Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of felony theft by possession of stolen property and four misdemeanor, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on any of his claims of error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court acted within its discretion in denying Defendant's motions for mistrial after two separate references to Defendant's "jail" status were made by State witnesses; (2) the district court did not err in declining to give a jury instruction on unauthorized use of a motor vehicle as a lesser-included offense of the charged theft by possession of stolen property; and (3) Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims would more appropriately be addressed through a petition for postconviction relief. View "State v. Denny" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for three felony counts of privacy in communications, in violation of Mont. Code Ann. 45-8-213(1)(a), holding that there were no prejudicial errors in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the Privacy in Communications statute, Mont. Code Ann. 45-8-213(1)(a), is not facially overbroad, nor does it constitute a content-based restriction on speech in violation of the "freedom of speech" clauses of the Montana and United States Constitutions; (2) the district court correctly interpreted the Privacy in Communications statute; (3) there was insufficient evidence to conclude that there was jurisdiction when the threatening communication was made to a person located outside of Montana; and (4) the district court fully and fairly instructed the jury in accordance with the charges and evidence presented. View "State v. Lamoureux" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the orders of the district court lifting its stay of execution of Defendant's sentence during his appeal and re-imposing the sentence, holding that the district court lacked the authority to impose the sentence after the State's delay in seeking to execute the sentence.The district court convicted Defendant for a first offense driving under the influence (DUI) conviction and sentenced him to six months with all but twenty-four hours suspended. The court stayed execution of the sentencing during Defendant's appeal. When Defendant's conviction was affirmed, the district court issued notice of remittitur to the parties. Eight months later, the State moved to lift the stay and require Defendant to serve his sentence. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's sentence expired before the State sought to enforce its terms and conditions, and therefore, the State could no longer execute the terms of the sentence; and (2) the district court correctly convicted Defendant of DUI. View "State v. Nelson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the sentence imposed on Defendant after she was convicted for criminal possession of dangerous drugs (CPDD) and criminal possession of drug paraphernalia (CPDP), holding that the district court abused its discretion in sentencing Defendant.The district court sentenced Defendant to four years with the Montana Department of Corrections (DOC), all for years suspended for the CPDD conviction. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred by sentencing her to a suspended sentence after determining that the State presented sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption in favor of a deferred sentence under Mont. Code Ann. 49-9-102(4). The Supreme Court agreed and remanded for resentencing, holding that the district court erred by sentencing Defendant to a four-year suspended sentence instead of deferring imposition of sentence. View "State v. Doubek" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for writ of supervisory control reversing an order of the Montana Twentieth Judicial District Court denying Petitioner's motion to substitute the presiding judge, the Honorable Deborah Kim Christopher, in the underlying matter, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to the writ.Petitioner was the defendant in the underlying matter. The district court denied Petitioner's motion for substitution of judge, concluding that it was not timely filed in accordance with the statutory filing fee requirement set out in Mont. Code Ann. 3-1-804(3). The Supreme Court agreed with the district court that Petitioner did not timely file her substitution motion in accordance with the statutory filing fee requirement and therefore declined to exercise supervisory control under the circumstances in this case. View "Lesage v. Twentieth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for sexual intercourse without consent (SIWOC) and his sentence of seventy-five years' imprisonment, with twenty-five years suspended, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on any of his claims of error.On appeal, Defendant argued (1) the district court erred by allowing the presentation of combined expert and lay testimony without providing a cautionary instruction or notice to counsel, (2) the court violated his due process rights by failing to exclude the prosecutor from a hearing regarding defense counsel's representation; and (3) his counsel provided ineffective assistance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) plain error review was not warranted for either issue one or issue two; and (2) Defendant failed to establish his ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal. View "State v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court sentencing Defendant to a net five-year suspended term of commitment to the Montana Department of Corrections and a $15,000 fine for her convictions for felony possession of methamphetamine and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, holding that the district court erred in imposing the fine.The fine at issue included the maximum $5,000 fine on criminal possession of dangerous drugs (CPDD) and an additional $10,000 for the thirty-five percent market value fine mandated by Mont. Code Ann. 45-9-130(1). The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in deviating from the statutory presumption that a defendant is entitled to a deferred imposition of sentence on a first-offense CPDD; but (2) erred in imposing the fine required by section 45-9-130(1) without a qualifying basis on the trial evidence and without consideration of the factors specified in Mont. Code Ann. 46-18-213(3). View "State v. Wilkes" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), fourth or subsequent offense, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence and in denying Defendant's motion for mistrial.On appeal, Defendant argued that the State had failed to meet its burden of proving that he was on a "way of this state open to the public" because he was found by a police officer in a vehicle that was parked in a permitted parking spot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence for the jury to assess whether the parking space at issue was adapted and fitted for public travel and in common use by the public, and therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant's motion for a mistrial based on allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. View "State v. Krause" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part Defendant's convictions for deliberate homicide and tampering with physical evidence, holding that Defendant's constitutional right of confrontation was violated, requiring reversal of his conviction of tampering with physical evidence.On appeal, Defendant argued that he was denied his right under the United States and Montana Constitutions to confront witnesses against him when the State presented a foundational witness in real time by two-way videoconference. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) furtherance of an important public policy to allow the witness to testify via two-way videoconferencing was not demonstrated in this case, and therefore, the first prong of the analysis set forth in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990), was not satisfied; and (2) Defendant's right to a fair trial was not undermined by the prosecutor's closing argument. View "State v. Mercier" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the district court resentencing Defendant to life without parole for three counts of deliberate homicide committed when he was a juvenile, holding that the district court erroneously concluded that Defendant was irreparably corrupt and permanently incorrigible.Defendant was convicted for three murders he committed when he was seventeen years old and was sentenced to three consecutive life terms without the possibility of parole. Defendant later filed a petition for postconviction relief asserting that his sentence was unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. __ (2016). After a hearing, the district court resentenced Defendant to three consecutive life terms. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case for resentencing, holding that the district court (1) did not err when it appointed a neutral expert for the resentencing hearing; (2) did not err when it denied Defendant's request for a jury to determine whether he was irreparably corrupt and permanently incorrigible; and (3) erred when it refused to consider post-offense evidence of rehabilitation at the resentencing hearing. View "State v. Keefe" on Justia Law