Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2001, Appellant pled guilty to robbery. Since then, the district court revoked Appellant’s sentence three times. The latest revocation occurred in 2015. Appellant appealed, asserting that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the revocation of his sentence on the grounds that the State did not comply with the statutory procedure set forth in Mont. Code Ann. 46-23-1012(2). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to dismiss the petition to revoke, as the State complied with the plain meaning of the statute. View "State v. Rossbach" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant with thirty-five counts of violating an order of protection. Defendant moved to dismiss thirty-four of the thirty-five counts on the grounds that the offenses were a continuing course of conduct rather than a series of individual crimes. The district court denied the motion. Defendant then entered a plea agreement with the State under which the State dropped all charges of violating an order of protection. Defendant instead entered a guilty plea to one count of felony stalking. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss. View "State v. Allen" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to an amended charge of criminal endangerment for having sexual intercourse with A.C., a fourteen-year-old, which resulted in A.C. becoming pregnant and giving birth to twins. The district court ordered Defendant to pay $35,667 in restitution to A.C.’s mother, which included $25,000 A.C.’s mother, D.C., claimed as lost wages due to the leave of absence she took from work to care for A.C. and the twins after the twins were born. Defendant appealed, challenging the restitution order and several of the conditions of his probation. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s restitution order, holding that the court did not err in awarding D.C. $25,000 in lost wages; and (2) reversed several of the probation conditions due to various errors. View "State v. Brave" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of criminal distribution of dangerous drugs, endangering the welfare of children, and incest for giving methamphetamine to his daughter, S.K., allowing her to ingest methamphetamine while in his care, and having sexual intercourse or sexual contact with her. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and sentence, holding (1) the district court did not err by concluding that S.K. was not legally accountable for Kline’s incest; and (2) the State presented sufficient evidence to the jury corroborating S.K.’s testimony regarding incest, and therefore, the district court properly denied Defendant’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal based on the State’s failure to present corroborating evidence. View "State v. Kline" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with aggravated kidnapping, burglary, intimidation and escape. During the ensuing jury trial, Defendant appeared wearing a security leg brace. Defendant requested that the sheriff’s deputies remove his brace, but the district court denied the request, concluding that the leg brace was concealed enough that it did not prejudice Defendant. The jury found Defendant guilty of aggravated kidnapping, intimidation, and escape. The district court sentenced Defendant to forty years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s request to order sheriff’s deputies to remove the security brace from Defendant’s leg during trial, holding that the district court abused its discretion by failing to apply the test set forth in State v. Herrick before denying Defendant’s request to remove his leg brace, but the error was harmless. View "State v. Rickett" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to felony burglary. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant and erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made to law enforcement officers. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence found in his home pursuant to a search warrant; and (2) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress statements he made while in custody and statements he made while being interrogated. View "State v. Kasparek" on Justia Law

Appellant entered a no-contest plea to felony incest and, in 2004, received a twenty-year suspended sentence. Appellant later pleaded guilty to two counts of felony sexual assault and, in 2007, was sentenced to twenty years ‘ imprisonment with ten years suspended for each felony, to run consecutively. Appellant subsequently filed numerous postconviction pleadings, all to no avail. In 2015, Appellant filed a motion to vacate his conviction and dismiss the charges. The district court summarily denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the doctrine of res judicata applied to Defendant’s appeal and barred the rehearing of issues already litigated. View "Montgomery v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated assault, criminal endangerment, and assault on a minor. Defendant was sentenced to thirty-five years in the Montana State Prison. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court committed reversible error when it declined to provide jury instructions proposed by Defendant on accomplice liability pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 26-1-303(4). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in not giving Defendant’s proposed instruction on accomplice liability. View "State v. Charlo-Whitworth" on Justia Law

In 1990, Gregg and her four-year-old son, Aaron, moved into Hanson’s home. They moved out in 1992. After they broke up, Gregg became concerned about Aaron's nightmares and anger, bed-wetting, locking the door when he bathed, and hiding when someone came to the door. Gregg contacted Detective Lamb, who interviewed Aaron, who testified that he and Hanson would shower together and wash each other’s genital areas and that Aaron performed oral sex on Hanson. Hanson was convicted of sexual assault and deviate sexual conduct, MCA 45-5-502(1); 45-5-505(1), and sentenced to 20 years.The Montana Supreme Court affirmed. After his pro se petition for state post-conviction relief was rejected, Hanson’s federal habeas petition was dismissed as procedurally defaulted. The Ninth Circuit affirmed in 2003. In 2012, by counsel, Hanson sought a hearing on "newly discovered evidence" that potential witnesses had contacted Lamb (now deceased) and told her Gregg was lying; Lamb told these witnesses “to stay away” and did not inform Hanson’s attorney. The petition claimed voicemails left by Gregg should have been played for the jury because they indicated she was angry with Hanson for ending their relationship. Because of a warrant for his arrest, Hanson failed to appear for three scheduled depositions. The district court dismissed Hanson’s petition. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, noting that Hanson had been warned of the possible sanction and the prejudice to the state. View "Hanson v. State" on Justia Law

At 1:37 a.m., Haddad reported to Missoula 911 that he was driving on Hillview when a black Acura 2.0 CL with gold badging pulled out in front of him; that the driver was swerving; that he could not describe the driver due to the vehicle’s tinted windows nor see the license plate; and that he would “possibly” be willing to sign a complaint. He provided his name and phone number, but declined to provide his address, indicating he was willing to be contacted by law enforcement. Officers Jones and Horton responded; on Hillview, Horton passed a vehicle that fit Haddad’s description. Jones saw it turn onto 34th Street, searched the area and found a black Acura 2.0 CL in an apartment complex parking lot. Tye was standing near the vehicle. Jones observed that she was swaying, had watery eyes and slow, slurred speech, and smelled of alcohol, and determined Tye was intoxicated. Tye admitted she had several drinks before driving down Hillview. Jones arrested her, then discovered that Haddad lied about his location. Haddad admitted calling 911 from his residence after Tye left that location intoxicated. Haddad did not want Tye to know he was the complainant. The court heard evidence that 911 dispatchers do not regularly use the GPS system, but rely on the information callers provide because it is more accurate, concluded that Jones reasonably relied on Haddad’s information, and denied a motion to suppress. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, based on the “Pratt” factors: whether the informant identifies himself and exposes himself to criminal and civil liability if the report is false; whether the report is based on the informant’s personal observations; and whether the officer’s own observations corroborated the informant’s information. View "Missoula v. Tye" on Justia Law