Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Appellant’s request for substitution of counsel in this criminal proceeding.Appellant pleaded guilty to deliberate homicide. Thereafter, Appellant made a request for substitution of counsel. After a hearing, the district court deemed the representation matter resolved because the Office of the State Public Defender denied Appellant’s request for new counsel and Appellant had not appealed that decision. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the district court failed adequately to inquire into Defendant’s complaints regarding his counsel, which necessitated a remand. On remand, the district court issued an order again denying Appellant’s request for substitution of counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it inquired into Appellant’s complaints of ineffective assistance of counsel and in denying his request for substitution of counsel. View "State v. Schowengerdt" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction of sexual intercourse without consent, holding that the State presented sufficient evidence to prove the elements of penetration and force.Defendant was convicted of sexual intercourse without consent after he rubbed a female client’s genitals during a massage treatment session. On appeal, Defendant argued that the testimony of clitoral rubbing did not prove that the vulva was penetrated and that the State did not present evidence that Defendant used force to compel Defendant to submit to sexual intercourse. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s guilty verdict. View "State v. Lerman" on Justia Law

Shayna Hubbard appealed a district court judgment convicting her of driving with a suspended license and for failing to show proof of liability insurance. Hubbard went to a Montana casino to gamble. She was 19 and could legally gamble, but only patrons who were 21 years old and older were eligible to receive a gambling coupon. She provided another person’s identification to a casino employee to get the coupon. An employee who recognized Hubbard and knew she was using another person’s identification called the police. Police learned that Hubbard’s Oregon driver’s license was suspended, and informed Hubbard that it was illegal to use another person’s identification. Police decided not to cite her for the offense, and left the casino. The same responding officer at the casino observed Hubbard a short while later driving on the suspended license, and pulled her over. Hubbard was arrested for driving with a suspended license (and failing to provide proof of insurance). Hubbard appeared in Libby City Court, pled not guilty to the charges, and asked for appointment of a public defender. Counsel was appointed, and Hubbard was tried in absentia. Counsel thereafter filed a Notice of Appeal; a jury trial in district court was scheduled for later that year. Counsel and Hubbard conversed by email, wherein Hubbard explained her belief that the arresting officer entrapped her by allegedly telling her to drive from the casino, with knowledge her license was suspended, because her companion had been drinking. Counsel ultimately moved to withdraw from Hubbard’s representation, arguing that a new trial in District Court “would be frivolous or wholly without merit.” Counsel filed a supporting memorandum and attached several documents, including the email Hubbard had sent to him explaining why she believed she was entrapped. The District Court denied Counsel’s motion to withdraw. Hubbard argued on appeal that Counsel violated his duties of loyalty and confidentiality to her by attaching the email explaining her view on trial strategy, violating attorney-client privilege, and revealing inculpatory information that was not previously in the city court record, which the prosecution used to file a motion in limine to prevent the entrapment defense. She also argued the improperly disclosed information prejudiced her during trial, because it gave the prosecution the idea to inquire into where she lived and how she arrived in Libby, prior to the incident at the casino. The District Court denied the motion and, further, gave an instruction regarding the entrapment defense to the jury. Hubbard presented an entrapment defense and the jury considered whether entrapment applied. The Montana Supreme Court concluded Counsel’s disclosure did not render the trial result “fundamentally unfair” or “unreliable,” and that Hubbard could not show that there was a reasonable probability that, but for her counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. View "City of Libby v. Hubbard" on Justia Law

Justin Dodge appealed a district court judgment and sentence imposing $14,438.44 in restitution following his guilty plea for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (DUI). "The requirement of section 46-18-242, MCA, that a victim submit evidence specifically describing his or her pecuniary loss under oath in an affidavit or by testifying at sentencing is designed to ensure that restitution awards comply with basic principles of due process; that is, that an award is reliable." The Montana Supreme Court determined that the Department of Transportation’s failure to describe its loss under oath did not comply with the procedures and qualifications of 46-18-242, MCA, thus drawing into question the reliability of the award and Dodge’s substantial right to pay an accurate amount in restitution. The Court reversed the district court and remanded this case for resentencing for the limited purpose of reconsidering the restitution order. View "Montana v. Dodge" on Justia Law

Murry Kim Reynolds was convicted of felony Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol, fourth or subsequent offense (DUI), and two misdemeanors: Failure To Have Liability Insurance In Effect and Failure To Drive On The Right Side Of The Roadway. He did not challenge his convictions on appeal; however, he appealed a June 2016 Judgment in which the District Court imposed fines, surcharges, prosecution costs, public defender costs, and court technology fees. The Montana Supreme Court found only that the misdemeanor surcharges totaling $30 and the court technology fee for the misdemeanors totaling $20 were incorrectly imposed in the written judgment and therefore had to be stricken from Reynolds’s criminal sentence. The Court found no abuse of the district court's discretion and otherwise affirmed. View "Montana v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

At issue was whether the Supreme Court should exercise plain error review to reverse Defendant’s conviction for assault because the jury was not instructed on the burden of proof for justifiable use of force.The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court that denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss, affirmed the justice court’s judgment, and remanded the case to the justice court to enforce its judgment. The court exercised plain error review to reverse Defendant’s conviction, holding that the justice court’s failure to instruct the jury that the State bore the burden of proving Defendant’s actions were not justified beyond a reasonable doubt denied Defendant a fair trial. View "State v. Akers" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court sentencing Defendant to forty years’ incarceration, with ten years suspended, and requiring him to pay approximately $3.5 million in restitution.Defendant was found guilty by a jury of aggravated assault. After Defendant was sentenced he appealed, arguing (1) the district court improperly admitted testimony that Child Protective Services removed children from Defendant’s care, and (2) the district court erred by ordering him to pay restitution for the victim’s future psychiatric treatment, counseling, family and marriage counseling, group home care, and case management expenses because the award was speculative. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court admitted irrelevant testimony that the children were removed from Defendant’s care, but the error was harmless; and (2) the restitution award was adequate because the costs were derived using reasonable methods and the best evidence available under the circumstances. View "State v. Santillan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court wherein Defendant pled guilty to felony driving under the influence of alcohol, fourth or subsequent offense, and three misdemeanors. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court violated his right to due process during sentencing and erred in sentencing him, and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel during sentencing. The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded for entry of an amended judgment, holding (1) the district court did not deprive Defendant of his right to due process during sentencing; (2) the district court did not err in imposing a condition on Defendant’s suspended sentence; (3) Defendant was not deprived of effective assistance of counsel during sentencing; and (4) the sentencing conditions in the written judgment should be amended to conform to oral pronouncement of the conditions. View "State v. Lafield" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that Petitioner’s sentence of 110 years’ imprisonment, without the possibility of parole, for deliberate homicide with the use of a weapon did not violate his Eighth Amendment rights even where Petitioner committed the offense when he was seventeen years old. At issue was whether Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, __ U.S. __ (2016), apply to Montana’s discretionary sentencing scheme and whether Petitioner’s sentence qualifies as a de facto life sentence to which Miller and Montgomery apply. The Supreme Court held (1) Miller and Montgomery apply to discretionary sentences in Montana; and (2) Petitioner’s sentence, when viewed in light of Petitioner’s eligibility for day-for-day good time credit and the concurrent sentence he was serving in Washington, did not qualify as a de facto life sentence to which Miller’s substantive rule applied. View "Steilman v. Michael" on Justia Law

The State filed an amended information charging Defendant of thirteen counts. Thereafter, federal prosecutors obtained an indictment against Defendant for four federal charges. The State then filed a second amended in information to remove from the first amended information transactions that were the subject of the federal indictment. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court denied. A jury subsequently found Defendant guilty of aggravated kidnapping and sexual intercourse without consent. Defendant then pled guilty to federal count two and the other federal charges were dismissed. Upon Defendant’s second trial on the remaining State charges, the jury found Defendant guilty of all counts except for burglary and an alternative theft charge. Defendant moved to dismiss the state felony charges on statutory multiple prosecution grounds. The district court denied the motion. Before Defendant was sentenced on the state charges, he filed this appeal. The Supreme Court held (1) a defendant can appeal the denial of a motion for dismissal under Mont. Code Ann. 46-11-504(1) prior to the entry of a final judgment; and; (2) the district court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion under section 46-11-504(1) to dismiss the charges of deceptive practices, burglary, and felony theft, given his federal conviction for possession of stolen firearms. View "State v. Burton" on Justia Law