Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2002, Defendant was convicted of sexual intercourse without consent. In 2010, the victim recanted his accusations in writing. Based upon those recantations, Defendant filed a petition for postconviction relief seeking a new trial. The district court denied the petition. The court predicated its decision upon the concurring opinion in State v. Beach (Beach II) and decided that the victim’s recantation did not definitively establish that Defendant was innocent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in grounding its rejection of Defendant’s petition upon the Beach II concurrence; and (2) a district court shall apply the statutory test set forth in Mont. Code Ann. 46-21-102(2) in determining the disposition of a timely filed petition for postconviction relief based upon newly discovered evidence and shall do so in accordance with the provisions of section 46-21-102(2) and -201 and this opinion. Remanded. View "Marble v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged in municipal court with misdemeanor cruelty to animals. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty. The district court affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the district court erred when it affirmed the municipal court decision allowing a witness to testify via Skype. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation was not violated under the circumstances of this case by the district court’s decision to allow the Skype testimony; and (2) the district court erred in concluding that Mont. R. Evid. 611(e) was “generally applicable to civil actions and not criminal cases,” but the error was harmless. View "City of Missoula v. Duane" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with failure to give notice of change of home residence as a registered sex offender. Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Defendant pleaded nolo contendere to the charge. Thereafter, Defendant was arrested for a subsequent offense. Because Defendant breached the plea agreement by being arrested, the district court allowed the State to deviate from its sentencing recommendation. Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his plea, arguing that the plea agreement was null and void. The district court denied the motion to withdraw and sentenced Defendant to five years at Montana State Prison. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, where Defendant’s plea was entered voluntarily, with knowledge that the district court could impose the sentence he ultimately received, good cause to allow withdrawal of Defendant’s plea of nolo contendere was not shown. View "State v. Warner" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of criminal endangerment and one count of assaulting a peace officer. Before the sentencing hearing, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. The district court denied the motion and sentenced Defendant to a total of thirty years with five years suspended. Defendant appealed, arguing that his right to a speedy trial was violated by pre-trial and pre-sentencing delays. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because this case was pending on direct review when State v. Betterman was decided, the holding in Betterman retroactively applies; (2) Defendant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated as a result of excessive pre-trial delays caused by the State; and (3) Defendant’s right to due process was not violated as a result of post-conviction, pre-sentencing delays caused by the State. View "State v. Maloney" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was found guilty of driving under the influence (DUI) per se, fourth-offense, a felony. Before sentencing, Defendant moved to dismiss the felony DUI charge or, alternatively, to amend the charge to a misdemeanor, alleging in her supporting affidavit that her 2003 DUI conviction was constitutionally inform because she was not told that she had a right to an attorney, and therefore, the 2003 DUI could not be used to enhance her current DUI charge to a felony. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss after an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in concluding that Defendant could not submit an affidavit without being subject to cross-examination as to the affidavit’s contents, and therefore, Defendant suffered no prejudice from the district court compelling her to testify. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Legislature enacted the Montana 24/7 Sobriety Program Act, which permits a court, as a condition of pretrial release of an individual accused of a drunk driving offense, to require the individual to submit to twice-daily alcohol breath tests. The justice court in this case ordered Defendant to participate in the 24/7 Sobriety Program as a condition of his release on bond. Defendant missed three tests while enrolled in the program and was charged with criminal contempt for the missed tests. Defendant pleaded nolo contendere to the contempt charges. Defendant appealed to the district court and moved to dismiss the contempt charges. The district court granted the motion and concluded that the 24/7 Program was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the breath tests required by the 24/7 Sobriety Program constitute a search, but the search does not violate proscriptions against unreasonable searches; and (2) court-ordered enrollment in the 24/7 Program does not impose pretrial punishment or violate provisions against excessive bail, but the court is required to condition pretrial release on participation in the program only after conducting an individualized assessment to determine if each defendant is an appropriate candidate for the program. Remanded. View "State v. Spady" on Justia Law

In 2013, Defendant was charged with five counts of felony criminal endangerment and two counts of felony assault on a peace officer. Defendant later pleaded guilty to the charges. In 2014, the State filed a motion asking the court to set a sentencing hearing. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. The district court denied Defendant’s motion and sentenced him to a total of thirty years imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing that his right to a speedy trial was violated by pre-trial and pre-sentencing delays. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State did not violate Defendant’s right to a speedy trial through excessive pre-trial delay; and (2) although the sentencing delay was perhaps excessive, the State did not violate Defendant’s due process rights through sentencing delay. View "State v. Maloney" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of felony robbery. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that he was subject to pretrial punishment in violation of his due process rights as a result of a district court order issued following a “critical stage” hearing at which he was not present. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) Defendant’s pretrial punishment claim was raised for the first time on appeal and is therefore dismissed; (2) sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support Defendant’s conviction; and (3) the district court did not err in ruling that Defendant’s reliance on the affirmative defense of justifiable use of force required Defendant to testify at his trial. View "State v. R.S.A." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, the justice court convicted Defendant of the offense of acting as an outfitter without a license. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the justice court (1) abused its discretion in denying Defendant’s challenge for cause of a prospective juror; (2) the justice court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the State’s motion in limine prohibiting Defendant from presenting evidence to the jury regarding the circumstances surrounding suspension of his outfitters license; and (3) the justice court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant, as the sentence was legal under the applicable sentencing statutes. View "State v. Kebble" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of two counts of deliberate homicide. The presentence investigation report (PSI) recommended that Defendant be given two consecutive 100-year sentences and that the cost of appointed counsel be assigned to Defendant. The district court accepted the PSI recommendations. Defendant objected to the cost of appointed counsel, arguing that she was indigent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court adequately questioned Defendant regarding her ability to pay the costs of appointed counsel; (2) the district court determined that Defendant had or would have the ability to pay the costs of appointed counsel; (3) Defendant’s constitutional right to a jury trial was not undermined by requiring her to pay the costs of appointed counsel; and (4) the absence of an itemization of costs of appointed counsel was not properly preserved for appeal. View "State v. Gable" on Justia Law