Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Scott Heddings was charged with felony incest in State court. While the incest charge was pending, Heddings was charged in federal court with receipt of child pornography, possession of child pornography, and destruction or removal of property to prevent seizure. Heddings pled guilty to federal court to these charges. Heddings then pled guilty to the incest charge in State court. Heddings subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing (1) he was subjected to double jeopardy because he was sentenced in State court for conduct that was used to enhance his federal sentence, and (2) his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel did not challenge the State court charge on double jeopardy grounds. The district court denied the petition, concluding that because the federal and State charges were based on separate conduct, Heddings' double jeopardy claim had no legal merit and, therefore, it would have been frivolous for his counsel to raise that claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the failure of Heddings' trial counsel to move for the dismissal of the State incest charge on double jeopardy grounds did not constitute ineffective assistance since the motion lacked merit and would not have changed the outcome of the proceedings.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Joshua McCaslin pled guilty to one count of failure to register as a sexual or violent offender. In accordance with the agreement, the district court committed McCaslin to the Department of Corrections (DOC) for five years, all suspended. Applicable to this appeal, the court applied credit for pretrial incarceration time served to any future revocation of McCaslin's suspended sentence rather than to his current fully suspended sentence. McCaslin appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that McCaslin's suspended sentence constituted a statutory judgment of imprisonment, and therefore, must be credited with the days of pretrial incarceration he served. Remanded.

Defendant John Finley's wife pleaded guilty to felony theft, and later, her probation officer conducted a valid search of her home. During a search of a safe in the couple's bedroom, the officer discovered drugs and drug paraphernalia. Defendant later entered conditional plea agreements to felony criminal possession of dangerous drugs and misdemeanor criminal possession of drug paraphernalia while reserving his right to appeal the district court's denial of his suppression motion. On appeal, Defendant challenged the district court's denial of his motion to suppress the evidence found in the safe, arguing that the probation officer exceeded the scope of the probationary search. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the probation officer legally searched the unlocked and open safe pursuant to the valid probationary search.

Defendant Hector Valdez-Mendoza pleaded guilty to one count of sexual assault. After the district court granted Defendant's request for new counsel, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw plea of guilty, asserting in part that he had good cause to withdraw his guilty plea because his previous defense counsel convinced him he could not get a fair trial. The district court denied Valdez-Mendoza's motion. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction, holding that Defendant had good cause to withdraw his guilty plea because his previous defense counsel shared her belief with Defendant that he could not get a fair trial and made no attempt to assuage Defendant's fear of an unfair trial. Remanded.

After a jury trial, Richard Edwards was found guilty of deliberate homicide. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding (1) the district court did not err when it permitted Edwards' wife's testimony because (a) her observations of Edwards' actions did not constitute spousal communications and therefore were not privileged, and (b) Edwards' marital communications regarding the murder that were accompanied by threats were not privileged because they were not communicated in reliance on the confidence of the marital relationship; (2) Edwards was not denied effective assistance of counsel because he failed to show he was prejudiced by defense counsel's admission of lack of preparation for cross-examination; and (3) while it was error for the district court not to inquire into Edwards' post-trial motion for new counsel, reversal in this case was not required because Edwards did not allege a conflict that resulted in a total lack of communication, nor did he claim that his attorneys were unable or unwilling to represent him at the sentencing hearing.

Rosina Spaulding pleaded guilty in district court to misdemeanor DUI per se. Spaudling reserved the right to appeal the district court's denial of her motion to suppress. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding the district court correctly denied Spaulding's motion to suppress as (1) although Spaulding was temporarily seized when a deputy sheriff pulled her vehicle over, made contact with her, and inquired as to her and her passengers' well-being, (2) the warrantless seizure was constitutionally reasonable because it met the criteria of the community caretaker doctrine, which allows a government official to stop and investigate a citizen without a warrant when there are objective, specific, and articulable facts from which an experienced officer would suspect that citizen is in need of help or is in peril.

John Chaussee was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol. The offense was alleged to be Chaussee's fourth DUI conviction, making it a felony. Chaussee filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that two of his prior DUI convictions were constitutionally invalid. The district court denied the motion. Chaussee pleaded guilty, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion. At issue on appeal was whether Chaussee sufficiently demonstrated that his prior convictions were constitutionally infirm. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of Chaussee's motion to dismiss, holding that Chaussee failed in his burdens of production and persuasion to demonstrate that his prior convictions were constitutionally invalid.

Defendant Sebastian Olivares-Coster pled guilty to deliberate homicide and attempted deliberate homicide and was sentenced to three life sentences. The district court did not orally impose any parole restrictions but presumed that Defendant would be eligible for parole after sixty years of incarceration. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment and commitment of the district court to the extent it provided that Defendant would be eligible for parole after sixty years, holding that because Defendant was a juvenile at the time he committed the offenses, the sixty-year restriction on Defendant's parole eligibility pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 46-23-201(4) was expressly prohibited by Mont. Code Ann. 46-18-222(1), which provides that restrictions on parole eligibility do not apply if the offender was less than eighteen years old at the time of the commission of the offense.

A jury convicted John Hartsoe of aggravated assault and violation of an order of protection. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and remanded in part, holding (1) the district court erred by by permitting Hartsoe to be shackled in a chair and brought into the courtroom during voir dire, but because the record was insufficiently developed to enable the Court to conduct a harmless error analysis, the matter was remanded to the district court to determine whether the violation was harmless in light of the interests that the right to remain free of physical restraints was designed to protect; and (2) the district court did not err in granting Hartsoe's request to represent himself as Hartsoe voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently elected to proceed pro se.

Gavin Johnston was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol after the result of a breath test taken by a breath analysis instrument called the Intoxilyzer 8000 showed Johnston had elevated blood alcohol levels. The district court granted Johnston's motion to suppress the results of the breath test pursuant to State v. Gieser because the Intoxilyzer 8000 had not been field tested within a week of Johnston's arrest. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's ruling, holding (1) the reference in Gieser to weekly field testing of breath analysis instruments was dicta and should not have been relied upon as authority as to how often breath analysis instruments must be field certified; and (2) the Intoxilyzer 8000 was properly certified as required by Mont. Admin. R. 23.4.213, which states that breath analysis instruments shall be field certified for accuracy at least once every thirty-one days.