Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of sexual assault. Appellant moved that the district court sentence him to the misdemeanor penalty of a first conviction of sexual assault under Mont. Code Ann. 45-5-502(2)(a) rather than the felony penalty in section 45-5-502(3). The district court granted the motion, concluding that the misdemeanor penalty provided by section 45-5-502(2)(a) was the maximum sentence that could be imposed. The State appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the facts found by the jury constituted felony sexual assault under section 45-5-502(3), and therefore, the district court may proceed to sentencing under that provision. View "State v. Ghostbear" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Carri Robertson and Joseph Robertson were found guilty of criminal trespass and theft. The Supreme Court affirmed the theft convictions, vacated the trespass convictions, and remanded the written judgments to the district court for amendment, holding (1) the State presented sufficient evidence to convict the Robertsons of theft, but there was insufficient evidence to support the trespass convictions; (2) the Robertsons’ failure to preserve certain issues with a timely objection at trial was fatal to their claims; and (3) the written judgments did not conform to the oral pronouncement of sentences. View "State v. Robertson" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge of operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more. Defendant appealed, arguing that the municipal court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an investigative stop. Specifically, Defendant claimed that the ordinances of the City of Missoula that impose a $500 fine for refusing to give a breath sample were invalid and that the arresting officer unlawfully administered a breath test despite her initial refusal. The district court affirmed the decision of the municipal court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Missoula has authority to enact ordinances creating a misdemeanor penalty for the refusal to submit to a requested breath test; (2) the arresting officer did not violate statutory procedures by administering a post-arrest breath test with Defendant’s consent; and (3) the Missoula ordinances criminalizing the refusal to submit to a breath test do not unconstitutionally impair Defendant’s freedom of speech. View "City of Missoula v. Armitage" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of sexual intercourse without consent and sexual assault. Appellant moved for a new trial and acquittal, arguing, among other things, that testimony at trial failed to bear out the prosecution’s theory that a newspaper article reporting that Appellant had been accused of molesting a five-year-old boy prompted the complainant’s disclosure, and that the unfair prejudice caused by testimony about the newspaper article outweighed its probative value. The district court vacated the sexual assault conviction and denied the motion with respect to the remaining issues. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the probative value of the evidence regarding the newspaper article was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and should have been excluded. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Franks" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict finding Defendant guilty of the sexual assault of the seven-year-old daughter of Defendant’s girlfriend. Defendant subsequently moved the district court to sentence him to the misdemeanor penalty for a first conviction of sexual assault under Mont. Code Ann. 45-5-502(2)(a), arguing that the felony penalty in section 45-5-502(3) did not apply because the jury did not make a finding that the victim was younger than sixteen and a finding that Defendant was more than three years older. The district court concluded that Defendant could not be sentenced to the enhanced penalty for felony sexual assault because the jury had not made a factual finding as to the ages of the victim and Defendant as required by Apprendi v. New Jersey. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the requirements of Apprendi were met in this case because, by following the instructions and by returning a guilty verdict, the jury necessarily found as facts the respective ages of Defendant and the victim.View "State v. Ghostbear" on Justia Law

Martin Vincent Lau was charged with deliberate homicide. Lau claimed that the fatal shooting was an act of self-defense. Lau sought to offer his own out-of-court statement to prove that at the time of the shooting, he knew of specific instances of violence by the victim. The State moved in limine to prohibit Lau from introducing the statement on hearsay grounds. Lau, in turn, argued that the exclusion of his statement would limit his ability to put forth a defense and that he would be required to testify in order to establish his knowledge of specific instances of conduct by the victim. The district court ruled that Lau would be permitted to cross-examine witnesses about the victim's specific acts of violence and Lau’s knowledge of those acts, as contained in his statement. The Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for writ of supervisory control, holding that the Montana Rules of Evidence did not permit Lau to offer his own out-of-court statement in support of his claim of justifiable use of force.View "State v. District Court" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with trespass to property and possession of dangerous drugs, both misdemeanor offenses. Defendant subsequently decided to enroll in the Mineral County Treatment Court. Defendant was aware that he could be sanctioned with incarceration if he was dishonest during his participation in the Treatment Court. During his participation in the Treatment Court Defendant tested positive for drug use and was interviewed by the Treatment Team regarding the results. Subsequently, a member of the Treatment Team sent a report to law enforcement detailing the information he learned from the interviews with Defendant. Defendant was subsequently charged with distribution of dangerous drugs and two counts of possession of dangerous drugs. Defendant filed motions to suppress and dismiss, arguing that the State violated the confidentiality provision of Mont. Code Ann. 46-1-1111(4) and his Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination by disclosing the confidential Treatment Court material to law enforcement. The district court denied the motions. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motions to suppress and dismiss, holding that the State violated section 46-1-1111(4) by disclosing confidential drug testing information to law enforcement in order to investigate a new criminal offense.View "State v. Plouffe" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of deliberate homicide. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction on appeal. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief alleging that the State had failed to disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence relevant to the case in violation of Brady v. Maryland and that his trial attorneys failed to provide effective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly denied Defendant’s postconviction petition because the petition did not fulfill the elements of a Brady violation; and (2) any alleged error on the part of trial counsel did not prejudice Defendant, and therefore, the trial court did not err in concluding that Defendant had not received ineffective assistance of counsel.View "McGarvey v. State" on Justia Law

In 2011, Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and disorderly conduct. Defendant pleaded not guilty and requested a jury trial. The trial court later informed Defendant that his scheduled trial was rescheduled because an older case had been set for trial on the same day. Before his rescheduled trial, Defendant moved to have his case dismissed for lack of a speedy trial. The municipal court granted the motion. The district court reversed. On remand, Defendant was convicted of DUI and acquitted of disorder conduct. The Supreme Court reversed the district court ruling reversing the municipal court’s dismissal of the charges, holding that the City failed to meet its burden of showing “good cause” for the delay in bringing Defendant to trial.View "City of Helena v. Broadwater" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of theft by a common scheme stemming from the theft of property from a salvage yard owned by Robert Appley. After a hearing, the district court ordered Defendant to pay a total of $31,878 to the victims. Defendant appealed the court’s order for restitution. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Defendant did not preserve his objection to the award of restitution for two victims based on their lack of affidavits or testimony; and (2) the district court’s restitution order to Appley for the value of scrap metal, road repairs, miscellaneous parts and radiators was supported by substantial evidence, but the court’s calculation of restitution for Appley for the value of two aluminum boats and a 1951 GMC truck was not supported by substantial evidence. Remanded.View "State v. Simpson" on Justia Law