Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Rodney Owen Skurdal, who is not a licensed attorney, attempted to represent Ronald Trow during Trow’s initial appearance in a criminal case in Yellowstone County Justice Court. Judge Jeanne Walker, presiding over the case, ordered Skurdal to vacate the defendant’s table and did not permit him to represent Trow, as Skurdal was not a member of the bar. Trow subsequently entered a plea of not guilty, and a public defender was appointed. Skurdal then filed a lawsuit in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court for Yellowstone County against Judge Walker, later joined by Yellowstone County as a defendant, alleging violations of his and Trow’s rights and advancing various arguments, including those associated with the “Sovereign Citizen” movement.The Thirteenth Judicial District Court dismissed Skurdal’s complaint with prejudice, holding that Judge Walker and Yellowstone County were protected by absolute judicial immunity for actions taken in the course of judicial duties. The court also found that Skurdal, as a non-lawyer, had no statutory or constitutional right to represent another individual in a criminal proceeding in Montana. The court denied leave to amend the complaint, finding that any amendment would be futile due to the immunity defense.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s dismissal. The Supreme Court held that Montana law does not permit non-lawyers to represent others in criminal cases, and that Judge Walker’s actions were judicial acts performed within her jurisdiction, entitling her and Yellowstone County to absolute immunity from suit. The Court also concluded that the District Court did not err in denying leave to amend, as further amendment could not overcome the immunity bar. View "Skurdal v. Walker" on Justia Law

The defendant was originally sentenced in 2003 in Lewis and Clark County, Montana, to 20 years with 16 years suspended. In 2008, after committing new offenses, he was sentenced in Yellowstone County to five years, to run concurrently with the Lewis and Clark sentence. In 2009, his suspended sentence in the Lewis and Clark case was revoked, and he was resentenced to 16 years with 11 years suspended. The Department of Corrections (DOC) treated the sentences as consecutive, not concurrent, based on statutory default. Over the years, the defendant repeatedly challenged the calculation of his sentences and the credit for time served, arguing that the sentences should have run concurrently and that he was entitled to additional credit for time served.The First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, most recently revoked the defendant’s suspended sentence in 2023, imposing an 11-year commitment with six years suspended, and granted him 62 days of credit for time served and 1,167 days of elapsed time credit. The defendant appealed, arguing that the court failed to award the proper amount of credit for time served, specifically for periods when he was incarcerated and for time when the sentences should have been running concurrently.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the district court erred by not awarding the correct amount of credit for time served. The Court determined that, under Montana law and its own precedents, the revocation sentence could not be run consecutively to the earlier sentence, and the defendant was entitled to additional credit for time served. The Court reversed the district court’s order and remanded with instructions to amend the judgment to grant the defendant an additional 2,220 days of credit for time served, in addition to the credits already awarded. View "State v. Keech" on Justia Law

A sheriff’s deputy in Lake County, Montana, stopped the defendant after observing erratic driving and signs of intoxication. The defendant admitted to drinking, partially completed field sobriety tests, refused further testing, and ultimately provided a blood sample showing a high blood alcohol concentration. He was cited for felony DUI. At his initial appearance, the Justice Court set a preliminary hearing and released him on his own recognizance, but he remained incarcerated due to a probation violation from a prior offense. Lake County policy, based on state statutes, allowed up to thirty days for probable cause determinations for defendants not detained specifically on the new charge. The State filed an information twenty-one days after the initial appearance.The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing the delay in determining probable cause was unreasonable. The Twentieth Judicial District Court denied the motion, finding the delay reasonable. After a jury convicted the defendant of felony DUI, the District Court sentenced him to five years with the Department of Corrections, imposed a $5,000 mandatory minimum fine, and required continuous alcohol monitoring (SCRAM) as a parole condition. The defendant appealed, challenging the delay, the SCRAM condition, and the fine.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding the twenty-one-day delay reasonable, given the local policy and lack of prejudice to the defendant. The Supreme Court reversed the imposition of SCRAM as a parole condition, holding that no statute authorized such a condition, and remanded for the condition to be modified as a recommendation to the Board of Pardons and Parole. The Supreme Court also reversed the mandatory minimum fine, holding that under State v. Gibbons, such fines are unconstitutional without individualized assessment of ability to pay, and remanded for resentencing consistent with that requirement. View "State v. Vaska" on Justia Law

Danielle Wood was charged with deliberate homicide for the death of Matthew LaFriniere, based on two theories: direct liability and accountability. During her trial, the jury was instructed on both theories, but the verdict form did not require the jury to specify which theory they based their decision on. Wood was found guilty, and she appealed, arguing that the accountability theory should not have been submitted to the jury due to insufficient evidence. The Montana Supreme Court agreed and reversed her conviction, remanding the case for a new trial.Upon remand, Wood moved to dismiss the case, claiming that a retrial would violate her double jeopardy rights. The Twentieth Judicial District Court denied her motion, reasoning that the Montana Supreme Court had remanded the case for a new trial, not dismissal, and that retrial did not constitute double jeopardy. Wood then sought a writ of supervisory control from the Montana Supreme Court to reverse the District Court's decision.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that double jeopardy did not bar a retrial for deliberate homicide under the direct liability theory. The Court clarified that its previous reversal was based on the lack of evidence for the accountability theory, not the direct liability theory. Therefore, retrying Wood solely on the direct liability theory did not violate her double jeopardy rights. The Court granted Wood's petition for supervisory control but affirmed the District Court's order denying her motion to dismiss, allowing the retrial to proceed on the direct liability theory. View "Wood v. 20th Jud. District Court" on Justia Law

Ryan Patrick Donahue, a DEA agent, met Marcus Joshlin at a bar in Bozeman on November 21, 2021. After a night of drinking, Donahue suspected Joshlin had drugs in his bag and demanded to see it while brandishing a firearm. Finding no drugs, they continued to another bar where Donahue's aggressive behavior led to an altercation. Donahue shoved a gun into Joshlin's neck, leading to his disarmament and arrest. Donahue was charged with Assault with a Weapon and Carrying a Concealed Weapon While Under Influence. He claimed self-defense, asserting Joshlin threatened him.The Eighteenth Judicial District Court excluded evidence of Joshlin's post-incident statements about being a fighter and his unresolved criminal case. The court allowed some evidence of Joshlin's untruthfulness but denied Donahue's motion for a new trial, finding substantial compliance with jury summons procedures. The jury found Donahue guilty on both counts, and the court deferred his sentence for three years on the assault charge and issued a suspended six-month sentence for the concealed weapon charge.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the District Court did not err in excluding Joshlin's post-incident statements as they were not known to Donahue at the time and thus irrelevant to his self-defense claim. The court also found that Donahue failed to preserve his argument regarding the unresolved criminal case for appeal. Lastly, the court affirmed the District Court's denial of a new trial, concluding that any technical violations in the jury summons process did not affect the randomness or objectivity of the jury selection. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decisions. View "State v. Donahue" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who responded to an online advertisement posted by an undercover law enforcement officer posing as a woman offering sexual services, including access to two fictitious underage girls, one purportedly 12 years old. The defendant agreed to meet at a hotel to engage in sexual conduct with the supposed minors and was arrested upon arrival. He was charged with two counts of Sexual Abuse of Children under Montana law, with enhanced penalties based on the alleged ages of the victims.The Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, denied the defendant’s motion to strike the mandatory sentencing enhancements, which imposed a 25-year parole restriction for offenses involving victims 12 years old or younger. The defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to one count of Attempted Sexual Abuse of Children, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion regarding the sentencing enhancement. The court imposed the State’s recommended sentence, including the mandatory enhancement, and dismissed the second count.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the mandatory minimum sentence enhancement for sexual child abuse applies when the “victim” is a fictitious child created by law enforcement in a sting operation. The court held that the statutory language requiring enhanced penalties based on the age of “the victim” refers to actual, specified child victims, not to fictional or simulated victims. The court concluded that the Legislature’s use of different language in the statute—distinguishing between “a child” in defining the offense and “the victim” in penalty enhancements—demonstrates an intent to limit enhanced penalties to cases involving real children. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s imposition of the mandatory enhancement and remanded for resentencing under the general penalty provision. View "State v. Schultz" on Justia Law

Douglas Baertsch was convicted in January 2023 by the Montana First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, for burglary with disorderly conduct as the predicate offense, partner or family member assault (PFMA), and criminal mischief. The incident occurred on May 21, 2020, when Baertsch and his girlfriend, K.W., argued after a night out. The argument escalated at K.W.'s home, leading to Baertsch forcibly taking K.W.'s phone and later kicking in her front door to retrieve his wallet. Inside the house, Baertsch called K.W. derogatory names before leaving.The District Court jury found Baertsch guilty of criminal mischief for breaking the door, PFMA for causing K.W. reasonable apprehension of bodily injury, and burglary with disorderly conduct for using abusive language inside the house. The court sentenced him to two consecutive five-year suspended prison terms for PFMA and burglary, and six months jail-time (all but 60 days suspended) for criminal mischief. Additionally, the court imposed a seven-year restriction on Baertsch’s ability to seek early termination of his sentence.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that there was insufficient evidence to support the burglary conviction with disorderly conduct as the predicate offense. The court found that the abusive language used by Baertsch inside K.W.'s private home did not disturb the public peace, a necessary element for disorderly conduct under the statute. Consequently, the court vacated the burglary conviction. Additionally, the court ruled that the District Court's seven-year restriction on Baertsch’s right to seek early termination of his sentence was illegal, as it exceeded statutory authorization. The case was remanded to the District Court to strike the illegal sentencing condition. View "State v. Baertsch" on Justia Law

Shelby Ragner was charged with aggravated sexual intercourse without consent, alleging he had sexual intercourse with C.M. while she was severely intoxicated. Ragner's attorney, Alexander Jacobi, did not interview or present Max Weimer as a witness, who later testified that he saw minor injuries on Ragner the morning after the incident. Ragner was found not guilty of aggravated sexual intercourse without consent but was convicted of sexual intercourse without consent (SIWOC). He was sentenced to ten years in prison, with four years suspended. Ragner's direct appeal was denied.Ragner filed a petition for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel due to Jacobi's failure to interview and call exculpatory witnesses, including Weimer. The District Court found that Jacobi's failure to investigate Weimer's potential testimony fell below the standard of care and granted Ragner's petition, concluding that Jacobi's performance prejudiced Ragner.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that even if Jacobi's performance was deficient, Ragner did not demonstrate prejudice as required under the second prong of the Strickland test. The court found that Weimer's limited observation of Ragner's injuries did not significantly alter the evidentiary picture presented to the jury, which included overwhelming evidence of C.M.'s severe intoxication, extensive documented injuries, and Ragner's own admissions. The court concluded that Weimer's testimony would not have reasonably affected the jury's verdict.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the District Court's decision, holding that Ragner failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, and remanded the case for amendment of the order consistent with its opinion. View "Ragner v. State" on Justia Law

Stephen Walks was charged with two counts of felony sexual intercourse without consent and two counts of felony sexual assault based on allegations made by his step-granddaughters, K.P. and K. The charges arose after K.P. disclosed to her mother that Walks had touched her inappropriately. Forensic interviews were conducted with both girls, during which they drew pictures depicting the alleged incidents. These drawings, along with their testimonies, were presented as evidence during the trial.The First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, presided over the trial. The jury found Walks guilty of felony sexual assault and two counts of felony sexual intercourse without consent. During deliberations, the jury was given unrestricted access to the drawings made by K.P. and K. during their forensic interviews and at trial. Walks objected to this, arguing that the drawings were testimonial in nature and should not have been available to the jury without supervision. The District Court overruled his objection.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that the forensic interview drawings were not testimonial evidence and could be reviewed by the jury during deliberations. However, the court acknowledged that the trial drawings were testimonial but concluded that allowing the jury unsupervised access to these drawings was harmless error. The court reasoned that other substantial evidence presented at trial proved the same facts as the trial drawings, and there was no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to Walks' conviction. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed Walks' judgment of conviction. View "State v. Walks" on Justia Law

The State of Montana charged John Raymond Welzel with Assault with a Weapon, a felony, on November 14, 2022. On April 4, 2023, Welzel pled no contest during a change of plea hearing. The District Court released him on his own recognizance, with the condition that he reside either at the Recovery Centers of Montana (RCM) or with his father before sentencing. Welzel attended treatment at RCM from April 5, 2023, to May 6, 2023. On June 15, 2023, the District Court sentenced Welzel and credited him with 142 days of time served, excluding the 30 days spent at RCM.The Eleventh Judicial District Court of Flathead County reviewed the case and determined that Welzel was not entitled to credit for the time spent at RCM. The court's order did not mandate Welzel to attend or complete treatment at RCM, only to reside there or with his father. The court concluded that Welzel's stay at RCM was not "under the order of the court" as required by the relevant statute for credit for time served.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that Welzel was not entitled to credit for the time spent at RCM because the District Court's order did not require him to attend treatment or impose consequences for not doing so. The court emphasized that the statute requires the time spent in a residential treatment facility to be "under the order of the court" to qualify for credit. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's judgment and sentence. View "State v. Welzel" on Justia Law