Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

On March 5, 2012, Appellant was charged with bail jumping. On April 19, 2012, Appellant pleaded guilty to the offense. On June 27, 2013, Appellant was sentenced for bail jumping. Appellant appealed the judgment of conviction and sentence, arguing that the fourteen-month delay between entry of his guilty plea and sentencing violated his speedy trial rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the constitutional right to a speedy trial does not extend from conviction to sentencing, but a criminal defendant does have a constitutional and statutory due process right to have sentence imposed in a timely manner; (2) because Appellant failed to assert a statutory claim, only his constitutional violation would be considered; and (3) although the delay in Appellant’s sentencing was unacceptable, Appellant’s prejudice from the delay was neither substantial nor demonstrable, and therefore, the unacceptable delay did not warrant finding a constitutional due process violation. View "State v. Betterman" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to fraudulently obtaining dangerous drugs. The district court stayed sentencing until Defendant completed a twelve-month drug and alcohol addiction treatment program. After completing the treatment program, Defendant relapsed and was taken into custody. At sentencing, Defendant requested that the district court give her credit for the time she spent in the treatment program. The district court denied the request. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err in denying Defendant credit for time served in the residential treatment facility, as Defendant’s enrollment in the program was not the equivalent to incarceration; and (2) erred in its order as it pertained to Defendant’s payment of defense counsel fees, as the court’s oral pronouncement of sentence pertaining to the counsel fees conflicted with the corresponding provision in the written judgment. View "State v. Byrd" on Justia Law

In 2009, the municipal court granted the petition filed by the mother of A.L. for an order of protection restraining Defendant from being near A.L. From 2009 until 2012, A.L. received counseling for alleged sexual abuse by Defendant. In 2012, Defendant was found guilty of one count of violating an order of protection. The district court ordered Defendant to pay restitution for all of A.L.’s counseling. Defendant appealed the restitution order, arguing that the district court erred by ordering him to pay restitution for losses that were not caused by his violation of the order of protection. The Supreme Court vacated the order, holding that the district court erred by ordering restitution for counseling expenses that did not result from Defendant’s violation of the order of protection. Remanded. View "State v. Thorpe" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI). Defendant was arraigned on May 23, 2012, and trial was set for August 27, 2012. Defendant’s trial, however, was postponed upon his motion to vacate the initial trial date for a change of plea. On October 1, 2012, the municipal court rearraigned Defendant, and he pled not guilty to the DUI. Defendant subsequently moved to dismiss on the grounds that his right to a speedy trial had been violated. The municipal court summarily denied Defendant’s motion without conducting any analysis. Defendant moved for reconsideration of his motion to dismiss under both the misdemeanor speedy trial statute and constitutional speedy-trial provisions. On May 9, 2013, Defendant pled guilty to DUI. The district court denied Defendant’s appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant’s statutory speedy-trial right was not violated because his motion to vacate his trial date for a change of plea made the misdemeanor speedy-trial statute inapplicable; but (2) in regards to Defendant's constitutional speedy-trial violation claim, the delay in Defendant’s case was sufficient to trigger analysis under the factors set forth in State v. Ariegwe. Remanded. View "City of Helena v. Heppner" on Justia Law

After Defendant was discharged from prison, he was required to register as a sexual offender. The State later charged Defendant with failure to give notice of change of address. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted and sentenced to 100 years in the Montana State Prison, with sixty years suspended. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim must be raised in a petition for postconviction relief; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the jury to review a portion of the trial transcript during deliberation; and (3) the written judgment unlawfully increased Defendant’s sentence. Remanded. View "State v. Greene" on Justia Law

In 1988, Defendant pled guilty to sexual intercourse without consent and was sentenced to thirty years imprisonment with ten years suspended. In 1992, Defendant escaped from prison. After he was apprehended, he was convicted with escape and other charges. In 2007, Defendant was discharged to serve the suspended portion of his sentence. In 2011, the district court orally found that Defendant had substantially violated the conditions of his parole. The court then imposed a new sentence of ten years with all time suspended and imposed fourteen new conditions to Defendant’s suspended sentence. Thereafter, the district court revoked Defendant’s suspended sentence, sentenced Defendant to ten years imprisonment with five years suspended, and reimposed the fourteen new conditions on his suspended sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the imposition of fourteen new conditions on Defendant’s suspended sentence for his 1988 crime did not violate ex post facto principles. Remanded. View "State v. Piller" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of sexual assault and sexual intercourse without consent. Defendant appealed, raising three allegations of error. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the State to elicit testimony from Defendant’s girlfriend and others who knew the couple regarding Defendant’s sexual habits. Further, the tainted evidence was inflammatory in nature and likely contributed to Defendant’s conviction. The district court further erred by permitting a primary investigator to act as both a representative of the State and a witness during trial. Remanded. View "State v. Nichols" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of accountability for robbery. Defendant was sentenced to thirty years imprisonment with ten years suspended and ordered to pay restitution in an unspecified amount. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and remanded in part, holding that the district court (1) properly instructed the jury on accountability for robbery; (2) did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence; and (3) erred in requesting that correctional authorities determine restitution upon Defendant’s release. Remanded for a determination of the amount of restitution Defendant owed for the victim’s medical expenses. View "State v. Hanna" on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial, Defendant was found guilty of assault with a weapon and sentenced to twenty years with the Department of Public Health and Human Services. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court (1) erred when it determined that he was not mentally fit to stand trial at a fitness proceeding in which he was not present, and (2) erred by failing to complete the initial appearance process. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant was not prejudiced by his absence from the fitness proceeding; and (2) Defendant was not prejudiced by the district court’s failure to provide the advisories in Mont. Code Ann. 46-7-102. View "State v. White" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was found guilty of assault with a weapon and sentenced to twenty years with the Department of Public Health and Human Services. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred by determining that he was not mentally fit to stand trial at a hearing in which he was not present and by failing to complete the initial appearance process. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) even if Defendant was improperly excluded from the proceeding at which his fitness to proceed was determined, his absence from the proceeding did not render the result unjust or unfair; and (2) Defendant was not prejudiced by the district court’s failure to provide the advisories in Mont. Code Ann. 46-7-102. View "State v. White" on Justia Law