Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff purchased a vehicle and an extended service contract for the vehicle from Defendant. Plaintiff signed several transactional documents, including a buyer's guide, a retail installment contract, and a retail purchase agreement, all of which contained statements providing that Defendant would not pay for costs for any repairs and that Defendant expressly disclaimed all express and implied warranties. The vehicle subsequently required repairs, which Defendant refused to pay for. Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking damages for Defendant's alleged failure to honor implied warranties of the vehicle. The justice court held that Defendant disclaimed implied warranties for the vehicle. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed on alternate grounds, holding (1) Defendant failed effectively to disclaim implied warranties on the vehicle; but (2) Plaintiff's breach of warranty claim failed for lack of evidence necessary to satisfy the elements of breach and causation. View "Payne v. Berry's Auto, Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose out of several business transactions entered into by parties involved in the development of condominiums on Hauser Lake. Cherrad, Merritt & Marie, and Max & V (the Hale interests) were limited liability companies owned by Conrad and Cheryl Hale. Craig Kinnaman was sole proprietor of a business called CK Design. Merritt & Marie purchased the Hauser Lake property. Subsequently, the Hales and Kinnaman agreed to develop a portion of the property. Cherrad was the developer, and Mountain West Bank (MWB) made three loans to Cherrad to develop the project. CK Design suffered delays in the project and later left the project. In 2007, Kinnaman committed suicide, and the Estate recorded a $3.3 million construction lien on the condominiums. MWB brought this action 2008 against the Hale interests and the Estate seeking foreclosure on the three secured loans. The Hale interests and the Estate cross-claimed against each other. The district court (1) declared the Estate's construction lien invalid; and (2) determined Cherrad owed the Estate $76,278 for work that CK Design performed on the project. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Mountain West Bank, N.A. v. Cherrad, LLC" on Justia Law

On December 14, 2012, the district court issued an alternative writ of mandate directing several irrigation districts to comply with Mont. Code Ann. 85-7-1956 and -1957 before executing a water use agreement with the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Nation and the United States. On February 15, 2013, the district court issued another writ of mandate that rescinded and superseded the alternative writ of mandate. The writ of mandate enjoined the irrigation districts from entering into the proposed agreement. The Supreme Court vacated both the district court's writ of mandate and injunction and the court's alternative writ of mandate, holding that the district court (1) issued an appealable order, making the appeal from the district court's writ of mandate and injunction as well as the issue of whether the statutes apply to the water use agreement properly before the Court; (2) improperly granted the writ of mandate and injunction; and (3) incorrectly compelled the irrigation districts to comply with sections 85-7-1956 and -1957 before they executed the water use agreement. View "W. Mont. Water Users Ass'n, LLC v. Mission Irrigation Dist." on Justia Law

To help finance her purchase of a condominium (condo) for $395,000, Mary McCulley sought a residential loan from Heritage Bank (Bank) for $300,000. American Land Title Company (ALTC) provided a commitment for title insurance. McCulley signed a promissory note and signed a deed of trust as collateral. Subsequently, ALTC changed the designated use of the condo in the deed from residential to commercial. After closing, McCulley discovered the Bank had issued her an eighteen-month, $300,000 commercial property loan rather than the thirty-year residential property loan for which she applied. When she was unable to obtain long-term refinancing on the property, McCulley signed a warranty deed transferring ownership of the condo to the Central Asia Institute and used the proceeds to pay off the loan. McCulley then sued ALTC and the Bank (collectively, Defendants) for, inter alia, negligence, breach of contract, slander of title, and fraud. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the district court's order of summary judgment in favor of the Bank on the issue of fraud, as genuine issues of material fact existed relative to McCulley's claim of fraud on the part of the Bank; and (2) otherwise affirmed. View "McCulley v. Am. Land Title Co." on Justia Law

This dispute stemmed from the actions of a former Bank employee, Diane Becker, who pleaded guilty to federal fraud and money laundering charges. Becker had previously assisted Marilyn Feller with her banking and finances. Feller filed a complaint against the Bank, alleging, inter alia, negligent supervision, wrongful conversion, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, claiming that her financial standing and credit reputation were damaged by Becker and the Bank. The district court entered summary judgment for the Bank, determining (1) Feller's state law causes of action were preempted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act, (2) Feller failed to provide sufficient evidence to support her emotional distress claims, and (3) Feller failed to establish the element of unauthorized control on her conversion claim. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in entering summary judgment in favor of the Bank on all of Feller's claims. View "Feller v. First Interstate Banksystem, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident and received medical treatment at Benefis Health System, Inc. Plaintiff had healthcare coverage as a TRICARE beneficiary and also had medical payments coverage through his insurance carrier, Kemper. Plaintiff's medical treatment costs totaled $2,073. Benefis accepted $662 from TRICARE as payment in full satisfaction of the bill pursuant to a preferred provider agreement (PPA) between Blue Cross Blue Shield and Benefis. Benefis subsequently received $1,866 from Kemper, upon which Benefis reimbursed TRICARE's payment in full. Plaintiff filed an individual and class action complaint, claiming that he was entitled to the additional $1,204 that Benefis received from Kemper over and above the TRICARE reimbursement rate. Plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, asking the district court to find Benefis breached its contract with TRICARE and that Benefis was liable for Plaintiff's damages. The district court converted the motion into a motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment, holding (1) Plaintiff was not entitled to pocket the difference between the TRICARE reimbursement rate and the amount Benefis accepted from Kemper; and (2) Plaintiff failed to establish any damages that resulted from the alleged breach. View "Conway v. Benefis Health Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff submitted an online application for a payday loan with Geneva-Roth Ventures, which charged Plaintiff an interest rate of 780 percent APR. The loan agreement contained an arbitration clause. Plaintiff entered into the contract over the Internet and did not separately sign or initial the arbitration clause. Plaintiff brought a putative class action against Geneva-Roth for charging an interest rate higher than the thirty-six percent APR permitted by the Montana Consumer Loan act for payday loans. Geneva-Roth filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause in the loan agreement. The district court denied the motion, determining that the arbitration clause was unenforceable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the arbitration clause qualified as a contract of adhesion and fell outside Plaintiff's reasonable expectations. Therefore, the arbitration clause was unconscionable. View "Kelker v. Geneva-Roth Ventures, Inc." on Justia Law

This action arose from easement disputes at Big Sky Lake. Plaintiffs were homeowners who owned lakeshore lots. The access road was owned by the Homeowners Association and provided the access to each lakeshore lot. Later, the larger tracts of land outside the access road were divided between the Hollinger and Williams families. The Hollingers' land did not abut the lakeshore and did not abut the lakeshore lots. Plaintiffs claimed a right, based upon language in various documents that arose from the initial development of the lake, to an express easement allowing them the unrestricted use of four roads or trails on the Hollingers' lands for motorized access. After the Hollingers installed gates at several points to block motorized access to the disputed roads, Plaintiffs sued in district court. The district court granted summary judgment to the Hollingers, holding that none of the documents relied upon by Plaintiffs established an easement across the Hollingers' land. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly applied the facts and the law to conclude that Plaintiffs had not established any right to easements over the Hollingers' land. View "Thayer v. Hollinger" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs acquired the assets of a restaurant. Defendant owned the real property on which the building was located. Plaintiffs and Defendant entered into an agreement granting Plaintiffs a ten-year lease of Defendant's real property. The lease granted Plaintiffs the option to purchase Defendant's real property in 1999 at the expiration of the lease. Plaintiffs claimed they provided written notice to Defendant of their interest in purchasing the property and that Defendant agreed to the appointment of an independent appraiser in 2000, but Defendant never followed through in procuring an appraisal. In 2009, Plaintiffs filed a complaint requesting a declaratory judgment and order requiring Defendant to select an independent appraiser and sell the property. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint on statute of limitations grounds and granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment on her unlawful detainer counterclaim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a set of facts that would enable them to equitably estop Defendant from raising her statute of limitations defense; and (2) the district court did not improperly consider matters outside the pleadings in reaching its decision to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint. View "Situ v. Smole" on Justia Law

Kristy Johnston, Judy Olsen, and their mother, Joyce Johnston, owned real property as tenants in common. Joyce left her one-third interest in the property to Kristy when she died. Kristy sent a letter to Judy in 2009 in which she offered to buy Judy's interest in the property or to sell her interest to Judy. Judy accepted Kristy's offer to sell. Kristy subsequently attempted to reject Judy's acceptance and revoke her offer to sell. Judy filed a complaint against Kristy. The court granted Judy's motion for summary judgment, determining that the letters exchanged between Judy and Kristy had created an enforceable contract that satisfied the statute of frauds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly concluded that the parties' exchange of letters created an enforceable contract. View "Olsen v. Johnston" on Justia Law