Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

On May 7, 2021, a citizen reported seeing a man, later identified as Thomas Wojtowicz, stumbling and crawling to his vehicle in a parking lot. Officer Haydon responded and found Thomas in the driver’s seat of a green Ford Escape, smelling of alcohol and slurring his speech. Thomas admitted to drinking but claimed he was waiting for his girlfriend to pick him up. Thomas failed non-standardized field sobriety tests and refused a breathalyzer. He was arrested for DUI, and a blood test later showed a high blood alcohol content.The Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, denied Thomas’s motion to suppress evidence and admitted the blood toxicology results over his objection. Thomas was found guilty of DUI by a jury. He appealed, arguing the blood evidence was improperly admitted, his motion to suppress should have been granted, and there was insufficient evidence to prove he was in actual physical control of the vehicle.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the blood toxicology evidence was properly admitted, as the procedural safeguards were met and any issues with the blood collection kit’s documentation went to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. The court also found no unlawful search or seizure occurred, as the officer’s actions were justified by particularized suspicion. Finally, the court determined there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find Thomas in actual physical control of his vehicle. The court affirmed the lower court’s decisions and the jury’s verdict. View "State v. Wojtowicz" on Justia Law

Neil Lynn Nunes was charged with multiple felonies, including Failure to Give Notice of Change of Residence and Tampering with Witnesses or Informants, across three consolidated cases. The charges were filed between December 2019 and February 2020. Nunes's trial was initially set for July 2020 but was delayed multiple times, leading to a total delay of 496 days for the first case, 484 days for the second, and 413 days for the third. Nunes filed motions to dismiss the charges due to lack of a speedy trial, which were denied by the District Court. The jury eventually found him guilty on all counts.The Ninth Judicial District Court denied Nunes's motions to dismiss, attributing 158 days of the delay to Nunes himself, as he had requested a continuance to allow for discovery. The court found that the State had provided all necessary discovery before Nunes's motion to continue. The remaining delays were attributed to institutional reasons, including court scheduling conflicts and COVID-19 concerns, which were weighed minimally against the State.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case, applying a four-factor balancing test to determine if Nunes's right to a speedy trial was violated. The court found that the initial delay was reasonable for pretrial preparation, and the subsequent delays were either caused by Nunes or were institutional delays that weighed minimally against the State. The court also noted that Nunes had asserted his right to a speedy trial but had caused substantial delays himself. Finally, the court found no significant prejudice to Nunes, as his incarceration was due to his own actions, and he did not demonstrate that his defense was impaired.The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's decision, concluding that Nunes's right to a speedy trial was not violated. View "State v. Nunes" on Justia Law

The case involves Clovis Christopher Geno, who was convicted of deliberate homicide. Geno appealed his conviction, arguing that the Montana Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Roosevelt County, erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to investigators and in imposing fees and costs at sentencing. The case arose from the death of Ramona Naramore, who was found unresponsive in Geno's apartment. An autopsy revealed multiple bruises and injuries on Naramore's body, and the cause of death was determined to be asphyxia caused by strangulation/homicide. Geno was subsequently charged with deliberate homicide.In the lower courts, Geno moved to suppress his statements from an interview with law enforcement, asserting that they were obtained involuntarily and in violation of his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The District Court denied Geno's motion, finding that there was no inappropriate coercion and that Geno's statements were voluntary. Geno's case proceeded to trial, where the jury found him guilty of deliberate homicide.In the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, Geno argued that his statements to law enforcement officers should have been suppressed as involuntary and that his second custodial interrogation violated his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, finding that Geno's statements were voluntary and that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not violated. However, the court remanded the case for the District Court to either strike the imposition of fees and costs from the judgment or conduct a hearing to determine Geno's ability to pay, as the court had not taken into consideration Geno's ability to pay as required by statute. View "State v. Geno" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over child support payments. Jeffery Williams, a former OB/GYN physician, was ordered by the District Court to pay $944 per child per month after it found him to be voluntarily underemployed. Williams had been earning a substantial income as a physician but was terminated from his position following a conviction for Partner/Family Member Assault. Instead of seeking further employment in the medical field, Williams decided to leave medicine and invested over $1,000,000 in two business ventures, one of which failed and the other was barely profitable. Williams appealed the District Court's decision, arguing that it was unfair to impute his previous income as a physician when determining his child support obligations.The District Court had initially ordered Williams to pay $1,110 per month in child support. However, after Williams was convicted of Partner/Family Member Assault and lost his job, the court increased the child support to $2,262 per month. Williams then requested a review of his child support obligations, and the Child Support Services Division proposed two alternative amounts based on different scenarios. The Administrative Law Judge found Williams to be voluntarily underemployed and proposed a reduction of his monthly child support obligation to $944.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court's decision. The court found that Williams was voluntarily underemployed and had made a personal choice to leave a highly-skilled field to start a business that would potentially earn him less than one-third of his prior salary. The court held that it was appropriate to impute Williams' prior income when determining his child support obligations, as he had not provided any reasonable alternative that would provide for his child's current needs. The court also rejected Williams' argument that the District Court had erred in applying relevant statutory and legal authority. View "In re Parenting of S.J.W." on Justia Law

The case revolves around Candice Lea Davis, who was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI) after her vehicle was found high-centered on a rock berm. Davis had red and watery eyes, and the officer detected the smell of alcohol from her vehicle. She admitted to having a drink after her shift at work. Due to adverse weather conditions, the officer decided to conduct standardized field sobriety tests (SFSTs) at the Sheriff’s Office. Davis was handcuffed for transportation but was informed that she was not under arrest. After performing poorly on the SFSTs and a breath test at the Sheriff’s Office, Davis was arrested for DUI.Davis was convicted on all counts in Justice Court and appealed to the District Court for a trial de novo. She filed a motion to suppress, arguing that she was subjected to a custodial interrogation without being advised of her Miranda rights and that all evidence obtained after she was handcuffed should be suppressed. The State argued that the officer had particularized suspicion that Davis was driving under the influence. The District Court denied Davis's motion to suppress, reasoning that the officer had particularized suspicion to extend the stop at each step of his investigation.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court's decision. The court concluded that there was probable cause to believe Davis had committed the offense of DUI when she was placed in handcuffs and taken to the Sheriff’s Office for testing. The court also found that Davis's Miranda rights were not violated as she was not subjected to a custodial interrogation. The court held that the results of the SFSTs and breath test did not require a Miranda warning as they were not self-incriminating statements that must be suppressed in the absence of a Miranda waiver. View "State v. Davis" on Justia Law

The defendant, Sarah Taresu Olds, was charged with three misdemeanors, one of which was the offense of Habitual Offender Operating a Motor Vehicle. Olds proposed a jury instruction that the City was required to prove that she knew she was a habitual offender at the time of the traffic stop. The City argued that the offense was an absolute liability offense, meaning that they did not need to prove Olds's knowledge of her status as a habitual offender. The Municipal Court agreed with the City and Olds was found guilty.Olds appealed her conviction to the Eleventh Judicial District Court, arguing that the offense required proof of a culpable mental state. She also contended that her right to due process was violated because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on this element of the offense. The District Court affirmed Olds's conviction, concluding that the Municipal Court's interpretation of the law was correct and that the offense was an absolute liability offense.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that the offense of Habitual Offender Operating a Motor Vehicle is an absolute liability offense, meaning that the City did not need to prove a culpable mental state. The court also found that Olds was not denied due process because the jury was properly instructed. The court concluded that the Municipal Court did not err in declining to give Olds's proposed jury instruction. View "City of Kalispell v. Olds" on Justia Law

The defendant, Charles Geoffrey Santoro, was convicted of negligent homicide after a retrial. The case stemmed from an incident at a bar where Santoro and another patron, Levi, had a confrontation. Santoro claimed that Levi choked him, leading him to reverse his truck in an attempt to escape, which resulted in Levi being run over and killed.In the first trial, Santoro was convicted and sentenced to 20 years in prison, with five years suspended and no parole restriction. However, this conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court of the State of Montana due to ineffective assistance of counsel.In the retrial, the District Court granted the State's motion to exclude expert testimony on the effects of strangulation, which had been admitted in the first trial. Santoro was again convicted and this time sentenced to 20 years in prison with a full 20-year parole restriction.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana found that the District Court abused its discretion by excluding the expert testimony on strangulation. The court held that this testimony was relevant and could have assisted the jury in determining whether Santoro's actions were a "gross deviation" from that of a reasonable person in Santoro's situation. The court also found that the State's enhanced sentencing recommendation after retrial was vindictive and that the District Court erred by failing to allow Santoro the opportunity to speak prior to sentencing. The court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. View "State v. Santoro" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Joseph Brian McElroy, who was charged with criminal possession of dangerous drugs with intent to distribute, a felony. The charge stemmed from a traffic stop initiated by Trooper Adams for speeding. During the stop, Trooper Adams noticed the smell of marijuana from the vehicle and observed signs of "hard travel." After verifying the driver's information and concluding that the driver was not under the influence, Trooper Adams questioned the occupants about the smell of marijuana. When they denied consent to search the vehicle, Trooper Adams deployed a canine for a sniff test, which led to the discovery of drugs and other items. McElroy filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the traffic stop was unlawfully extended without sufficient particularized suspicion.The District Court denied McElroy's motion to suppress the evidence. The court found that Trooper Adams had sufficient particularized suspicion to conduct the canine sniff based on the smell of marijuana, signs of hard travel, the occupants' nervousness, and their somewhat differing backstories. McElroy then entered a plea agreement, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the District Court's decision. The court found that Trooper Adams did not have sufficient particularized suspicion to expand the traffic stop into a drug possession investigation. The court held that factors such as signs of hard travel, traveling from a known drug center in a third-party vehicle, and nervous demeanor, even when considered together, do not constitute particularized suspicion. The court also noted that the smell of marijuana itself does not constitute particularized suspicion sufficient to conclude there could be drugs in the vehicle. Therefore, the court concluded that Trooper Adams's further questioning about the marijuana smell and subsequent use of the canine sniff were unlawful. The court reversed the District Court's order denying McElroy's motion to suppress evidence and the resulting judgment of conviction and sentence. View "State v. McElroy" on Justia Law

Esandro Rodriguez was convicted by a jury of aggravated kidnapping, accountability for aggravated burglary, and two separate counts of accountability for assault with a weapon. The charges stemmed from an incident where Rodriguez, along with Jesse Daniels and Lauren Aviles, sought to collect money from Michael Crawford for a past drug transaction. During the incident, Rodriguez and Daniels held Amanda and Junior, Michael's girlfriend and mother's partner respectively, at gunpoint and forced them into a car. They then drove to Michael's mobile home, where they confronted Michael's mother, Leah. Daniels entered the home with a gun, causing chaos and fear among the occupants. Rodriguez was later charged with several offenses related to the incident.The District Court of the Eighth Judicial District convicted Rodriguez on four of the six counts he was charged with, including aggravated kidnapping of Amanda, accountability for assault with a deadly weapon against Junior, accountability for aggravated burglary, and accountability for assault with a weapon against Leah. Rodriguez appealed his convictions, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of aggravated burglary by accountability and that his convictions for aggravated burglary by accountability and assault with a weapon by accountability violated the multiple conviction statute.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed Rodriguez's conviction for aggravated burglary by accountability, finding that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Daniels committed assault with a weapon inside the home, thus supporting Rodriguez's conviction for aggravated burglary by accountability. However, the court reversed Rodriguez's conviction for assault with a weapon by accountability against Leah, ruling that the State had prosecuted the aggravated burglary charge in a manner that required proof that Daniels committed the assault inside the home. As such, the assault with a weapon charge merged, as a predicate offense, with aggravated burglary, and Rodriguez's conviction of both violated the multiple conviction statute. The court remanded the case for entry of an amended judgment consistent with its opinion. View "State v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

The case involves Donald Aaron Hesser, who was charged with felony driving under the influence (DUI) after a motorcycle accident. Hesser was found unconscious at the scene and was taken to the hospital for treatment. Upon learning of Hesser's four previous DUI convictions, Montana State Trooper Daniel Arnold requested that the hospital retain a blood sample taken from Hesser. An investigative subpoena was later issued for Hesser's medical records and blood sample, which revealed a blood alcohol content of .208. Hesser pleaded guilty but reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress the blood sample evidence.The District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, Cascade County, denied Hesser's motion to suppress the blood sample evidence. Hesser argued that Trooper Arnold lacked the authority to apply for an investigative subpoena, as only a prosecutor could do so under § 46-4-301(3), MCA. He also contended that there was insufficient probable cause for the subpoena. The District Court found that a prosecutor had sought the subpoena and that it was supported by probable cause, given Hesser's serious accident, the unexplained nature of the accident, and his prior DUI convictions.Upon review, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that there was sufficient probable cause for the issuance of the investigative subpoena. The court also determined that Trooper Arnold was authorized to request a blood draw under § 61-8-402(2)(a), MCA (2019), as Hesser, being unconscious, was considered statutorily not to have withdrawn his consent under § 61-8-402(3), MCA (2019). View "State v. Hesser" on Justia Law