Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed a portion of the order of the district court ordering Defendant to pay $25,835.37 in restitution to his former employer after he pleaded no contest to theft of property by embezzlement, holding that Mont. Code Ann.46-18-243 did not authorize all the restitution that the district court ordered.On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court had no authority to order restitution for the cost of the wages paid to other employees to recreate Defendant's work, the reimbursement of wages paid to Defendant for time off and training, or the billable value of the hours that his employer's office administrator and president worked with law enforcement on the case. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding that the district court (1) erred in ordering $4,326.92 in "lost wages"; (2) erred in ordering $1,788.39 in restitution to reimburse the employer for the wages it paid Defendant for training, conferences, and paid time off; and (3) erred in ordering $2,635 in restitution for the billable value of the officer administrator's time and $5,239 for the billable value of the president's time spent cooperating with law enforcement. View "State v. Lowry" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of sexual intercourse without consent, burglary, and sexual assault, holding that the district court abused its discretion by denying Defendant's motion to strike juror M.J. for cause.After the jurors were selected in this case, the bailiff informed the court that a juror, M.J., had stated to the bailiff that "he is pretty sure the Defendant is guilty" based upon the juror's assessment of the statements used by defense counsel during voir dire. The court denied defense counsel's subsequent motion to strike M.J. for cause, and the trial resumed with M.J. being empaneled and sworn. After Defendant was convicted he appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, based on a totality of circumstances, there was a troubling pattern that should have resulted in M.J.'s removal, and the district court abused its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss M.J. for cause. View "State v. Anderson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of two counts of incest, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant's for-cause challenge of a prospective juror during voir dire.During voir dire, the prospective jurors were asked whether they knew the victim or any of her family members. One juror responded that he knew the victim's father. After a colloquy, Defendant moved to dismiss the juror from the jury for cause. The district court denied the for-cause challenge on the basis that the standard for removal under Mont. Code Ann. 46-16-115 had not been met. Defendant then used a preemptory challenge to remove the juror. After a trial, Defendant was convicted on both counts of incest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the juror affirmatively stated that he could fairly weigh the evidence at trial without impermissible coaxing the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the challenge for cause. View "State v. Block" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court finding Appellant guilty of attempted sexual intercourse without consent, a felony, holding that the district court erred by applying Montana's Rape Shield Law, Mont. Code Ann. 45-5-511(2), to exclude evidence of the presence of unidentified sperm cells that remained on B.J.'s underwear.Appellant was convicted of attempted sexual intercourse without consent for pulling down B.J.'s underwear and ejaculating on them. The Montana State Crime Lab discovered sperm cell evidence and skin cells on B.J.'s underwear but concluded that the major profile of the sperm cells was from an unknown male. The crime lab further determined that the skin cells were a mixture of a major profile that matched B.J.'s DNA. The State sought to exclude the sperm cell evidence as evidence of B.J.'s prior sexual conduct pursuant to the Rape Shield Law, but Appellant sought to introduce the evidence to rebut the State's explanation that laundering accounted for the absence of Appellant's DNA on the underwear. The district court excluded the evidence. The jury subsequently found Appellant guilty. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court incorrectly applied the Rape Shield Law when it failed appropriately to balance B.J.'s rights with Appellant's constitutional rights. View "State v. Lake" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant for felony aggravated kidnapping and misdemeanor partner family member assault, holding that the district court committed reversible error by allowing the jury unrestricted access to view testimonial videos during its deliberations.In this case, the jury made no requests to view testimonial materials. The videos at issue were simply given to the jury by the court for unsupervised and unrestricted review at the start of deliberations. On appeal, Defendant argued that the videos contained testimonial evidence, and therefore, the district court abused its discretion by allowing the jury unsupervised review of these videos. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the district court erred by allowing the jury unsupervised access to view the videos during its deliberations and that the error was not harmless. View "State v. Nordholm" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court sentencing Defendant under the 2015 persistent felony offender (PFO) statute in effect at the time Defendant committed his offense, holding that the district court properly sentenced Defendant as a PFO pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 46-18-501 (2015).The State charged Defendant with felony driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and other offenses alleged to have been committed in 2016. Based on a prior conviction for felony escape, the State filed a notice seeking designation of Defendant as a PFO under Mont. Code Ann. 46-18-501 (2015). During the 2017 sentencing hearing, Defendant's counsel acknowledged there had been a legislative revision to the PFO statute but did not argue the change applied to Defendant. The district court proceeded to sentence Defendant as a PFO under section 46-18-501 (2015). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Defendant committed felony DUI before the amendments at issue were made applicable to offenses, the ameliorative effects of the revision of the PFO definition did not apply to Defendant. View "State v. Thomas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Appellant's motion to dismiss based on a finding that law enforcement had the requisite particularized suspicion to initiate a traffic stop, holding that the traffic stop was not justified under Mont. Code Ann. 46-5-401.The justice court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that the police officer who initiated the traffic stop lacked particularized suspicion. The district court disagreed and Defendant's motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the officer did not have objective data available to him to support a particularized suspicion that Defendant was committing, had committed, or was about to commit an offense, and therefore, the traffic stop was not justified pursuant to section 46-5-401. View "State v. Reeves" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Appellant's petition to reinstate his driver's license after it was suspended following his refusal to submit to a post-arrest blood or breath test under Mont. Code Ann. 61-8-402, holding that the district court did not err by determining that the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe Appellant was driving a vehicle on Montana's public roadways while under the influence.Specifically, the Court held (1) the arresting officer had a sufficient particularized suspicion, stemming from a reliable informant's 911 call, that ripened into probable cause to arrest Appellant for driving under the influence and also had reasonable grounds to believe Appellant was driving while under the influence; and (2) because the officer appropriately requested that Appellant submit to post-arrest testing under section 61-8-402(a)(i), Appellant's refusal to do so properly resulted in a suspension of Appellant's driver's license. View "Indreland v. Montana Department of Justice" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court convicting Defendant of evidence tampering and deliberate homicide, holding that investigating officers had a reasonable suspicion of exigent circumstances justifying a no-knock entry into Defendant's residence and that the forensic search of Defendant's computer was not constitutionally infirm.At issue on appeal were weather the district court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant that did not explicitly authorize a no-knock entry and whether the court properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained through a forensic search of his computer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) State v. Anyan, 104 P.3d 511 (Mont. 2004), is overturned insofar as it requires investigating officers to obtain authorization from a judge to execute a no-knock entry, and officers may execute a no-knock entry where they have a reasonable suspicion of exigent circumstances justifying it; (2) officers may seize an electronic device pursuant to a warrant where the type of evidence the officers are looking for could reasonably be found on the device, and where officers are lawfully in possession of property, they may subsequently search the property pursuant to a search warrant; and (3) the jury instructions in this case were proper. View "State v. Neiss" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order denying Defendant's motion to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy trial, holding that the 422-delay in resolving Defendant's felony driving under the influence (DUI) charge violated Defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial.Defendant pleaded guilty to felony DUI 422 days after he was arrested and charged, a delay stretching far beyond the 200-day threshold. After examining the speedy trial violation under the four-factor test set forth in State v. Ariegwe, 167 P.3d 815 (Mont. 2007), the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State violated Defendant's right to a speedy trial. The Court remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the charge. View "State v. Kurtz" on Justia Law