Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner appealed from an order of the district court denying his petition for post-conviction relief after he was convicted with two counts of sexual assault for touching the vaginal areas of his co-worker's two stepdaughters. At issue was whether petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel during trial and on direct appeal, and whether prosecutorial misconduct violated petitioner's due process rights. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying petitioner post conviction relief and held that petitioner did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel relating to counsel's pretrial investigation, use of expert testimony, decisions regarding objections to vouching and prosecutorial misconduct, admissibility of evidence, and other objections to trial irregularities, as well as on appeal, where petitioner failed to demonstrate the two-part test established in Strickland v. Washington. The court also held that petitioner failed to raise claims of prosecutorial misconduct on direct appeal and could not raise them in post-conviction relief.

Defendant appealed her misdemeanor convictions of driving while the privilege to do so was suspended, failing to carry proof of insurance, and driving under the influence. At issue was whether defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel when her counsel failed to file a motion to dismiss on grounds that she did not receive a speedy trial. The court held that defendant's attorney provided ineffective assistance where the attorney's failure to move for dismissal after six months following mistrial was deficient performance and did not meet the objective standard of reasonableness. The court also held that defendant suffered extreme prejudice as a consequence of her attorney's ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, the court remanded with instructions for the district court to dismiss and vacate defendant's charges.

The Missoula City Counsel, the City of Missoula, and the Mayor, (collectively "City") and Muth-Hilberry, LLC ("developer") appealed a district court determination that found that the City was arbitrary and capricious in approving a zoning and preliminary plat for a subdivision known as Sonata Park located in Rattlesnake Valley, Montana. At issue was whether neighbors, several parties opposed to the subdivision, and the North Duncan Drive Neighborhood Association, Inc. ("Association") had standing. Also at issue was whether the district court erred in striking affidavits filed by the developer and the City in connection with their motions for summary judgment. Further at issue was whether the 1989 Sunshine Agreement between the City and the developer's predecessor in interest superseded the City's growth policy. Finally at issue was whether the City's decision in Sonata Park was arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful. The court held that the neighbors had standing to sue in their own right and that the Association had associational standing to proceed on behalf of its members. The court also held that any error made by the district court in granting the neighbor's motion to strike the developer's affidavit was harmless. The court further held that the Sunlight Agreement did not supersede the City's growth policy where the Sunlight Agreement could be void ab initio and did not appear to guarantee certain density. The court finally held that substantial compliance was still valid and that a government body must substantially comply with its growth policy in making zoning decisions and that the City's decision to approve Sonata Park was arbitrary, capricious, and unlawful.

Defendant appealed a conviction of driving under the influence of alcohol ("DUI") where the DUI was charged as a felony because he had three prior DUI convictions. At issue was whether the district court erred in denying defendant's motion to reduce the charge to a misdemeanor where he claimed that his 1997 conviction was constitutionally infirm because he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel. The court affirmed and held that defendant had not met his burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his 1997 conviction was constitutionally infirm due to his ineffective assistance of trial counsel where defendant failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable care and where, even assuming that it did, defendant failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different.

Defendant appealed a conviction of sexual intercourse without consent. At issue was whether defendant's due process rights were violated by false and misleading DNA evidence. Also at issue was whether defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel. The court affirmed and held that defendant failed to demonstrate that his right to due process was violated where defendant failed to demonstrate that the DNA evidence was actually false, that there was no evidence that the prosecutor knowingly presented false testimony, and that that the false testimony was material and where there was no reasonable likelihood that the allegedly false testimony could have affected the jury's judgment where the prosecutor relied on DNA and non-DNA evidence. The court also held that defendant failed to demonstrate that he received ineffective assistance of counsel where the record did not reveal why trial counsel failed to undertake actions that he alleged she should have taken.

The State of Montana appealed an order of the district court reversing defendant's conviction for partner or family member assault where his wife called 911 while fleeing from the family home afraid that he would harm her. At issue was whether the evidence presented to establish reasonable apprehension of bodily injury was sufficient to support defendant's conviction where his wife testified at trial that many of her statements provided to the police were lies. Also at issue was whether the state's appeal was precluded by law because it sought to reinstate defendant's guilty verdict. The court first held that the state's appeal was not precluded by law where defendant was not subjected to impermissible retrial, further prosecution, or double punishment for the same offense. The court also held that the evidence presented by the prosecution could have allowed a rational trier of fact to conclude that the "reasonable apprehension of bodily injury" element was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt where the 911 recording clearly demonstrated the wife's outright fear, she was scared enough to flee her home into a cold, snowy night wearing only pajamas and socks, her fear was so great that the dispatcher had to coax her out of hiding, and three officers testified to her distraught appearance.

In November, 2009, Plaintiff-Appellee Mick Grant was convicted of felonious aggravated assault. On appeal, Appellant argued that the trial court's limiting voir dire prevented him from obtaining an impartial jury, and seeks reversal of his conviction. A key issue in the State's case for aggravated assault against Appellant was whether the victim's injuries could be considered "protracted." "Protracted" is part of the definition of "serious bodily injury" applicable in this case. The State planned on calling two doctors as expert witnessed to testify to the "protracted impairment" caused by the victim's injuries. During voir dire, Appellant's counsel sought to explore the juror's concepts of the word "protracted," which he alleged was necessary to evaluate potential juror bias as to the doctors' testimony. After questioning potential jurors in succession, the trial judge interjected during the examination, cutting it short. Over objection from counsel, the court did not modify its directive. The eventual jury convicted Appellant of aggravated assault. Appellant's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court's actions in cutting short his counsel's juror-by-juror inquiry of their understanding of "protracted" deprived him of a right to an impartial jury. On review, the Supreme Court noted its duty in balancing Appellant's "essential right to an impartial jury with the broad discretion a trial court has to oversee the administration of trial." The Court held that it was within the trial court's discretion to limit counsel's insistent focus on one word in the statutory elements of the offense and affirmed the lower court's decision.