Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The defendant was charged with eight offenses, including sexual abuse of children under 12 and incest. He entered into a plea agreement with the State, pleading guilty to all counts in exchange for the State’s agreement to recommend specific terms of incarceration for each offense. The plea agreement was silent regarding any restrictions on parole eligibility and expressly allowed only the defendant, not the State, to argue for any legal sentence.After the plea agreement was executed, the Seventh Judicial District Court, Dawson County, held a sentencing hearing. At that hearing, the State recommended a 40-year parole restriction, even though the agreement did not mention parole restrictions. The defendant did not object at the hearing but requested no parole restriction. The District Court ultimately sentenced the defendant to 75 years in prison, with a 40-year parole restriction, explicitly referencing the State’s recommendation in its decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. Applying plain error review due to the lack of objection at sentencing, the court held that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by recommending a parole restriction not contemplated by the agreement. The court distinguished this case from State v. Lewis, 2012 MT 157, because, unlike in Lewis, the plea agreement here did not allow the State to argue for any lawful sentence. The court found that the breach affected the fairness of the proceedings, as the District Court’s decision was explicitly based on the prosecutor’s improper recommendation. The Supreme Court of Montana reversed the District Court’s sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing before a different judge, ordering specific performance of the plea agreement. View "State v. Walton" on Justia Law

The case concerns Lloyd Mortier Barrus, who, along with his son Marshall, was involved in a series of violent events in Montana in May 2017. After a period of escalating paranoia and antigovernment rhetoric, Barrus and Marshall engaged in a high-speed chase and shootout with law enforcement, resulting in the death of Deputy Sheriff Mason Moore and the disabling of two police vehicles. Barrus was arrested after a standoff in which both he and Marshall fired at officers; Marshall was killed, and Barrus surrendered. Barrus was charged with deliberate homicide by accountability and two counts of attempted deliberate homicide by accountability.The First Judicial District Court, Broadwater County, presided over Barrus’s trial. Prior to trial, Barrus was found unfit to proceed due to a mental disorder but was later restored to fitness through involuntary medication. After a jury convicted Barrus on all counts, the court held a bifurcated evidentiary hearing to determine whether Barrus’s mental disease or disorder rendered him unable to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his behavior to the law, as required by § 46-14-311, MCA. Expert testimony was presented by both parties, with conflicting opinions regarding Barrus’s mental state at the time of the offense.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court abused its discretion by sentencing Barrus to the Department of Corrections (DOC) rather than the Department of Public Health and Human Services (DPHHS). The Supreme Court held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion, finding substantial evidence supported the conclusion that Barrus appreciated the criminality of his actions and could have conformed his conduct to the law. The judgment sentencing Barrus to DOC custody was affirmed. View "State v. Barrus" on Justia Law

The defendant, while on probation for prior convictions, was involved in a series of incidents that led to multiple criminal charges. After fleeing from law enforcement during a stop, he was apprehended and his backpack, which he initially denied owning, was searched. The search revealed illegal drugs, drug paraphernalia, and a mask matching the description of one worn by a gunman in a recent shooting. He was subsequently charged with attempted deliberate homicide, assault with a weapon, drug offenses, and obstructing a peace officer. Additionally, the State sought to revoke his previously suspended sentences.The First Judicial District Court of Montana denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence found in his backpack, finding that law enforcement had particularized suspicion to justify the stop and subsequent search. The court also denied his motion to substitute counsel after a hearing, concluding that the defendant’s complaints did not establish good cause for new representation. The defendant was convicted by juries on the drug charges and the attempted deliberate homicide and assault charges. The court revoked his suspended sentences and imposed new sentences, ordering all to run concurrently.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana addressed three main issues. First, the Court held that the District Court erred by allowing a key witness to testify via video deposition at trial without a proper showing of the witness’s unavailability, violating the defendant’s confrontation rights. The State conceded this error, and the Supreme Court reversed the convictions for attempted deliberate homicide and assault with a weapon, remanding for a new trial on those charges. The Court affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress and the motion to substitute counsel, finding no abuse of discretion. The Court also ordered new sentencing for the drug convictions and the revocation of suspended sentences, as the original sentences were influenced by the now-reversed convictions. View "State v. Songer" on Justia Law

A sixteen-year-old youth admitted to sexually assaulting his two younger half-siblings, ages six and seven, over a period spanning late 2021 to early 2023. The abuse involved coercion through threats of withholding privileges and included both physical and digital penetration. The youth was charged with multiple counts of felony sexual assault and incest, and a more serious charge was dismissed as part of a plea agreement. A psychosexual evaluation found the youth to be at moderate risk of reoffending and recommended against requiring registration as a sexual offender, suggesting that avoiding registration would better support his rehabilitation. The victims’ family members and therapist, however, advocated for registration due to the trauma suffered.The Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, reviewed the psychosexual evaluation, probation officer’s report, and victim impact statements. The court designated the youth as a Level 2 Sexual Offender, committed him to a youth correctional facility until age 18, and placed him on probation until age 21. Despite recommendations against registration from the evaluator and probation officer, the court ordered the youth to register as a sexual offender for life, citing the need to protect the public given the nature of the offenses and the youth’s position of trust.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana considered whether the District Court abused its discretion in imposing the registration requirement. The Supreme Court held that the District Court acted within its discretion, finding substantial evidence supported the decision and that the court properly considered the statutory requirements and public interest. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s order requiring the youth to register as a sexual offender. View "In re B.J.B." on Justia Law

Rodney Owen Skurdal, who is not a licensed attorney, attempted to represent Ronald Trow during Trow’s initial appearance in a criminal case in Yellowstone County Justice Court. Judge Jeanne Walker, presiding over the case, ordered Skurdal to vacate the defendant’s table and did not permit him to represent Trow, as Skurdal was not a member of the bar. Trow subsequently entered a plea of not guilty, and a public defender was appointed. Skurdal then filed a lawsuit in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court for Yellowstone County against Judge Walker, later joined by Yellowstone County as a defendant, alleging violations of his and Trow’s rights and advancing various arguments, including those associated with the “Sovereign Citizen” movement.The Thirteenth Judicial District Court dismissed Skurdal’s complaint with prejudice, holding that Judge Walker and Yellowstone County were protected by absolute judicial immunity for actions taken in the course of judicial duties. The court also found that Skurdal, as a non-lawyer, had no statutory or constitutional right to represent another individual in a criminal proceeding in Montana. The court denied leave to amend the complaint, finding that any amendment would be futile due to the immunity defense.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s dismissal. The Supreme Court held that Montana law does not permit non-lawyers to represent others in criminal cases, and that Judge Walker’s actions were judicial acts performed within her jurisdiction, entitling her and Yellowstone County to absolute immunity from suit. The Court also concluded that the District Court did not err in denying leave to amend, as further amendment could not overcome the immunity bar. View "Skurdal v. Walker" on Justia Law

The defendant was originally sentenced in 2003 in Lewis and Clark County, Montana, to 20 years with 16 years suspended. In 2008, after committing new offenses, he was sentenced in Yellowstone County to five years, to run concurrently with the Lewis and Clark sentence. In 2009, his suspended sentence in the Lewis and Clark case was revoked, and he was resentenced to 16 years with 11 years suspended. The Department of Corrections (DOC) treated the sentences as consecutive, not concurrent, based on statutory default. Over the years, the defendant repeatedly challenged the calculation of his sentences and the credit for time served, arguing that the sentences should have run concurrently and that he was entitled to additional credit for time served.The First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, most recently revoked the defendant’s suspended sentence in 2023, imposing an 11-year commitment with six years suspended, and granted him 62 days of credit for time served and 1,167 days of elapsed time credit. The defendant appealed, arguing that the court failed to award the proper amount of credit for time served, specifically for periods when he was incarcerated and for time when the sentences should have been running concurrently.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the district court erred by not awarding the correct amount of credit for time served. The Court determined that, under Montana law and its own precedents, the revocation sentence could not be run consecutively to the earlier sentence, and the defendant was entitled to additional credit for time served. The Court reversed the district court’s order and remanded with instructions to amend the judgment to grant the defendant an additional 2,220 days of credit for time served, in addition to the credits already awarded. View "State v. Keech" on Justia Law

A sheriff’s deputy in Lake County, Montana, stopped the defendant after observing erratic driving and signs of intoxication. The defendant admitted to drinking, partially completed field sobriety tests, refused further testing, and ultimately provided a blood sample showing a high blood alcohol concentration. He was cited for felony DUI. At his initial appearance, the Justice Court set a preliminary hearing and released him on his own recognizance, but he remained incarcerated due to a probation violation from a prior offense. Lake County policy, based on state statutes, allowed up to thirty days for probable cause determinations for defendants not detained specifically on the new charge. The State filed an information twenty-one days after the initial appearance.The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing the delay in determining probable cause was unreasonable. The Twentieth Judicial District Court denied the motion, finding the delay reasonable. After a jury convicted the defendant of felony DUI, the District Court sentenced him to five years with the Department of Corrections, imposed a $5,000 mandatory minimum fine, and required continuous alcohol monitoring (SCRAM) as a parole condition. The defendant appealed, challenging the delay, the SCRAM condition, and the fine.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding the twenty-one-day delay reasonable, given the local policy and lack of prejudice to the defendant. The Supreme Court reversed the imposition of SCRAM as a parole condition, holding that no statute authorized such a condition, and remanded for the condition to be modified as a recommendation to the Board of Pardons and Parole. The Supreme Court also reversed the mandatory minimum fine, holding that under State v. Gibbons, such fines are unconstitutional without individualized assessment of ability to pay, and remanded for resentencing consistent with that requirement. View "State v. Vaska" on Justia Law

Danielle Wood was charged with deliberate homicide for the death of Matthew LaFriniere, based on two theories: direct liability and accountability. During her trial, the jury was instructed on both theories, but the verdict form did not require the jury to specify which theory they based their decision on. Wood was found guilty, and she appealed, arguing that the accountability theory should not have been submitted to the jury due to insufficient evidence. The Montana Supreme Court agreed and reversed her conviction, remanding the case for a new trial.Upon remand, Wood moved to dismiss the case, claiming that a retrial would violate her double jeopardy rights. The Twentieth Judicial District Court denied her motion, reasoning that the Montana Supreme Court had remanded the case for a new trial, not dismissal, and that retrial did not constitute double jeopardy. Wood then sought a writ of supervisory control from the Montana Supreme Court to reverse the District Court's decision.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that double jeopardy did not bar a retrial for deliberate homicide under the direct liability theory. The Court clarified that its previous reversal was based on the lack of evidence for the accountability theory, not the direct liability theory. Therefore, retrying Wood solely on the direct liability theory did not violate her double jeopardy rights. The Court granted Wood's petition for supervisory control but affirmed the District Court's order denying her motion to dismiss, allowing the retrial to proceed on the direct liability theory. View "Wood v. 20th Jud. District Court" on Justia Law

Ryan Patrick Donahue, a DEA agent, met Marcus Joshlin at a bar in Bozeman on November 21, 2021. After a night of drinking, Donahue suspected Joshlin had drugs in his bag and demanded to see it while brandishing a firearm. Finding no drugs, they continued to another bar where Donahue's aggressive behavior led to an altercation. Donahue shoved a gun into Joshlin's neck, leading to his disarmament and arrest. Donahue was charged with Assault with a Weapon and Carrying a Concealed Weapon While Under Influence. He claimed self-defense, asserting Joshlin threatened him.The Eighteenth Judicial District Court excluded evidence of Joshlin's post-incident statements about being a fighter and his unresolved criminal case. The court allowed some evidence of Joshlin's untruthfulness but denied Donahue's motion for a new trial, finding substantial compliance with jury summons procedures. The jury found Donahue guilty on both counts, and the court deferred his sentence for three years on the assault charge and issued a suspended six-month sentence for the concealed weapon charge.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the District Court did not err in excluding Joshlin's post-incident statements as they were not known to Donahue at the time and thus irrelevant to his self-defense claim. The court also found that Donahue failed to preserve his argument regarding the unresolved criminal case for appeal. Lastly, the court affirmed the District Court's denial of a new trial, concluding that any technical violations in the jury summons process did not affect the randomness or objectivity of the jury selection. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decisions. View "State v. Donahue" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who responded to an online advertisement posted by an undercover law enforcement officer posing as a woman offering sexual services, including access to two fictitious underage girls, one purportedly 12 years old. The defendant agreed to meet at a hotel to engage in sexual conduct with the supposed minors and was arrested upon arrival. He was charged with two counts of Sexual Abuse of Children under Montana law, with enhanced penalties based on the alleged ages of the victims.The Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, denied the defendant’s motion to strike the mandatory sentencing enhancements, which imposed a 25-year parole restriction for offenses involving victims 12 years old or younger. The defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to one count of Attempted Sexual Abuse of Children, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion regarding the sentencing enhancement. The court imposed the State’s recommended sentence, including the mandatory enhancement, and dismissed the second count.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the mandatory minimum sentence enhancement for sexual child abuse applies when the “victim” is a fictitious child created by law enforcement in a sting operation. The court held that the statutory language requiring enhanced penalties based on the age of “the victim” refers to actual, specified child victims, not to fictional or simulated victims. The court concluded that the Legislature’s use of different language in the statute—distinguishing between “a child” in defining the offense and “the victim” in penalty enhancements—demonstrates an intent to limit enhanced penalties to cases involving real children. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s imposition of the mandatory enhancement and remanded for resentencing under the general penalty provision. View "State v. Schultz" on Justia Law