Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

For more than a century, Asarco LLC and its predecessors operated a lead smelting facility (the Site). For almost fifty years, Atlantic Richfield Company’s predecessor operated a zinc fuming plant on land leased from Asarco at the Site. Atlantic Richfield subsequently sold the plant and related property to Asarco. Due to extensive contamination at the Site, the Environmental Protection Agency determined that Asarco was obligated to fund cleanup efforts at the Site. After conducting extensive remediation at the Site, Asarco filed a complaint seeking contribution pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) from Atlantic Richfield, asserting that Atlantic Richfield was liable under CERCLA for its equitable share of costs related to the Site’s cleanup. The federal district court granted summary judgment for Atlantic Richfield, concluding that Asarco’s claims were untimely under CERCLA’s statute of limitations. Asarco then commenced the present action against Atlantic Richfield alleging several state-law claims. The district court granted Atlantic Richfield’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the doctrine of claim preclusion barred Asarco’s claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that claim preclusion barred Asarco’s action because Asarco could have brought its state-law claims before the federal district court in Asarco I. View "Asarco LLC v. Atlantic Richfield Co." on Justia Law

For more than a century, Asarco LLC and its predecessors operated a lead smelting facility (the Site). For almost fifty years, Atlantic Richfield Company’s predecessor operated a zinc fuming plant on land leased from Asarco at the Site. Atlantic Richfield subsequently sold the plant and related property to Asarco. Due to extensive contamination at the Site, the Environmental Protection Agency determined that Asarco was obligated to fund cleanup efforts at the Site. After conducting extensive remediation at the Site, Asarco filed a complaint seeking contribution pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) from Atlantic Richfield, asserting that Atlantic Richfield was liable under CERCLA for its equitable share of costs related to the Site’s cleanup. The federal district court granted summary judgment for Atlantic Richfield, concluding that Asarco’s claims were untimely under CERCLA’s statute of limitations. Asarco then commenced the present action against Atlantic Richfield alleging several state-law claims. The district court granted Atlantic Richfield’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the doctrine of claim preclusion barred Asarco’s claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that claim preclusion barred Asarco’s action because Asarco could have brought its state-law claims before the federal district court in Asarco I. View "Asarco LLC v. Atlantic Richfield Co." on Justia Law

Julia Fenwick and the State, Department of Military Affairs and Emergency Services Division (Department) executed a Severance Agreement whereby the Department agreed to lay off Fenwick, as opposed to discharging her, in exchange for Fenwick releasing any claims she had against the Department. Fenwick later filed this action alleging that the Severance Agreement should be rescinded for several reasons. The district court concluded as a matter of law that the Severance Agreement could not be rescinded. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by (1) ruling that the Severance Agreement was lawful; and (2) ruling that the undisputed facts established that the Department’s consideration for the Severance Agreement did not fail. Remanded with instructions to proceed on Fenwick’s remaining claims. View "Fenwick v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff initiated this action against Defendant alleging that Defendant defrauded her out of $100,000. Plaintiff alleged claims of unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and fraud. The district court ultimately granted default judgment in favor of Plaintiff after Plaintiff filed a motion for sanctions requesting a default judgment against Defendant as a sanction for violating a district court scheduling order requiring mediation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing default judgment for Defendant’s failure to comply with the court ordered mediation; and (2) the district court did not err in awarding prejudgment interest. View "Stafford v. Fockaert" on Justia Law

This was the third of three lawsuits arising from the development of condominiums at Lakeside Village on Hauser Lake in Lewis and Clark County. Cherrad, LLC (Cherrad) was the project’s developer and Mountain West Bank (Bank) was its lender. Craig Kinnaman was the general contractor on the project but died in 2007. In this third suit, the estate of Kinnaman (the Estate) brought eight claims against the Bank. The Bank moved for summary judgment on all the Estate’s claims on the grounds that the claims were barred by the compulsory counterclaim rule or the doctrine of claim preclusion. The district court granted summary judgment on all claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion (1) in granting the Bank’s motion to change venue; (2) in granting summary judgment in favor of the Bank on all claims; (3) by taking judicial notice of the record in previous actions; and (4) by denying the Estate’s motion for relief from judgment under Mont. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). View "Kinnaman v. Mountain West Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Keller Transport, Inc. leased a tanker truck from Wagner Enterprises, LLC to transport gasoline. The truck’s trailer overturned and spilled 6,380 gallons of gasoline, which flooded several homeowners’ properties. Keller and Wagner were both insured under a commercial transportation policy. Westchester Surplus Lines Insurance Company insured both Keller and Wagner under an excess liability policy. Homeowners initiated suit against Keller and Wagner. Westchester undertook defense of the suit on behalf of Kohler and Wagner pursuant to a reservation of rights and defended Keller and Wagner until the limit of its excess coverage had allegedly been exhausted. Westchester sought a declaration that the limit under its excess policy was $4 million in total and that the limit had been exhausted. As relevant to this appeal, the district court granted summary judgment against Westchester. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err by determining that Westchester’s policy was ambiguous and that it provided an additional $4 million in coverage under the “general aggregate” limit; but (2) erred by holding that Westchester breached its duty to defend the insureds under its policy. View "Westchester Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Keller Transport, Inc." on Justia Law

Todd Kiser initiated this action by filing a form complaint against Noel Kiser and Marie McDowell alleging that Noel and Marie owed him a sum of money arising out of an asserted agreement among them regarding their father’s nursing care and cremation costs. The small claims court entered judgment in favor of Todd. Noel and Marie appealed the judgment to the district court. The district court dismissed the appeal, reasoning that the brief filed by Noel and Marie had been untimely filed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in dismissing the appeal on the basis of the briefing deadline imposed in the inapplicable Municipal Court Appellate Rules. Remanded to the district court for reinstatement of Noel and Marie’s appeal and for further proceedings. View "Kiser v. Kiser" on Justia Law

Continental Partners bought a lot with two building pads from Yellowstone Development that was part of the Yellowstone Club subdivision. The purchase and sale agreement included an assurance that the houses Continental intended to build on the lot would have ski-in and gravity ski-out access built by the Yellowstone Club. During construction, Continental sold the homes to separate buyers, including the managing member of WLW Realty Partners, LLC. Before construction on the ski-out access on the two homes had begun, the Yellowstone Club filed for bankruptcy protection. The subsequent owners of Yellowstone Club informed the new owners that ski-out access to the homes would not be constructed. WLW Realty filed this action against Continental, alleging, inter alia, negligent misrepresentation and violation of the Montana Consumer Protection Act (MCPA). After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment for WLW Realty. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred by (1) imposing liability on Continental for negligent misrepresentation, as WLW Realty failed to satisfy the first and second elements of the tort; and (2) finding that Continental had violated the MCPA, as Continental did not engage in unfair or deceptive acts or practices. View "WLW Realty Partners, LLC v. Continental Partners VIII, LLC" on Justia Law

Starting in 2007, A&C Soaring Eagle, Inc. (A&C) purchased chemicals and fertilizer on account from Fitterer Sales Montana, Inc. (Fitterer). In 2009, Fitterer filed suit alleging that A&C and Clint Mullin, Jr. (Clint), A&C’s president and sole shareholder, personally owed Fitterer $98,184 and that it was owed interest on the amount due. After a bench trial in 2014, the district court found that A&C and Clint personally breached a contract with Fitterer for the sale of goods. The court ordered A&C and Clint to pay Fitterer $114,398, which included unpaid principal and interest calculated at a rate of ten percent per year from June 11, 2007 to November 30, 2014. The court also ordered A&C and Clint to pay $526 per month in prejudgment interest. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) a valid, binding contract existed between A&C and Fitterer for the sale of goods; (2) Fitterer was entitled to prejudgment interest on the amount due under the contract; and (3) as conceded on appeal by Fitterer, Clint should be dismissed as a defendant in this case. View "Fitterer v. Mullin" on Justia Law

In 2009, Carol McClue was involved in a serious car accident. At the time of the accident, Carol had underinsured motorist (UIM) insurance coverage through Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois. In 2011, Carol was diagnosed with bulbar ALS. In 2013, Carol died from the illness. After the diagnosis, Dan McClue, Carol’s husband, submitted claims to Safeco for UIM benefits for damages associated with Carol’s ALS. Safeco denied the claims. Dan subsequently filed suit against Safeco, asserting that Safeco breached the insurance contract by failing to provide UIM benefits for Carol’s ALS. Before trial, the district court granted Safeco’s motions in limine to exclude expert testimony from two doctors - Dr. John Sabow and Dr. Decontee Jimmeh-Fletcher. The district court subsequently granted summary judgment to Safeco on the grounds that, without the expert testimony, Dan did not have admissible evidence to establish that the car accident caused Carol’s ALS. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s ruling barring Dan from using Dr. Jimmeh-Fletcher’s testimony to establish causation in this case; but (2) reversed the district court’s ruling that Dr. Sabow was not qualified to present expert testimony during trial. View "McClue v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ill." on Justia Law