Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed from his convictions of felony incest, involving his fourteen-year-old son and six-year-old daughter, and his conviction of felony tampering with evidence. At issue was whether the district court erred when it allowed the six-year-old alleged incest victim to testify via a two-way electronic audio-video communication rather than in the presence of defendant and the jury. Also at issue was whether the district court abused its discretion when it prohibited defendant from conducting a forensic interview with, and calling as a trial witness, the four-year-old sibling of the two alleged incest victims. Further at issue was whether the district court erred in allowing the State to present evidence and summary testimony regarding pornographic images obtained from defendant's computer under 26-1-103, MCA, the transaction rule. The court held that defendant's constitutional right to confront witnesses against him was not violated when the 6-year-old testified via two-way electronic audio-video communication and that there was substantial evidence to support the district court's findings that the child would be traumatized by testifying in open court and in front of defendant. The court also held that it was entirely reasonable for the court to conclude that the four-year-old did not have relevant testimony to offer, was incompetent to testify, and would be psychologically harmed if required to testify. The court further held that defendant failed to preserve any possible error arising out of the admission of the summary evidence description of the photographic images for appeal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's rulings.

Defendant appealed from the denial of her motion to dismiss the charge of criminal possession of dangerous drugs. At issue was whether the district court erred in denying defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to 46-11-503 and -504, MCA. The court affirmed the district court's judgment and held that defendant's charges did not fall within the meaning of the "same transaction" under 46-1-202(23)(a), MCA, and therefore, the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to 46-11-504, MCA. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to 46-11-503, MCA, where the plain meaning of the statute required "two or more offenses are knowing to the prosecutor..." and where the prosecutor did not know what the substances were until testing was conducted later.

Appellant appealed from the sentence imposed by the district court where appellant was charged with aggravated assault of his two-month-old daughter and found guilty after a jury trial. At issue was whether the district court sentenced appellant illegally by inappropriately enhancing his sentence because he refused to admit guilt. The court held that the district court imposed the sentence because of the gravity of the offense, the lifelong consequences that appellant's actions would have on his daughter, not because he refused to admit guilt. Therefore, the court affirmed the sentence where appellant's continued minimization of what actually occurred caused the child's medical treatment to be delayed and where appellant's sentence resulted from the combination of numerous factors.

Appellant appealed from an order of the district court dismissing its complaint for condemnation and entering judgment in favor of appellee. At issue was whether the district court erred in issuing an order concluding that appellant did not possess the power of eminent domain, either express or implied, and it had no authority to take the private property of a nonconsenting landowner. The court concluded that HB 198 provided appellant authority to pursue eminent domain proceedings and that HB 198 explicitly codified eminent domain authority into the Major Facility Siting Act ("Act"), Title 75, chapter 20. The court held that HB 198 retroactively applied to appellant's certificate issued pursuant to the Act and the explicit language of HB 198 was in conflict with the district court's order. Accordingly, the court reversed the order dismissing appellant's complaint and remanded for further proceedings.

J.A. was charged with burglary by common scheme and theft by common scheme when he was 17-years-old and placed on probation until February 2009 by the Youth Court. In December 2008, the State filed a petition to revoke probation and transfer supervision of J.A. to district court. The Youth Court issued a summons and, when J.A. did not appear, the court issued a warrant for his arrest. J.A. was not picked up on the warrant until May 2010, when he was 21-years-old. J.A. appealed the order entered by the Youth Court denying his motion for release from custody due to lack of jurisdiction. The court held that the Youth Court Act, section 46-18-203(2), MCA, did not provide for continuing jurisdiction in youth court over revocation proceedings after youth turned 21, even where a petition to transfer had previously been filed and therefore, the court held that it could not extend the Youth Court's jurisdiction beyond what the Legislature had clearly provided. Accordingly, the court held that the Youth Court erred in denying J.A.'s motion and reversed the Youth Court's order, remanding for further proceedings.

Defendant appealed from the judgment and conviction of deliberate homicide, felony murder. At issue was whether the district court erred by denying defendant's motion to suppress and by denying defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence at the close of the State's case-in-chief. Also at issue was whether defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel. The court held that the district court's findings of fact, considering the totality of the circumstances, were not clearly erroneous, and its conclusions of law were correct where defendant's waiver was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently given. The court also held that the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to find the elements of the crime had been committed beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore, the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence. The court further held that defendant failed to demonstrate that his counsel was ineffective and the court declined to address certain related issues on appeal and to apply plain error review. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant entered a plea agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to two counts of felony theft and to pay restitution for the loss incurred as a result of his fraudulent acts. At issue was whether the district court erred in issuing a restitution order where the State failed to submit sworn victim affidavits as required by 46-18-242(1)(b), MCA. The court held that defendant failed to preserve his objection to the pre-sentencing investigation report's omission of victim affidavits where, except for his lone objection on the date of sentencing, defendant did not alert the trial court of any claim that victim affidavits were required for an order of restitution in his case; where defendant's plea agreement expressly consented to the court's determination of restitution upon hearing; where his own filings acknowledged the accuracy of the surrender penalty figures; and where his pre-sentencing briefs stated the dispute in terms of legal argument regarding the measure of loss, which the parties had agreed to submit to the court for resolution, a ruling he did not challenge on appeal.

Plaintiff, on behalf of a class of similarly situated plaintiffs who received Medicaid assistance and were subject to a Medicaid lien pursuant to 53-2-612, MCA, sued defendant alleging that defendant had collected a greater amount than it was entitled from plaintiffs' recoveries from other sources. The parties raised several issues on appeal. The court held that Ark. Dept. of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn applied retroactively to all class members' claims and that defendant must raise affirmative defenses with respect to individual class members to avoid Ahlborn's effect. The court held that the applicable statute of limitations to be 27-2-231, MCA, which provided for a five-year limitations period. The court declined to disturb the district court's order requiring defendant to compile data on individual class members' claims. The court reversed the district court's determination as to interest assessed against defendant, and concluded that no interest could be assessed until two years after any judgment had been entered, under 2-9-317, MCA. The court concluded that the term "third party" in the Medicaid reimbursement statutes included all other sources of medical assistance available to Medicaid recipients, including private health or automobile insurance obtained by the Medicaid recipient. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the class on its proffered distinction between "first party" and "third party" sources. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that plaintiffs' "made whole" claim was immaterial in light of Ahlborn.

Defendant was found guilty of deliberate homicide, DUI, violation of an order of protection, criminal endangerment, driving while the privilege to do so was suspended or revoked, and tampering with physical evidence. At issue was whether defendant's right to be present at all critical stages of his criminal proceeding was violated and whether he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The court held that the district court did not commit reversible error when defendant was not allowed to be present at his omnibus hearing where, based on the facts, the court found that defendant suffered no prejudice as a result of his absence from the hearing. The court also held that the record did not demonstrate the reasoning behind any of the alleged errors committed by defendant's counsel and therefore, a postconviction proceeding would better address defendant's claims where the record could be fully developed.

Respondent entered a true plea and was adjudged delinquent in the district court in 2005 for knowingly engaging in sexual acts with a person under 12 years of age, which would have been a crime under 18 U.S.C. 2241(c) and 1153(a) if committed by an adult. At issue, in a certified question, was whether respondent's duty to remain registered as a sex offender under Montana law was contingent upon the validity of the conditions of his now-expired federal juvenile-supervision order that required him to register as a sex offender or was the duty an independent requirement of Montana law that was unaffected by the validity or invalidity of the federal juvenile-supervision conditions. The court held that respondent's state law duty to remain registered as a sex offender was not contingent upon the validity of the conditions of his federal supervision order, but was an independent requirement of Montana law. Therefore, the Montana Sexual or Violent Offender Registration Act ("SVORA"), 46-23-501 through 502, directly applied to respondent and he had a continuing duty to register under SVORA, which was entirely independent from the registration conditions imposed by his federal supervision order.