Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed a conviction of sexual intercourse without consent. At issue was whether defendant's due process rights were violated by false and misleading DNA evidence. Also at issue was whether defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel. The court affirmed and held that defendant failed to demonstrate that his right to due process was violated where defendant failed to demonstrate that the DNA evidence was actually false, that there was no evidence that the prosecutor knowingly presented false testimony, and that that the false testimony was material and where there was no reasonable likelihood that the allegedly false testimony could have affected the jury's judgment where the prosecutor relied on DNA and non-DNA evidence. The court also held that defendant failed to demonstrate that he received ineffective assistance of counsel where the record did not reveal why trial counsel failed to undertake actions that he alleged she should have taken.

The State of Montana appealed an order of the district court reversing defendant's conviction for partner or family member assault where his wife called 911 while fleeing from the family home afraid that he would harm her. At issue was whether the evidence presented to establish reasonable apprehension of bodily injury was sufficient to support defendant's conviction where his wife testified at trial that many of her statements provided to the police were lies. Also at issue was whether the state's appeal was precluded by law because it sought to reinstate defendant's guilty verdict. The court first held that the state's appeal was not precluded by law where defendant was not subjected to impermissible retrial, further prosecution, or double punishment for the same offense. The court also held that the evidence presented by the prosecution could have allowed a rational trier of fact to conclude that the "reasonable apprehension of bodily injury" element was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt where the 911 recording clearly demonstrated the wife's outright fear, she was scared enough to flee her home into a cold, snowy night wearing only pajamas and socks, her fear was so great that the dispatcher had to coax her out of hiding, and three officers testified to her distraught appearance.

In November, 2009, Plaintiff-Appellee Mick Grant was convicted of felonious aggravated assault. On appeal, Appellant argued that the trial court's limiting voir dire prevented him from obtaining an impartial jury, and seeks reversal of his conviction. A key issue in the State's case for aggravated assault against Appellant was whether the victim's injuries could be considered "protracted." "Protracted" is part of the definition of "serious bodily injury" applicable in this case. The State planned on calling two doctors as expert witnessed to testify to the "protracted impairment" caused by the victim's injuries. During voir dire, Appellant's counsel sought to explore the juror's concepts of the word "protracted," which he alleged was necessary to evaluate potential juror bias as to the doctors' testimony. After questioning potential jurors in succession, the trial judge interjected during the examination, cutting it short. Over objection from counsel, the court did not modify its directive. The eventual jury convicted Appellant of aggravated assault. Appellant's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court's actions in cutting short his counsel's juror-by-juror inquiry of their understanding of "protracted" deprived him of a right to an impartial jury. On review, the Supreme Court noted its duty in balancing Appellant's "essential right to an impartial jury with the broad discretion a trial court has to oversee the administration of trial." The Court held that it was within the trial court's discretion to limit counsel's insistent focus on one word in the statutory elements of the offense and affirmed the lower court's decision.

Plaintiff-Appellee Anthony Otten appeals his misdemeanor conviction for operating a motor vehicle while declared a habitual traffic offender. Officers observed Appellee on a four-wheeler vehicle on the highway, and issued a citation. At trial, Appellee stipulated he was a habitual traffic offender whose license was revoked on the date of the offense. However, Appellee disputed the that the State could prove that the four-wheeler he was driving fit the definition of a "motor vehicle" according to state law. Appellee moved for a directed verdict; the court rejected the motion. On appeal, Appellee challenged the trial court's ruling on his motion. On review, the Supreme Court held that the definition of a quadricycle (or "four-wheeler") is clearly and unambiguously meets the definition of a motor vehicle within state law. The Court concluded that the lower court correctly denied Appellee's motions and affirmed the conviction.