Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed from the denial of her motion to dismiss the charge of criminal possession of dangerous drugs. At issue was whether the district court erred in denying defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to 46-11-503 and -504, MCA. The court affirmed the district court's judgment and held that defendant's charges did not fall within the meaning of the "same transaction" under 46-1-202(23)(a), MCA, and therefore, the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to 46-11-504, MCA. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to 46-11-503, MCA, where the plain meaning of the statute required "two or more offenses are knowing to the prosecutor..." and where the prosecutor did not know what the substances were until testing was conducted later.

Appellant appealed from the sentence imposed by the district court where appellant was charged with aggravated assault of his two-month-old daughter and found guilty after a jury trial. At issue was whether the district court sentenced appellant illegally by inappropriately enhancing his sentence because he refused to admit guilt. The court held that the district court imposed the sentence because of the gravity of the offense, the lifelong consequences that appellant's actions would have on his daughter, not because he refused to admit guilt. Therefore, the court affirmed the sentence where appellant's continued minimization of what actually occurred caused the child's medical treatment to be delayed and where appellant's sentence resulted from the combination of numerous factors.

J.A. was charged with burglary by common scheme and theft by common scheme when he was 17-years-old and placed on probation until February 2009 by the Youth Court. In December 2008, the State filed a petition to revoke probation and transfer supervision of J.A. to district court. The Youth Court issued a summons and, when J.A. did not appear, the court issued a warrant for his arrest. J.A. was not picked up on the warrant until May 2010, when he was 21-years-old. J.A. appealed the order entered by the Youth Court denying his motion for release from custody due to lack of jurisdiction. The court held that the Youth Court Act, section 46-18-203(2), MCA, did not provide for continuing jurisdiction in youth court over revocation proceedings after youth turned 21, even where a petition to transfer had previously been filed and therefore, the court held that it could not extend the Youth Court's jurisdiction beyond what the Legislature had clearly provided. Accordingly, the court held that the Youth Court erred in denying J.A.'s motion and reversed the Youth Court's order, remanding for further proceedings.

Defendant appealed from the judgment and conviction of deliberate homicide, felony murder. At issue was whether the district court erred by denying defendant's motion to suppress and by denying defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence at the close of the State's case-in-chief. Also at issue was whether defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel. The court held that the district court's findings of fact, considering the totality of the circumstances, were not clearly erroneous, and its conclusions of law were correct where defendant's waiver was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently given. The court also held that the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to find the elements of the crime had been committed beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore, the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence. The court further held that defendant failed to demonstrate that his counsel was ineffective and the court declined to address certain related issues on appeal and to apply plain error review. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant entered a plea agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to two counts of felony theft and to pay restitution for the loss incurred as a result of his fraudulent acts. At issue was whether the district court erred in issuing a restitution order where the State failed to submit sworn victim affidavits as required by 46-18-242(1)(b), MCA. The court held that defendant failed to preserve his objection to the pre-sentencing investigation report's omission of victim affidavits where, except for his lone objection on the date of sentencing, defendant did not alert the trial court of any claim that victim affidavits were required for an order of restitution in his case; where defendant's plea agreement expressly consented to the court's determination of restitution upon hearing; where his own filings acknowledged the accuracy of the surrender penalty figures; and where his pre-sentencing briefs stated the dispute in terms of legal argument regarding the measure of loss, which the parties had agreed to submit to the court for resolution, a ruling he did not challenge on appeal.

Defendant was found guilty of deliberate homicide, DUI, violation of an order of protection, criminal endangerment, driving while the privilege to do so was suspended or revoked, and tampering with physical evidence. At issue was whether defendant's right to be present at all critical stages of his criminal proceeding was violated and whether he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The court held that the district court did not commit reversible error when defendant was not allowed to be present at his omnibus hearing where, based on the facts, the court found that defendant suffered no prejudice as a result of his absence from the hearing. The court also held that the record did not demonstrate the reasoning behind any of the alleged errors committed by defendant's counsel and therefore, a postconviction proceeding would better address defendant's claims where the record could be fully developed.

Respondent entered a true plea and was adjudged delinquent in the district court in 2005 for knowingly engaging in sexual acts with a person under 12 years of age, which would have been a crime under 18 U.S.C. 2241(c) and 1153(a) if committed by an adult. At issue, in a certified question, was whether respondent's duty to remain registered as a sex offender under Montana law was contingent upon the validity of the conditions of his now-expired federal juvenile-supervision order that required him to register as a sex offender or was the duty an independent requirement of Montana law that was unaffected by the validity or invalidity of the federal juvenile-supervision conditions. The court held that respondent's state law duty to remain registered as a sex offender was not contingent upon the validity of the conditions of his federal supervision order, but was an independent requirement of Montana law. Therefore, the Montana Sexual or Violent Offender Registration Act ("SVORA"), 46-23-501 through 502, directly applied to respondent and he had a continuing duty to register under SVORA, which was entirely independent from the registration conditions imposed by his federal supervision order.

Petitioner appealed from an order of the district court denying his petition for post-conviction relief after he was convicted with two counts of sexual assault for touching the vaginal areas of his co-worker's two stepdaughters. At issue was whether petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel during trial and on direct appeal, and whether prosecutorial misconduct violated petitioner's due process rights. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying petitioner post conviction relief and held that petitioner did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel relating to counsel's pretrial investigation, use of expert testimony, decisions regarding objections to vouching and prosecutorial misconduct, admissibility of evidence, and other objections to trial irregularities, as well as on appeal, where petitioner failed to demonstrate the two-part test established in Strickland v. Washington. The court also held that petitioner failed to raise claims of prosecutorial misconduct on direct appeal and could not raise them in post-conviction relief.

Defendant appealed her misdemeanor convictions of driving while the privilege to do so was suspended, failing to carry proof of insurance, and driving under the influence. At issue was whether defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel when her counsel failed to file a motion to dismiss on grounds that she did not receive a speedy trial. The court held that defendant's attorney provided ineffective assistance where the attorney's failure to move for dismissal after six months following mistrial was deficient performance and did not meet the objective standard of reasonableness. The court also held that defendant suffered extreme prejudice as a consequence of her attorney's ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, the court remanded with instructions for the district court to dismiss and vacate defendant's charges.

Defendant appealed a conviction of driving under the influence of alcohol ("DUI") where the DUI was charged as a felony because he had three prior DUI convictions. At issue was whether the district court erred in denying defendant's motion to reduce the charge to a misdemeanor where he claimed that his 1997 conviction was constitutionally infirm because he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel. The court affirmed and held that defendant had not met his burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his 1997 conviction was constitutionally infirm due to his ineffective assistance of trial counsel where defendant failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable care and where, even assuming that it did, defendant failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different.