Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involved a man who was charged with felony intimidation after an incident at a pre-release center in Helena, Montana. While reporting for a required urinalysis as a condition of probation, the defendant became upset with a staff member, Curt McAlpin, after being told his test was positive and would be reported to authorities. He was accused of threatening to “shoot up” the center if he had a gun, which caused alarm to McAlpin and led to subsequent police involvement. This event also formed the basis for revoking the defendant’s previously suspended sentence for earlier felony violations of an order of protection.Previously, in the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, the defendant was convicted by a jury of felony intimidation. The court denied his motions to dismiss for insufficient evidence and for a directed verdict of acquittal. The court also revoked his probation and resentenced him on the prior convictions, giving him credit for certain periods without violations. The defendant was sentenced to consecutive five-year prison terms for the intimidation conviction and the probation revocation. He then appealed both the conviction and the sentence.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the consolidated appeals. It held that there was sufficient evidence for a rational juror to convict the defendant of intimidation, the jury instructions were proper or any error was harmless, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion regarding evidentiary rulings. The court found no reversible plain error, no ineffective assistance of counsel on the record-based claims, and no cumulative error. The calculation of elapsed-time credit for the probation revocation was upheld as legal. The Supreme Court affirmed both the conviction and the sentence. View "State v. Strobel" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted of felony strangulation of a partner or family member after an incident in which she physically assaulted S.R., her romantic partner. During their relationship, the appellant exhibited a pattern of abusive behavior, including emotional and physical abuse, financial control, and threats. The charged offense occurred during a confrontation related to S.R.’s Facebook communication with another person. During this incident, the appellant took S.R.’s phone and, after a struggle, placed S.R. in a chokehold, applying significant weight that caused pain and lightheadedness but did not result in loss of consciousness. S.R. did not immediately report the assault but later confided in her sister, who helped her contact law enforcement. The appellant was subsequently interviewed by detectives, during which her statements about the incident changed multiple times.The First Judicial District Court for Lewis and Clark County initially declared a mistrial due to comments made in the presence of the jury regarding the controlling nature of the relationship. In preparation for the second trial, the court considered the admissibility of evidence of other acts of domestic violence by the appellant. The court ultimately allowed testimony regarding a pattern of abuse and control, excluding only allegations of prior sexual assault as unduly prejudicial, and permitted limited testimony about prior strangulation.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of other acts under Montana Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b). The Supreme Court held that the evidence was properly admitted for non-propensity purposes, specifically to demonstrate motive, explain the relationship dynamics, and clarify the victim’s behavior and credibility. The Court concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion and affirmed the conviction. View "State v. Mann" on Justia Law

A man was convicted in 2012 of felony murder following the death of a two-year-old child for whom he was the primary caretaker. The child had suffered severe head injuries consistent with nonaccidental trauma and was pronounced brain dead after being transported to a hospital. Law enforcement interviewed the man, who was advised of his Miranda rights and did not confess but offered alternative explanations for the injuries. He received a 100-year sentence without parole.After his conviction, the man filed a petition for postconviction relief in the Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, primarily alleging ineffective assistance of counsel on several grounds, including failure to move to suppress his statements to police, not hiring an independent medical expert, conceding in closing argument that the child’s injuries were not accidental, and not allowing him to testify. Initially denied without counsel, the case was remanded for appointment of counsel and a new hearing. With counsel, he renewed his claims and added an allegation that the State had not produced certain discovery related to a drug investigation at the residence. After a second evidentiary hearing, the District Court denied all claims, finding either they were procedurally barred, unsupported by evidence, or reflected reasonable trial strategy.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the District Court’s findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. Applying the two-prong test from Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court held that the man failed to demonstrate deficient performance by either his trial or appellate counsel, or resulting prejudice. The Court found that counsel’s actions were reasonable strategic decisions under the circumstances and that no meritorious claims for ineffective assistance or other postconviction relief were established. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s denial of the petition. View "Hyslop v. State" on Justia Law

The defendant was arrested in October 2021 and charged with robbery and disorderly conduct. Initial proceedings raised concerns about his mental fitness, and he was evaluated at Montana State Hospital. Multiple evaluations between December 2021 and April 2023 determined that he was unfit to proceed, largely due to his refusal to take medication. In October 2022, the court authorized involuntary medication following a Sell v. United States hearing. By April 2023, the defendant was found fit to proceed, and at a subsequent hearing, he was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty to both charges. In July 2023, a plea agreement was reached where the defendant pleaded guilty to attempted robbery in exchange for dismissal of the disorderly conduct charge.The Fourth Judicial District Court accepted the defendant’s guilty plea after confirming it was entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. At the change of plea hearing, the defendant expressed concern about a potential speedy trial violation and asked to have it noted for the record. The court acknowledged the statement but declined to accept briefing on the issue, and neither the defendant nor his counsel filed a motion or objected further. The defendant was subsequently sentenced to ten years, with credit for time served.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana considered whether the lower court abused its discretion by refusing to accept briefing on the speedy trial issue and whether the issue was preserved for review. The Supreme Court held that by voluntarily and knowingly pleading guilty without first obtaining an adverse ruling on a timely filed motion, the defendant waived all nonjurisdictional defects, including claims of speedy trial violations. The Court also declined to review the claim under the plain-error doctrine, finding no manifest miscarriage of justice. The judgment was affirmed. View "State v. Hill" on Justia Law

Police investigated a domestic disturbance in December 2020 involving the appellant, who was subsequently charged in Yellowstone County, Montana, with his fourth DUI-related offense. The State later amended the charges to include DUI per se for operating a noncommercial vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more, fourth or subsequent offense. The appellant entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to the amended charge in exchange for dismissal of the original DUI charge. At sentencing, both parties recommended specific incarceration and treatment conditions, and agreed to a $5,000 fine. The appellant requested that certain fees be waived due to his financial circumstances.The Thirteenth Judicial District Court accepted the plea, dismissed the original charge, and imposed the recommended sentence, including the mandatory-minimum $5,000 fine under § 61-8-731(1)(a)(iii), MCA (2019). The court also orally stated it would waive several fees. However, the written judgment subsequently entered required the appellant to pay a variety of fees and surcharges, contrary to the oral pronouncement. The appellant appealed, arguing that the mandatory fine was unconstitutional and that the imposition of fees conflicted with the oral pronouncement.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. Guided by its recent decision in State v. Cole, the Court held that sentencing courts must consider a defendant’s ability to pay when imposing the mandatory-minimum fine and may suspend the portion a defendant is unable to pay. Because the District Court made no findings regarding the appellant’s ability to pay, the Supreme Court reversed the fine and remanded for further proceedings consistent with Cole. The Court also ordered the written judgment to be amended to conform to the fees waived in open court. View "State v. C. Horn" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged in three separate cases with felony offenses in Lake County, Montana, including driving under the influence for a fourth or subsequent offense. The State also sought to revoke a previously imposed suspended sentence in another DUI case. A global plea agreement was reached, and the Twentieth Judicial District Court conducted a combined sentencing hearing. The court imposed consecutive prison terms and, as relevant here, imposed a $5,000 fine for the felony DUI, which it fully suspended after considering the defendant’s financial situation. The written judgment also included a condition allowing the probation office to reinstate suspended fines and fees if the defendant failed to comply with probation terms.The defendant appealed, challenging only two aspects of the judgment: the legality of the $5,000 fine, and the condition permitting the probation office to reinstate suspended financial penalties. The State conceded that the delegation to the probation office was improper but otherwise defended the judgment. The defendant argued that the mandatory minimum fine was unconstitutional, relying on a recent Montana Supreme Court decision. The State countered that the statute at issue was not addressed in that case and urged affirmance.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that, consistent with its more recent decision in State v. Cole, it is permissible for a sentencing court to impose the statutory $5,000 minimum fine for felony DUI, provided the court determines the defendant’s ability to pay and uses its authority to suspend the fine as appropriate. The court affirmed the imposition and suspension of the fine, finding the sentence lawful. However, the court held that the district court lacked authority to delegate to the probation office the power to reinstate suspended fines and fees. The case was remanded for entry of an amended judgment striking that condition. View "State v. Trombley" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of .08% or greater (DUI per se), first offense, in the City of Whitefish, Montana. He pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement that recommended a fine and surcharge, but also requested the court consider his ability to pay and suspend the fine if warranted. At sentencing, the defendant, then 73 years old, testified about his limited financial means, relying solely on Social Security income. The Municipal Court, while sympathetic, imposed the statutory $600 minimum fine, finding it lacked discretion to suspend it, but waived the surcharge.The defendant appealed to the Eleventh Judicial District Court, which affirmed the Municipal Court’s decision. On further appeal, the Montana Supreme Court, in a prior decision (City of Whitefish v. Curran, 2023 MT 118), found that the Municipal Court had the authority to consider alternatives to full payment of the fine and remanded for consideration of such alternatives. On remand, the Municipal Court held a new hearing, again reviewed the defendant’s financial circumstances, and suspended the $600 fine in its entirety, conditioned on the defendant’s completion of court-ordered alcohol education.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the applicable sentencing statutes require sentencing courts to determine a defendant’s ability to pay fines and allow courts to suspend mandatory minimum fines to the extent a defendant cannot pay. The Supreme Court found that the Municipal Court complied with these statutory requirements by considering the defendant’s ability to pay, imposing the statutory fine, and then suspending it. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s order upholding the Municipal Court’s sentence and judgment. View "City of Whitefish v. Curran" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was released from custody on the express condition that he appear at a scheduled adjudicatory hearing related to an unrelated felony. He failed to appear at the specified time and place, leading the State to charge him with the felony offense of Bail Jumping under Montana law. The defendant was arrested about ten weeks after missing the hearing. He pled not guilty and subsequently moved to dismiss the charge, arguing both that the statute was unconstitutionally vague—particularly regarding the requirement that his failure to appear be “without lawful excuse”—and that the State had failed to allege sufficient facts to establish probable cause, since it did not affirmatively show he lacked a lawful excuse.The Twentieth Judicial District Court of Montana denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The defendant then entered a plea agreement, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion. He admitted to the facts constituting the offense, including that he did not have a lawful excuse for missing the hearing.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether Montana’s bail-jumping statute is unconstitutionally vague and whether the State must allege facts negating the existence of a lawful excuse to establish probable cause. The Supreme Court held that the statute provides fair notice and sufficient guidelines to defendants and law enforcement, and is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant’s conduct. The Court also held that the State is not required to allege or prove the absence of a lawful excuse in its charging documents; rather, the existence of a lawful excuse is an affirmative defense for which the defendant carries the initial burden of production. The Court affirmed the judgment of the District Court. View "State v. Trombley" on Justia Law

The defendant was originally arrested for felony DUI in 2019 and sentenced to two years in the custody of the Montana Department of Corrections, followed by four years of suspended time, with credit for time served. After completing a residential treatment program, the remainder of his custodial sentence was to be served on probation, with the four-year suspended period to follow. The defendant later violated probationary terms, leading to a first revocation, where the district court imposed a suspended sentence except for placement into a treatment program and credited time served.Following additional probation violations, a second revocation proceeding occurred. After a hearing, the Fifth Judicial District Court found further violations and imposed a new disposition of five years, three months to the Department of Corrections, with credit for 505 days previously served. This resulted in a net DOC sentence of 1,410 days. Both the defendant and the State asserted that the district court improperly included the probationary portion of the original custodial sentence as part of the suspended time available for revocation, contrary to Montana law.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the district court erred by revoking and converting the remaining probationary period from the custodial portion of the sentence into a DOC commitment. The court determined that, under Montana statutes, only the suspended portion of a sentence may be revoked upon a petition, and the district court’s authority did not extend to the probationary period remaining on the custodial portion. The court reversed the disposition in part and remanded for correction, instructing the district court to revoke only the 1,204 days of remaining suspended time, and clarified that credit for time served must be properly applied as required by law. View "State v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was convicted in Oregon in 2001 of attempted unlawful sexual penetration in the first degree and sexual abuse in the second degree. After completing his sentence, including probation, in 2014, he moved to Montana in 2016 and registered as a sexual offender as required by law. In 2023, the Montana Department of Justice attempted to verify his address, but the verification was returned undeliverable. The defendant left a voicemail reporting a new address but did not update his registration in person, as required by the current statute.The State of Montana charged the defendant in 2024 with failure to register as a sexual offender, expressly citing the 2023 version of the Sexual or Violent Offender Registration Act (SVORA) in its charging documents. The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that retroactive application of the 2023 SVORA to his pre-2007 conviction violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Montana Constitution. The Second Judicial District Court agreed and dismissed the charge, concluding that applying the 2023 SVORA retroactively was unconstitutional.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the District Court’s dismissal de novo. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the State charged the defendant under the 2023 SVORA—and this Court has previously held that the post-2007 version of SVORA is punitive and cannot be applied retroactively to convictions predating its enactment—the prosecution could not stand. The Court emphasized that the State could not rely on older versions of SVORA not cited in the charging documents and did not address arguments regarding restoration of rights, limiting its decision to the ex post facto violation. The order of dismissal was affirmed. View "State v. Pratt" on Justia Law