Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The defendant, Sarah Taresu Olds, was charged with three misdemeanors, one of which was the offense of Habitual Offender Operating a Motor Vehicle. Olds proposed a jury instruction that the City was required to prove that she knew she was a habitual offender at the time of the traffic stop. The City argued that the offense was an absolute liability offense, meaning that they did not need to prove Olds's knowledge of her status as a habitual offender. The Municipal Court agreed with the City and Olds was found guilty.Olds appealed her conviction to the Eleventh Judicial District Court, arguing that the offense required proof of a culpable mental state. She also contended that her right to due process was violated because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on this element of the offense. The District Court affirmed Olds's conviction, concluding that the Municipal Court's interpretation of the law was correct and that the offense was an absolute liability offense.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that the offense of Habitual Offender Operating a Motor Vehicle is an absolute liability offense, meaning that the City did not need to prove a culpable mental state. The court also found that Olds was not denied due process because the jury was properly instructed. The court concluded that the Municipal Court did not err in declining to give Olds's proposed jury instruction. View "City of Kalispell v. Olds" on Justia Law

The defendant, Charles Geoffrey Santoro, was convicted of negligent homicide after a retrial. The case stemmed from an incident at a bar where Santoro and another patron, Levi, had a confrontation. Santoro claimed that Levi choked him, leading him to reverse his truck in an attempt to escape, which resulted in Levi being run over and killed.In the first trial, Santoro was convicted and sentenced to 20 years in prison, with five years suspended and no parole restriction. However, this conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court of the State of Montana due to ineffective assistance of counsel.In the retrial, the District Court granted the State's motion to exclude expert testimony on the effects of strangulation, which had been admitted in the first trial. Santoro was again convicted and this time sentenced to 20 years in prison with a full 20-year parole restriction.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana found that the District Court abused its discretion by excluding the expert testimony on strangulation. The court held that this testimony was relevant and could have assisted the jury in determining whether Santoro's actions were a "gross deviation" from that of a reasonable person in Santoro's situation. The court also found that the State's enhanced sentencing recommendation after retrial was vindictive and that the District Court erred by failing to allow Santoro the opportunity to speak prior to sentencing. The court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. View "State v. Santoro" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Joseph Brian McElroy, who was charged with criminal possession of dangerous drugs with intent to distribute, a felony. The charge stemmed from a traffic stop initiated by Trooper Adams for speeding. During the stop, Trooper Adams noticed the smell of marijuana from the vehicle and observed signs of "hard travel." After verifying the driver's information and concluding that the driver was not under the influence, Trooper Adams questioned the occupants about the smell of marijuana. When they denied consent to search the vehicle, Trooper Adams deployed a canine for a sniff test, which led to the discovery of drugs and other items. McElroy filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the traffic stop was unlawfully extended without sufficient particularized suspicion.The District Court denied McElroy's motion to suppress the evidence. The court found that Trooper Adams had sufficient particularized suspicion to conduct the canine sniff based on the smell of marijuana, signs of hard travel, the occupants' nervousness, and their somewhat differing backstories. McElroy then entered a plea agreement, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the District Court's decision. The court found that Trooper Adams did not have sufficient particularized suspicion to expand the traffic stop into a drug possession investigation. The court held that factors such as signs of hard travel, traveling from a known drug center in a third-party vehicle, and nervous demeanor, even when considered together, do not constitute particularized suspicion. The court also noted that the smell of marijuana itself does not constitute particularized suspicion sufficient to conclude there could be drugs in the vehicle. Therefore, the court concluded that Trooper Adams's further questioning about the marijuana smell and subsequent use of the canine sniff were unlawful. The court reversed the District Court's order denying McElroy's motion to suppress evidence and the resulting judgment of conviction and sentence. View "State v. McElroy" on Justia Law

Esandro Rodriguez was convicted by a jury of aggravated kidnapping, accountability for aggravated burglary, and two separate counts of accountability for assault with a weapon. The charges stemmed from an incident where Rodriguez, along with Jesse Daniels and Lauren Aviles, sought to collect money from Michael Crawford for a past drug transaction. During the incident, Rodriguez and Daniels held Amanda and Junior, Michael's girlfriend and mother's partner respectively, at gunpoint and forced them into a car. They then drove to Michael's mobile home, where they confronted Michael's mother, Leah. Daniels entered the home with a gun, causing chaos and fear among the occupants. Rodriguez was later charged with several offenses related to the incident.The District Court of the Eighth Judicial District convicted Rodriguez on four of the six counts he was charged with, including aggravated kidnapping of Amanda, accountability for assault with a deadly weapon against Junior, accountability for aggravated burglary, and accountability for assault with a weapon against Leah. Rodriguez appealed his convictions, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of aggravated burglary by accountability and that his convictions for aggravated burglary by accountability and assault with a weapon by accountability violated the multiple conviction statute.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed Rodriguez's conviction for aggravated burglary by accountability, finding that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Daniels committed assault with a weapon inside the home, thus supporting Rodriguez's conviction for aggravated burglary by accountability. However, the court reversed Rodriguez's conviction for assault with a weapon by accountability against Leah, ruling that the State had prosecuted the aggravated burglary charge in a manner that required proof that Daniels committed the assault inside the home. As such, the assault with a weapon charge merged, as a predicate offense, with aggravated burglary, and Rodriguez's conviction of both violated the multiple conviction statute. The court remanded the case for entry of an amended judgment consistent with its opinion. View "State v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

The case involves Donald Aaron Hesser, who was charged with felony driving under the influence (DUI) after a motorcycle accident. Hesser was found unconscious at the scene and was taken to the hospital for treatment. Upon learning of Hesser's four previous DUI convictions, Montana State Trooper Daniel Arnold requested that the hospital retain a blood sample taken from Hesser. An investigative subpoena was later issued for Hesser's medical records and blood sample, which revealed a blood alcohol content of .208. Hesser pleaded guilty but reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress the blood sample evidence.The District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, Cascade County, denied Hesser's motion to suppress the blood sample evidence. Hesser argued that Trooper Arnold lacked the authority to apply for an investigative subpoena, as only a prosecutor could do so under § 46-4-301(3), MCA. He also contended that there was insufficient probable cause for the subpoena. The District Court found that a prosecutor had sought the subpoena and that it was supported by probable cause, given Hesser's serious accident, the unexplained nature of the accident, and his prior DUI convictions.Upon review, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that there was sufficient probable cause for the issuance of the investigative subpoena. The court also determined that Trooper Arnold was authorized to request a blood draw under § 61-8-402(2)(a), MCA (2019), as Hesser, being unconscious, was considered statutorily not to have withdrawn his consent under § 61-8-402(3), MCA (2019). View "State v. Hesser" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Neil Lanchantin, who was charged with felony DUI and four misdemeanor offenses after being pursued and arrested by a Montana Highway Patrol Trooper on private property. The property, where Lanchantin was residing with his girlfriend, was marked with a "No Trespassing" sign. Lanchantin appealed the First Judicial District Court's order denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained when law enforcement officers entered the private property without a warrant.The District Court denied Lanchantin's motion to suppress on the basis that he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy at the location of the stop. Lanchantin pled guilty to the DUI charge but reserved his right to appeal the District Court’s order. The State argued that Lanchantin had no privacy interest in the property because he did not live there, and that the "No Trespassing" signs were inadequate to convey an expectation of privacy because they were tacked to trees along the side of the road.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the District Court's decision, holding that Lanchantin had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the driveway of the property where he was residing with his girlfriend. The court found that the "No Trespassing" signs were sufficient to manifest an actual expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable. The court concluded that law enforcement cannot enter onto private property without a warrant, even in the case of a misdemeanant fleeing, unless there are exigent circumstances. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion. View "State v. Lanchantin" on Justia Law

The case involves Clark Ryan Ramsey, an attorney who represented Justin Kalina in a felony assault case. Jessica Foote, a witness in the assault case, was investigated for alleged theft from Kalina's Uber Eats account, but no charges were brought against her. Ramsey sought information from the prosecutor in the assault case that had been gathered in the theft investigation, which he believed could be used to impeach Foote. He submitted a modified form to the Yellowstone County Sheriff’s Office (YCSO) requesting copies of the Confidential Criminal Justice Information (CCJI) in the theft case, noting he sought copies of CCJI regarding Foote. The YCSO disseminated the CCJI to Ramsey.The State filed a motion in the Justice Court, seeking to charge Ramsey with misdemeanor forgery and misdemeanor solicitation of the misuse of confidential criminal justice information, stemming from Ramsey’s submission of the form to the YCSO and subsequent receipt of CCJI from that agency. Ramsey filed a Motion to Dismiss, asserting the matter must be dismissed due to a lack of probable cause because, as a matter of law, the State could not prove the elements of forgery or solicitation. The Justice Court denied Ramsey’s motion to dismiss.Ramsey then petitioned the Supreme Court of the State of Montana for a writ of supervisory control directing the Yellowstone County Justice Court to reverse its order denying Ramsey’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court found that there was not probable cause to believe Ramsey committed either offense charged in this case and the Justice Court should not have granted the State’s motion for leave to file a complaint. The Supreme Court accepted and granted Ramsey’s petition, reversed the Justice Court’s finding of probable cause and accompanying order allowing filing of amended complaint, and remanded the matter to the Justice Court with instructions to dismiss. View "Ramsey v. Yellowstone County Justice Court" on Justia Law

John David Panasuk was pulled over by Officer Riediger and Lieutenant Frank Martell for towing a trailer without trailer plates. After Panasuk was unable to initially provide his license, registration, and proof of insurance, Riediger asked him to exit his vehicle. The other occupants, Camilla TalksDifferent and Dustin Hickman, were also asked to exit. Riediger and Martell knew TalksDifferent as a drug user, but they did not know Panasuk or Hickman. When Hickman produced a North Dakota driver’s license, Riediger contacted the Williams County Task Force in North Dakota and was told Hickman had a history of being a drug dealer and user. Riediger also recalled a previous incident where Panasuk was suspected of selling methamphetamine. TalksDifferent gave consent to search her purse, where Riediger found two syringes. She also told Riediger there was methamphetamine in Panasuk’s vehicle. Riediger seized the vehicle and applied for a search warrant. Law enforcement recovered 6.4 grams of methamphetamine from the vehicle’s center console after searching the vehicle. Panasuk was charged with criminal possession of dangerous drugs and drug paraphernalia.The District Court denied Panasuk’s motion to suppress the evidence, noting Panasuk’s previous incident and that TalksDifferent had said there was methamphetamine in the vehicle. The court found that law enforcement had sufficient particularized suspicion to expand the scope of a traffic stop to a drug investigation.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the District Court's decision. The Supreme Court found that the initial detention was unconstitutionally extended beyond what was necessary to effectuate the initial purpose of the stop. The court concluded that there were no articulable facts, other than prior suspected criminal histories, which were offered as justification to expand the search into a drug investigation. The court held that knowledge of a person’s prior criminal involvement is alone insufficient to give rise to the requisite reasonable suspicion. The court remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "State v. Panasuk" on Justia Law

The case involves Neldia Marie Puccinelli, who was accused of embezzling funds from her employer, ProMark, between 2006 and 2009. After her employment was terminated, ProMark filed a civil suit against her, which was settled with an agreement that Puccinelli would transfer certain personal property to ProMark and make 84 monthly payments of $350. In 2011, the State filed criminal charges against Puccinelli for theft by embezzlement. She entered a plea agreement, which consolidated the three counts into one and recommended a fully suspended sentence with restitution consistent with the civil settlement agreement.The District Court rejected the plea agreement, speculating that Puccinelli would stop paying restitution if given a probationary sentence. The court imposed a 10-year commitment to the Montana Women’s Prison, with 5 years suspended, and ordered Puccinelli to pay $67,235 in restitution. Puccinelli's disability payments were suspended during her incarceration, which led to financial instability for her household. Upon release, Puccinelli resumed making regular payments towards restitution.In 2022, five months before Puccinelli was set to discharge her probation, the State filed a Petition for Revocation of Suspended Sentence, alleging Puccinelli violated the restitution conditions of her sentence. The District Court determined Puccinelli had violated the terms and conditions of her suspended sentence as she had not “completely paid restitution.” The court revoked her suspended sentence and committed her to the Department of Corrections for five years, all suspended, with “the same conditions and restitution requirements as was in the original Judgment with no credit for street time.”The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the District Court's decision, finding that the lower court had abused its discretion when it revoked Puccinelli’s suspended sentence based on her failure to pay full restitution. The Supreme Court concluded that the violation should have been characterized as a compliance violation, which should have been excused pursuant to § 46-18-203(6)(b), MCA. The case was remanded to the District Court to vacate the August 25, 2022 Judgment on Revocation of Suspended Sentence and dismiss the petition for revocation. View "State v. Puccinelli" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the defendant, Johnathan James, who was convicted of felony Driving Under the Influence (DUI) and Driving While Suspended. The charges stemmed from an incident where James was found asleep in his running vehicle at a gas station, surrounded by empty alcohol containers. The arresting officer, Deputy Sheriff Derek Breiland, testified that James exhibited signs of intoxication, such as bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and inability to maintain balance during a field sobriety test. James' blood alcohol concentration was later determined to be 0.322 percent.Prior to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, the case was heard in the District Court of the Nineteenth Judicial District, Lincoln County. During the trial, the defense counsel questioned the arresting officer's observations and suggested that James could have started drinking after he had safely parked his vehicle. The defense also objected to the officer's testimony that James was in "actual physical control" of his vehicle, arguing that it was a legal conclusion that invaded the province of the jury. The District Court overruled the objection, and the jury convicted James on both charges.Upon review, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the arresting officer's testimony was admissible as lay opinion testimony under Montana Rule of Evidence 701. The court reasoned that the officer's testimony was based on his perception and was helpful to the jury in determining a fact in issue. The court also noted that the defense had opened the door for clarification about what factors constitute "actual physical control" under State v. Sommers, thus making the officer's testimony properly admitted lay opinion testimony. The court concluded that it was not an abuse of discretion to allow the officer to testify that James was in "actual physical control" of his vehicle. View "State v. James" on Justia Law