Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Defendant’s motion in limine to exclude evidence at trial that his wages were being garnished and an order requiring Defendant to pay nearly $65,000 in restitution plus statutory and administration fees. The court held (1) the district court did not err when it denied Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found that Defendant’s wage garnishment was admissible evidence under Mont. R. Evid. 404(b); and (3) there was substantial evidence to support the district court’s restitution order. View "State v. Ailer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Defendant’s motion in limine to exclude evidence at trial that his wages were being garnished and an order requiring Defendant to pay nearly $65,000 in restitution plus statutory and administration fees. The court held (1) the district court did not err when it denied Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found that Defendant’s wage garnishment was admissible evidence under Mont. R. Evid. 404(b); and (3) there was substantial evidence to support the district court’s restitution order. View "State v. Ailer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction of felony aggravated assault, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of a doctor who examined the victim.After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of felony aggravated assault for strangling Michelle Allen, his domestic partner. During trial, over Defendant’s objection, the district court admitted testimony from an emergency room physician about Allen’s statements during her examination after the attack. On appeal, Defendant argued that the doctor’s testimony violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause and was not admissible under the under the hearsay exception for information related to medical examinations under Mont. R. Evid. 803(4). The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the doctor’s testimony concerning the victim’s out-of-court statements did not violate Defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights; and (2) the doctor’s testimony met the Rule 803(4) hearsay exception as a statement made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. View "State v. Porter" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction for aggravated driving under the influence and related offenses, holding that the State did not deny Defendant due process of law by failing to provide Computer Online Breath Records Archive (COBRA) data underlying Defendant’s breath test, and the municipal court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant’s motion to exclude breath evidence.During the DUI proceedings, Defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude her Intoxilyzer 8000 breath test results or dismiss her DUI charge as a sanction against the City of Missoula for failing to produce requested COBRA data. The municipal court denied the motion to exclude. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the municipal court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to exclude, and the district court did not err in affirming. View "State v. Jeffries" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction for sexual intercourse without consent, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving the deadlocked jury an Allen-instruction.During Defendant’s second jury trial, the jury sent a note to the judge six hours into deliberation asking when it could determine it was deadlocked because the jurors were unable to agree on a verdict. The State requested the revised Allen-instruction in State v. Norquay, 248 P.3d 817 (Mont. 2011). Defendant objected, requesting that the judge accept the jury as deadlocked because the six-hour deliberation indicated that the jury had diligently considered the case. The court overruled the objection and gave the jury an instruction nearly identical to Norquay’s revised Allen-instruction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Norquay’s revised Allen-instruction was appropriately given because it was not coercive. View "State v. Santiago" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction for sexual intercourse without consent, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving the deadlocked jury an Allen-instruction.During Defendant’s second jury trial, the jury sent a note to the judge six hours into deliberation asking when it could determine it was deadlocked because the jurors were unable to agree on a verdict. The State requested the revised Allen-instruction in State v. Norquay, 248 P.3d 817 (Mont. 2011). Defendant objected, requesting that the judge accept the jury as deadlocked because the six-hour deliberation indicated that the jury had diligently considered the case. The court overruled the objection and gave the jury an instruction nearly identical to Norquay’s revised Allen-instruction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Norquay’s revised Allen-instruction was appropriately given because it was not coercive. View "State v. Santiago" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the district court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to modify his criminal judgment “as to financial obligations.”Appellant was convicted of criminal endangerment. At the sentencing hearing, the State sought significant restitution for the victim. Appellant argued that the case involved liability issues more appropriately addressed in civil litigation initiated by the victim. The district court determined that imposition of full restitution in Appellant’s sentence was mandatory and also imposed an administrative fee. After the civil lawsuit was settled, Appellant filed a motion to amend the judgment regarding his financial obligations within the criminal action, requesting that the district court waive the restitution administrative fee in light of the promptness of the settlement and find that, based on civil releases, a restitution condition had been satisfied as to two parties. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme court affirmed the district court’s denial of Appellant’s request for modification or satisfaction of the criminal judgment to reflect his civil settlement but reversed the district court’s order denying all relief, holding that the district court’s order contained a factual error regarding the amount received by the victim in the civil settlement relative to the restitution he was ordered to receive. View "Erickson v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Appellant’s request for substitution of counsel in this criminal proceeding.Appellant pleaded guilty to deliberate homicide. Thereafter, Appellant made a request for substitution of counsel. After a hearing, the district court deemed the representation matter resolved because the Office of the State Public Defender denied Appellant’s request for new counsel and Appellant had not appealed that decision. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the district court failed adequately to inquire into Defendant’s complaints regarding his counsel, which necessitated a remand. On remand, the district court issued an order again denying Appellant’s request for substitution of counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it inquired into Appellant’s complaints of ineffective assistance of counsel and in denying his request for substitution of counsel. View "State v. Schowengerdt" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction of sexual intercourse without consent, holding that the State presented sufficient evidence to prove the elements of penetration and force.Defendant was convicted of sexual intercourse without consent after he rubbed a female client’s genitals during a massage treatment session. On appeal, Defendant argued that the testimony of clitoral rubbing did not prove that the vulva was penetrated and that the State did not present evidence that Defendant used force to compel Defendant to submit to sexual intercourse. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s guilty verdict. View "State v. Lerman" on Justia Law

Shayna Hubbard appealed a district court judgment convicting her of driving with a suspended license and for failing to show proof of liability insurance. Hubbard went to a Montana casino to gamble. She was 19 and could legally gamble, but only patrons who were 21 years old and older were eligible to receive a gambling coupon. She provided another person’s identification to a casino employee to get the coupon. An employee who recognized Hubbard and knew she was using another person’s identification called the police. Police learned that Hubbard’s Oregon driver’s license was suspended, and informed Hubbard that it was illegal to use another person’s identification. Police decided not to cite her for the offense, and left the casino. The same responding officer at the casino observed Hubbard a short while later driving on the suspended license, and pulled her over. Hubbard was arrested for driving with a suspended license (and failing to provide proof of insurance). Hubbard appeared in Libby City Court, pled not guilty to the charges, and asked for appointment of a public defender. Counsel was appointed, and Hubbard was tried in absentia. Counsel thereafter filed a Notice of Appeal; a jury trial in district court was scheduled for later that year. Counsel and Hubbard conversed by email, wherein Hubbard explained her belief that the arresting officer entrapped her by allegedly telling her to drive from the casino, with knowledge her license was suspended, because her companion had been drinking. Counsel ultimately moved to withdraw from Hubbard’s representation, arguing that a new trial in District Court “would be frivolous or wholly without merit.” Counsel filed a supporting memorandum and attached several documents, including the email Hubbard had sent to him explaining why she believed she was entrapped. The District Court denied Counsel’s motion to withdraw. Hubbard argued on appeal that Counsel violated his duties of loyalty and confidentiality to her by attaching the email explaining her view on trial strategy, violating attorney-client privilege, and revealing inculpatory information that was not previously in the city court record, which the prosecution used to file a motion in limine to prevent the entrapment defense. She also argued the improperly disclosed information prejudiced her during trial, because it gave the prosecution the idea to inquire into where she lived and how she arrived in Libby, prior to the incident at the casino. The District Court denied the motion and, further, gave an instruction regarding the entrapment defense to the jury. Hubbard presented an entrapment defense and the jury considered whether entrapment applied. The Montana Supreme Court concluded Counsel’s disclosure did not render the trial result “fundamentally unfair” or “unreliable,” and that Hubbard could not show that there was a reasonable probability that, but for her counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. View "City of Libby v. Hubbard" on Justia Law