Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A jury found Robert DaSilva guilty of failure to provide notice of address change as a sex offender, a felony, and resisting arrest, a misdemeanor. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not violate DaSilva's due process rights by instructing the jury as a matter of law that DaSilva's previous Washington conviction of second degree assault with sexual motivation was a "sexual offense" under Montana law; and (2) the district court did not act arbitrarily or err in granting a continuance of trial that was requested by the State to permit an amendment to the information.

The State charged Michael Spreadbury with felony intimidation by way of an information. Spreadbury initially pled not guilty and moved to dismiss the information for failure to establish probable cause to charge him with intimidation. After the district court denied the motion, Spreadbury changed his plea to no contest without reserving any issues for appeal. The district court entered judgment against Spreadbury and imposed a one-year deferred sentence. Spreadbury appealed, arguing that the State had no probable cause to believe he committed the offense of felony intimidation. At issue was whether Spreadbury waived the right to raise a probable cause challenge when he entered his no contest plea without reserving the issue for appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment entered by the district court, holding that, by entering a no contest plea without reserving for appeal the question whether there was probable cause to support the information filed against him, Spreadbury waived the right to raise the issue on appeal from the final judgment entered.

After James Patrick filed a petition for postconviction relief, the district court judge who presided over Patrick's previous trial and sentencing recused herself and ordered that Patrick's postconviction proceedings be reassigned. Patrick filed a motion to invalidate the State's judicial substitution, which the district court denied. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court did not err when it denied Patrick's motion to invalidate the State's judicial substitution because the substitution in this instance was permitted, Patrick received notice of the substitution, and Patrick was not denied due process when the district court issued its order denying Patrick's motion without waiting for Patrick's reply brief; and (2) Patrick should have been given the opportunity to file his own motion for judicial substitution. The Court concluded that equity demanded that Patrick be given twenty days to move for a judicial substitution.

The Department of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks seized unlawfully killed deer head mounts, deer antlers, and a golden eagle skull and feathers from Lin Torgerson's residence and family business. Torgerson was charged with and subsequently convicted of possession of unlawfully killed wildlife and unlawful possession of bird parts. After trial, Torgerson filed a motion for the return of property seized during the investigation. The district court denied the motion. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court, holding that there was substantial evidence supporting the district court's determination that Torgerson had no right of possession to any of the exhibits he sought.

Brandon Burns was charged with felony DUI or, in the alternative, felony DUI per se. Ultimately, Burns pled guilty to DUI per se, reserving his right to appeal. The district court designated Burns as a persistent felony offender and sentenced him to fifteen years' incarceration. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding the district court did not err in (1) denying Burns' motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial; (2) denying Burns' motion to suppress evidence; (3) denying Burns' motion to dismiss the felony DUI charge on the grounds that his third prior DUI conviction was invalid; and (4) sentencing Burns as a persistent felony offender.

Defendant Wesley Couture was charged with a DUI. During trial, defense counsel attempted to introduce redacted versions of a video from the arresting officer's patrol car even though counsel had not listed the video as an exhibit pursuant to an omnibus order, nor had he provided a copy to the state. The court refused to admit the redacted video. Couture was convicted of the charges and designated a persistent felony offender (PFO). Couture filed a motion for a new trial, arguing, inter alia, that his trial was unfair because the court refused to allow him to admit the redacted video. The court denied the motion. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded Couture's offered video evidence at trial; (2) the district court did not err in sentencing Couture as a PFO; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Couture's motion for a new trial.

David Johnson, a life and disability insurance provider, entered a plea agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to two counts of felony theft and to pay restitution for the loss incurred as a result of his fraudulent acts. At an evidentiary hearing to determine restitution, the state did not present sworn affidavits from victims. The district court ultimately adopted the rationale for calculating restitution proposed by the state and ordered that Johnson pay $71,374 in restitution. On appeal, Johnson argued that without victim affidavits the restitution order was unlawful and his sentence must be corrected. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Johnson failed to preserve his objection to the omission of victim affidavits. Except for his objection on the date of sentencing, Johnson did not alert the trial court to any claim that victim affidavits were required for an order of restitution, and Johnson's plea agreement expressly consented to the court's determination of restitution upon hearing.

Following a jury trial, James Main Jr. was convicted of deliberate homicide and felony murder. Main appealed, arguing that (1) the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made to two police officers while he was being driven to the police station and while at the police station; (2) the district court erred by denying Main's motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence at the close of the state's case-in-chief; and (3) Main was denied effective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) Main voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights; (2) the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to find the elements of the crime had been committed beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) Main's ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be addressed in a postconviction proceeding.

While taking care of his infant daughter, R.G., Tony Garcia fell on top of R.G. then shook her when she did not respond. The next day R.G. was taken to the hospital where it was discovered that she was suffering from a traumatic subdural hemorrhage. The doctors found her injuries were consistent with violent shaking. Tony Garcia was charged with aggravated assault and found guilty after a jury trial. Garcia was sentenced to prison for 20 years, a period of time within the statutory parameters. Garcia appealed, arguing that his sentence was enhanced because he refused to admit guilt. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that far from punishing Garcia for maintaining his innocence, the district court imposed the sentence because a combination of numerous factors, not least of which was the gravity of the offense.

Defendant appealed from his convictions of felony incest, involving his fourteen-year-old son and six-year-old daughter, and his conviction of felony tampering with evidence. At issue was whether the district court erred when it allowed the six-year-old alleged incest victim to testify via a two-way electronic audio-video communication rather than in the presence of defendant and the jury. Also at issue was whether the district court abused its discretion when it prohibited defendant from conducting a forensic interview with, and calling as a trial witness, the four-year-old sibling of the two alleged incest victims. Further at issue was whether the district court erred in allowing the State to present evidence and summary testimony regarding pornographic images obtained from defendant's computer under 26-1-103, MCA, the transaction rule. The court held that defendant's constitutional right to confront witnesses against him was not violated when the 6-year-old testified via two-way electronic audio-video communication and that there was substantial evidence to support the district court's findings that the child would be traumatized by testifying in open court and in front of defendant. The court also held that it was entirely reasonable for the court to conclude that the four-year-old did not have relevant testimony to offer, was incompetent to testify, and would be psychologically harmed if required to testify. The court further held that defendant failed to preserve any possible error arising out of the admission of the summary evidence description of the photographic images for appeal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's rulings.