Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of two counts of incest, one count of solicitation, and one count of sexual abuse of children. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in denying his discovery requests for information contained in the Department of Public Health and Human Services (DPHHS) files of his two victims without first conducting an in camera review. The Supreme Court agreed with Defendant and ordered the case remanded to the district court to conduct an in camera review of the victims’ DPHHS files, holding that Defendant’s request was sufficient to invoke his right to potentially exculpatory information in the DPHHS files, and once he invoked that right, it was the trial court’s duty to conduct an in camera review to ascertain whether there was any exculpatory evidence in the files. View "State v. Johnston" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. During trial, the State presented no evidence that Defendant drove while under the influence but rather presented evidence intended to prove Defendant was in “actual physical control” of his truck when a police officer found him passed out at the wheel. Defendant appealed, arguing that because his vehicle was disabled in such a way that he could not move it, he could not be in actual physical control of his vehicle for purposes of the DUI statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court improperly instructed the jury: “It does not matter that the vehicle is incapable of movement”; and (2) the instruction prejudicially affected Defendant’s substantial rights by preventing the jury from considering a valid defense. View "State v. Sommers" on Justia Law

On May 4, 2010, Defendant was arrested and cited with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), driving while license suspended, and traveling the wrong way on a one-way street. On September 18, 2012, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. The justice court denied Defendant’s motion, concluding that the six-month limit of Mont. Code Ann. 46-13-401(2) had not been violated because most of the delay was attributable to Defendant. After a trial at which Defendant failed to appear, the justice court found Defendant guilty of DUI per se and driving the wrong direction on a one-way street. Defendant appealed, challenging the denial of his motion to dismiss. The district court affirmed, concluding that Defendant had disengaged from the process, and therefore, Defendant’s right to a speedy trial had not been violated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly refused to reverse the justice court’s decision, as Defendant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated. View "State v. Hodge" on Justia Law

The State charged Appellant, a forty-year-old developmentally disabled man, with three counts of felony sexual intercourse without consent and one count of felony sexual assault. Appellant pleaded guilty to sexual assault, and the district court accepted the plea. The district court subsequently sentenced Appellant to forty years imprisonment. Nearly one year after issuance of an amended judgment, Appellant moved to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court concluded that Appellant’s motion was timely brought but refused to allow Appellant to withdraw his guilty plea, finding it had been entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s motion to withdraw plea was not time-barred; and (2) the district court did not err when it concluded that Appellant’s guilty plea was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. View "State v. Garner" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to criminal endangerment, driving under the influence, and being a habitual traffic offender operating a motor vehicle. The district court sentenced Defendant to a three-year suspended sentence, a fine, and participation in Adult Impaired Driving Court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s felony criminal endangerment charge did not qualify as an exception to the prior felony conviction rule, and therefore, Defendant did not qualify for a deferred sentence; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to specific performance of the original plea agreement that recommended a three-year deferred sentence because he had a prior felony conviction that was not discovered until after the plea agreement was executed. View "State v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with aggravated assault or, in the alternative, criminal endangerment. At the close of the State’s case-in-chief, Defendant moved to dismiss for insufficient evidence, arguing that the State had not met its burden of proving that Defendant was not justified in his use of force. The district court denied the motion. A jury found Defendant guilty of criminal endangerment and not guilty of aggravated assault. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State presented sufficient evidence to prove that Defendant was not justified in his use of force, and therefore, the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving the jury an “aggressor” instruction pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 45-3-105(2)(a). View "State v. Erickson" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded not guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol, obstructing a peace officer, and driving while license suspended. Defendant filed two motions to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial, contending that the City had not diligently prosecuted the case. The municipal court denied both motions, concluding that Defendant’s conduct had caused the delay. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of obstructing a police officer and driving while license suspended. The district court affirmed the municipal court’s orders. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the municipal court did not err in denying Defendant’s motions to dismiss, as Defendant’s rights to a speedy trial were not violated. View "City of Kalispell v. Gabbert" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with misdemeanor DUI in city court. After the prosecution discovered Defendant had three prior DUIs, the city court transferred the case to the district court but failed to dismiss the misdemeanor. Thereafter, Defendant moved to dismiss on the basis that the misdemeanor was not brought to trial within six months of arraignment. The city court denied Defendant’s motion, concluding that there was no speedy trial violation because the case had been transferred to the district court. The State subsequently charged Defendant with felony DUI, and the city court dismissed the misdemeanor charge. Defendant argued that the city court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss. The district court agreed that the prosecution failed to follow the proper procedure when it transferred the case from city court to district court but concluded that the procedural flaw did not affect Defendant’s rights. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding that Defendant suffered no violation of his right to a trial within six months of arraignment because he moved for a postponement of the original trial date. View "State v. Christensen" on Justia Law

In 2012, Defendant pleaded guilty to bad check and bail jumping charges. The State thereafter charged Defendant with two new offenses of bail jumping for failing to appear at two sentencing proceedings in 2010 and 2011. Defendant moved to dismiss the new charges, alleging that they constituted vindictive prosecution. The district court denied Defendant’s motion, concluding that the subsequent bail jumping offenses, which had been discussed in prior plea negotiations, fell within the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Defendant pled guilty to the new bail jumping charges but reserved his right to appeal the vindictive prosecution issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no support for a finding of vindictive prosecution. View "State v. Ridge" on Justia Law

In 2007, Plaintiff was convicted of several sex-related crimes. In 2008, Plaintiff was sentenced to thirty-five years imprisonment. In 2013, Plaintiff filed a pro se claim against Defendant, the attorney who defended him during his criminal trial, claiming that Defendant failed to meet the appropriate standard of care for legal representation by failing to secure certain testimony at trial. The district court dismissed the lawsuit, concluding that Plaintiff’s claim was time-barred under the three-year statute of limitations for legal malpractice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Defendant on the grounds that Plaintiff’s claim was time barred by Mont. Code Ann. 27-2-206. View "Passmore v. Watson" on Justia Law