Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant pled no contest to the charge of possession of dangerous drugs with intent to distribute, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress and from the final judgment ordering him to pay the cost of his interpreter and imposing a ten-percent administration fee. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded, holding that the district court (1) correctly determined that the arresting officer had particularized suspicion to stop Defendant’s vehicle; (2) erred by ordering Defendant to pay the costs of his interpreter; and (3) erred when it imposed the ten-percent administration fee on Defendant. View "State v. Duong" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with aggravated assault, criminal mischief, and elder abuse for his conduct during one incident. Defendant filed a pretrial motion requesting that the court order the State to elect between prosecuting him for either aggravated assault or elder abuse, arguing that his federal double jeopardy protections and the protections of Montana’s “multiple charges” statute would be violated if he were prosecuted for both offenses. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the elder abuse statute was neither a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault nor a specific instance of aggravated assault. The Supreme Court dismissed Defendant’s appeal, holding (1) Defendant may be prosecuted for more than one offense arising out of the same transaction; and (2) Defendant’s double jeopardy claim and reliance on the protections of the multiple charges statute were premature. View "State v. Violette" on Justia Law

Missoula County Sheriff’s Department (MCSD) deputies accompanied Christine Robutka to a rural property to assist with a civil standby while Robutka removed her belongings from the property. Robutka had been sharing a residence on the property with two men, including Defendant. While assisting with the civil standby, the deputies observed marijuana plants at the property. Robutka subsequently told detectives that Defendant was growing marijuana at the property. Thereafter, MCSD deputies obtained a warrant to search the property and executed the search, which resulted in the seizure of multiple adult marijuana plants. Defendant was charged with cultivating marijuana. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence gathered from the civil standby on the search. The district court denied the motion to suppress, and Defendant eventually pleaded guilty. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress and his resulting conviction, holding that the deputies did not violate Defendant’s constitutional rights when they entered the driveway to conduct the civil standby, and the plain view observation of marijuana plants by MCSD deputies provided probable cause for the search warrant. View "State v. Urziceanu" on Justia Law

Fire Insurance Exchange (FIE) insured Defendant’s home in Clancy, Montana. When Defendant’s home was broken into and robbed, Defendant made a claim under her homeowner’s policy. FIE paid Defendant $22,602, representing property damage and actual cash value for the items Defendant claimed were stolen from the home. Defendant then submitted a supplemental claim in the amount of $23,102 for personal property she asserted she had replaced. When FIE concluded that the receipts Defendant provided to substantiate her replacement claims were fraudulent, FIE made a referral for criminal charges. Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to felony insurance fraud and theft. The district court ordered Defendant to pay restitution to FIE in the amount of $22,602. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it ordered Defendant to pay restitution to FIE even where Defendant’s initial claim was legitimate because Defendant’s subsequent fraudulent replacement value claim voided her policy, and FIE suffered a pecuniary loss in the amount of Defendant’s initial claim. View "State v. Henderson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of sexual intercourse without consent. Based upon the post-trial statements of the alleged victim, Defendant filed a request for a new trial. The district court denied the request, concluding that the motion was time-barred and that no exception to the time bar applied. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion when, in considering whether Defendant was entitled to a new trial, it failed to apply State v. Clark (Clark I) factors and instead directed Defendant to pursue postconviction relief to address the alleged victim’s post-trial statements; and (2) after applying the Clark I factors to the alleged victim’s post-trial statements in this case, it is clear the district court abused its discretion in denying a new trial. View "State v. Morse" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to criminal trespass and theft. The district court revoked a suspended sentence Defendant had received from an earlier conviction and committed him to the Department of Corrections for five years, with two years suspended. The court ordered that the sentence run consecutive to another sentence Defendant was serving. Defendant did not challenge the legality of his sentence through a direct appeal to the Supreme Court. Instead, Defendant filed a Mont. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for relief from the judgment. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Defendant did not perfect his appeal within the relevant timeframe, he was precluded from challenging his sentence with the Supreme Court. View "State v. Osborn" on Justia Law

On March 5, 2012, Appellant was charged with bail jumping. On April 19, 2012, Appellant pleaded guilty to the offense. On June 27, 2013, Appellant was sentenced for bail jumping. Appellant appealed the judgment of conviction and sentence, arguing that the fourteen-month delay between entry of his guilty plea and sentencing violated his speedy trial rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the constitutional right to a speedy trial does not extend from conviction to sentencing, but a criminal defendant does have a constitutional and statutory due process right to have sentence imposed in a timely manner; (2) because Appellant failed to assert a statutory claim, only his constitutional violation would be considered; and (3) although the delay in Appellant’s sentencing was unacceptable, Appellant’s prejudice from the delay was neither substantial nor demonstrable, and therefore, the unacceptable delay did not warrant finding a constitutional due process violation. View "State v. Betterman" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to fraudulently obtaining dangerous drugs. The district court stayed sentencing until Defendant completed a twelve-month drug and alcohol addiction treatment program. After completing the treatment program, Defendant relapsed and was taken into custody. At sentencing, Defendant requested that the district court give her credit for the time she spent in the treatment program. The district court denied the request. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err in denying Defendant credit for time served in the residential treatment facility, as Defendant’s enrollment in the program was not the equivalent to incarceration; and (2) erred in its order as it pertained to Defendant’s payment of defense counsel fees, as the court’s oral pronouncement of sentence pertaining to the counsel fees conflicted with the corresponding provision in the written judgment. View "State v. Byrd" on Justia Law

In 2009, the municipal court granted the petition filed by the mother of A.L. for an order of protection restraining Defendant from being near A.L. From 2009 until 2012, A.L. received counseling for alleged sexual abuse by Defendant. In 2012, Defendant was found guilty of one count of violating an order of protection. The district court ordered Defendant to pay restitution for all of A.L.’s counseling. Defendant appealed the restitution order, arguing that the district court erred by ordering him to pay restitution for losses that were not caused by his violation of the order of protection. The Supreme Court vacated the order, holding that the district court erred by ordering restitution for counseling expenses that did not result from Defendant’s violation of the order of protection. Remanded. View "State v. Thorpe" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI). Defendant was arraigned on May 23, 2012, and trial was set for August 27, 2012. Defendant’s trial, however, was postponed upon his motion to vacate the initial trial date for a change of plea. On October 1, 2012, the municipal court rearraigned Defendant, and he pled not guilty to the DUI. Defendant subsequently moved to dismiss on the grounds that his right to a speedy trial had been violated. The municipal court summarily denied Defendant’s motion without conducting any analysis. Defendant moved for reconsideration of his motion to dismiss under both the misdemeanor speedy trial statute and constitutional speedy-trial provisions. On May 9, 2013, Defendant pled guilty to DUI. The district court denied Defendant’s appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant’s statutory speedy-trial right was not violated because his motion to vacate his trial date for a change of plea made the misdemeanor speedy-trial statute inapplicable; but (2) in regards to Defendant's constitutional speedy-trial violation claim, the delay in Defendant’s case was sufficient to trigger analysis under the factors set forth in State v. Ariegwe. Remanded. View "City of Helena v. Heppner" on Justia Law