felony tampering with witnesses and informants. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence that Defendant had previously assaulted and harassed the victim; (2) plain error review was not warranted for the Court to review the district court’s jury instruction regarding the evidence of the previous bad acts; and (3) Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel due to his counsel’s failure to object to the State’s use of the previous bad acts.View "State v. Crider" on Justia Law

After Defendant accused her ex-boyfriend of raping her, the State charged Defendant with one count of tampering with or fabricating physical evidence in violation of Mont. Code Ann. 45-7-207(1)(b). Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charge, arguing that the Information did not allege a cognizable basis to find probable cause that the charged offense had occurred. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, based on the State’s allegations, there were sufficient facts from which a rational trier of fact could conclude that each element of the charged offense had been proven. View "State v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to tampering with witnesses and informants. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the district court denied. Defendant appealed, arguing that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because his counsel misinformed him about his eligibility for a persistent felony offender designation. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order denying Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, holding (1) the district court correctly determined that Defendant was fully aware of the direct consequences of his plea and that the plea was not induced by misrepresentation; and (2) therefore, Defendant failed to show that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, he would not have entered a guilty plea.View "State v. Hendrickson" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of assault with a weapon and one count of criminal mischief. An affidavit by the victim indicated that he suffered $6,418 in medical and dental expenses related to the assault, but the victim’s insurer paid for some portion of that total. The district court required Defendant to pay $6,418 in restitution to the victim. Defendant appealed, arguing that his restitution to the victim should be reduced by the amount paid by the insurer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly applied the law in determining that Defendant was not entitled to an offset in his restitution based on the victim’s insurance compensation, as the victim and his insurer were entitled to any damages that could be pursued against Defendant in a civil action, regardless of any subrogation issues between them. View "State v. Fenner" on Justia Law

In 1988, Appellant was convicted of misdemeanor assault and felony sexual intercourse without consent and was also designated a persistent felony offender (PFO). In 2013, Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he was wrongly sentenced for both the underlying felony and his PFO status. The Supreme Court granted the petition and remanded for correction of the illegal sentence. On remand, the district court resentenced Appellant during a status conference docketed under a newly-created civil cause number when neither Defendant nor his attorney were present. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant was sentenced with a complete lack of statutory or constitutional process. Remanded for a sentencing hearing.View "State v. McEvoy" on Justia Law

Defendant was accused of multiple instances of sexual activity with C.M., a fourteen-year-old student at Billings Senior High School, where Defendant was employed as a teacher. C.M. subsequently took her own life. The State eventually charged Defendant with three counts of sexual intercourse without consent. Defendant pled guilty to one count of the charged offense, and the State recommended a prison sentence of twenty years with ten suspended. The district court, however, sentenced Defendant to fifteen years’ incarceration with all but thirty-one days suspended, indicating that C.M. had “control” of the situation with Defendant and that she was mature beyond her years. After significant public outcry, the district court apologized and published an order acknowledging the illegality of Defendant’s sentence. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s judgment, holding (1) the sentence in this case was imposed under an inapplicable statute, and the illegality of the sentence could not be corrected by striking some portion of the offending language; and (2) reassignment to a new judge was necessary to preserve the appearance of fairness and justice in this matter. Remanded for resentencing.View "State v. Rambold" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of criminal distribution of dangerous drugs. The State subsequently filed a petition to revoke Defendant’s deferred sentence based on her possession of oxycodone in violation of the conditions of her probation. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized by her probation officer after a search of Defendant’s purse. The district court denied the motion and later revoked Defendant’s deferred sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly concluded that the probation officer conducted a legitimate probation search based on reasonable suspicion and in thereby denying Defendant’s motion to suppress.View "State v. Fischer" on Justia Law

In 2009, Kristine Davenport sought to disqualify Justice of the Peace John Odlin for cause from presiding in two misdemeanor cases against Davenport. The district court denied Davenport’s motion to disqualify Odlin. Davenport subsequently filed a flurry of motions, briefs, and requests, which the district court denied. On August 23, 2011, the district court entered an amended order imposing Mont. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions and ordered Davenport to pay $2,500 within thirty days. Davenport appealed the district court’s refusal to disqualify Odlin pursuant to her affidavits of disqualification. The Supreme Court held that Davenport’s affidavits did not comply with the good faith requirement in Mont. Code Ann. 3-1-805(1)(b) and that her arguments failed. Subsequently, on April 1, 2013, the district court again amended its order to impose jail time on Davenport should she fail to pay the $2,500 Rule 11 sanctions within thirty days. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court’s April 1, 2013 order must be set aside and its August 23, 2011 amended order reinstated because the district court incorrectly amended its order a year and a half after the matter should have terminated. View "Davenport v. Odlin" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of felony aggravated assault related to injuries incurred by his five-month-old son. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err when it concluded that Defendant had waived his right to a jury trial; (2) Defendant failed to convince the Court that plain error review was warranted as to Defendant’s claim that his absence from the deposition of a State witness violated his right to be present at all critical stages of the proceedings; and (3) the district court did not commit reversible error in rendering its verdict that Defendant was guilty of aggravated assault.View "State v. Reim" on Justia Law

Petitioner pled guilty to and was convicted of one count of sexual intercourse without consent. The district court sentenced Petitioner to thirty years imprisonment, with twenty years suspended. Petitioner subsequently submitted an application to the Sentence Review Division for sentence review. During a hearing, Petitioner’s counsel advocated for a more onerous sentence than the district court had originally imposed. After the hearing had concluded, Petitioner’s counsel asked that Petitioner be permitted to withdraw his application, leaving his original sentence intact. The Division declined Petitioner’s request to withdraw his application and ultimately entered an order increasing Petitioner’s sentence to thirty years imprisonment, with ten years suspended. The district court amended the previous judgment and resentenced Petitioner in accordance with the Division’s decision. Petitioner sought relief from the Division’s decision. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Division and the amended judgment of the district court and remanded with directions to reinstate the sentence as originally imposed, holding that counsel’s deficient performance rendered the proceeding before the Division fundamentally unfair. View "Avery v. Batista" on Justia Law