Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After child R.M.T. had been in the custody of the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services for two years, the Department petitioned for termination of Father's and Mother's rights. After finding that Father's attempts to comply with his treatment plan failed to reach the level necessary to complete the plan, the court determined that the termination of Father's parental rights was in R.M.T.'s best interest. The court then terminated both Father's and Mother's parental rights. Father appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the lower court did not abuse its discretion when it terminated Father's rights; and (2) the lower court violated Father's due process rights when at the termination hearing the court declined Father's request to cross-examine the guardian ad litem, who submitted a factual report to the court, but because the report provided no new information to the court, the exclusion of the guardian ad litem's testimony did not cause substantial injustice to Father.

Harold Caldwell was injured when he fell at an airport where he worked as manager. The airport's insurer, MACo, paid Caldwell's medical and wage-loss benefits. MACo, however, denied Caldwell rehabilitation benefits based on Mont. Code Ann. 39-71-710. Caldwell challenged the constitutionality of the statute on the basis that its categorical termination of benefits based on a claimant's eligibility for social security violated equal protection principles. The Workers' Compensation Court (WCC) agreed, concluding that the statute creates two similarly situated classes and treats them disparately without being reasonably related to a legitimate government interest. MACo appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statute creates two similarly situated classes and treats them differently, and (2) the categorical elimination of rehabilitation benefits in the statute based solely on age-defined eligibility for social security does not rationally relate to any governmental interest. Therefore, the statute violates the Equal Protection clause insofar as it deems disabled workers ineligible to receive rehabilitation benefits based on their eligibility for social security benefits.

Montana resident Robin Jordan petitioned for a temporary protective order in a Montana county court against Ohio resident Mark Kalin. The court issued the temporary protective order, and Kalin appealed. In the district court, Kalin moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The district court did not rule on the motion but found it had jurisdiction in its findings issued after the substantive hearing. The district court then adopted a permanent order of protection prohibiting Kalin from having any contact with Jordan or her husband. Kalin appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in failing to grant Kalin's motion to dismiss as the allegations of the petition were sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the district court; (2) the evidence was sufficient for the district court to issue a permanent order of protection; and (3) the district court's order of protection did not punish Kalin for exercising his constitutional right to defend himself in court.

Following a jury trial, James Main Jr. was convicted of deliberate homicide and felony murder. Main appealed, arguing that (1) the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made to two police officers while he was being driven to the police station and while at the police station; (2) the district court erred by denying Main's motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence at the close of the state's case-in-chief; and (3) Main was denied effective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) Main voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights; (2) the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to find the elements of the crime had been committed beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) Main's ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be addressed in a postconviction proceeding.

Defendant appealed from his convictions of felony incest, involving his fourteen-year-old son and six-year-old daughter, and his conviction of felony tampering with evidence. At issue was whether the district court erred when it allowed the six-year-old alleged incest victim to testify via a two-way electronic audio-video communication rather than in the presence of defendant and the jury. Also at issue was whether the district court abused its discretion when it prohibited defendant from conducting a forensic interview with, and calling as a trial witness, the four-year-old sibling of the two alleged incest victims. Further at issue was whether the district court erred in allowing the State to present evidence and summary testimony regarding pornographic images obtained from defendant's computer under 26-1-103, MCA, the transaction rule. The court held that defendant's constitutional right to confront witnesses against him was not violated when the 6-year-old testified via two-way electronic audio-video communication and that there was substantial evidence to support the district court's findings that the child would be traumatized by testifying in open court and in front of defendant. The court also held that it was entirely reasonable for the court to conclude that the four-year-old did not have relevant testimony to offer, was incompetent to testify, and would be psychologically harmed if required to testify. The court further held that defendant failed to preserve any possible error arising out of the admission of the summary evidence description of the photographic images for appeal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's rulings.

Defendant appealed from the denial of her motion to dismiss the charge of criminal possession of dangerous drugs. At issue was whether the district court erred in denying defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to 46-11-503 and -504, MCA. The court affirmed the district court's judgment and held that defendant's charges did not fall within the meaning of the "same transaction" under 46-1-202(23)(a), MCA, and therefore, the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to 46-11-504, MCA. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to 46-11-503, MCA, where the plain meaning of the statute required "two or more offenses are knowing to the prosecutor..." and where the prosecutor did not know what the substances were until testing was conducted later.

Appellant appealed from the sentence imposed by the district court where appellant was charged with aggravated assault of his two-month-old daughter and found guilty after a jury trial. At issue was whether the district court sentenced appellant illegally by inappropriately enhancing his sentence because he refused to admit guilt. The court held that the district court imposed the sentence because of the gravity of the offense, the lifelong consequences that appellant's actions would have on his daughter, not because he refused to admit guilt. Therefore, the court affirmed the sentence where appellant's continued minimization of what actually occurred caused the child's medical treatment to be delayed and where appellant's sentence resulted from the combination of numerous factors.

Appellant appealed from an order of the district court dismissing its complaint for condemnation and entering judgment in favor of appellee. At issue was whether the district court erred in issuing an order concluding that appellant did not possess the power of eminent domain, either express or implied, and it had no authority to take the private property of a nonconsenting landowner. The court concluded that HB 198 provided appellant authority to pursue eminent domain proceedings and that HB 198 explicitly codified eminent domain authority into the Major Facility Siting Act ("Act"), Title 75, chapter 20. The court held that HB 198 retroactively applied to appellant's certificate issued pursuant to the Act and the explicit language of HB 198 was in conflict with the district court's order. Accordingly, the court reversed the order dismissing appellant's complaint and remanded for further proceedings.

J.A. was charged with burglary by common scheme and theft by common scheme when he was 17-years-old and placed on probation until February 2009 by the Youth Court. In December 2008, the State filed a petition to revoke probation and transfer supervision of J.A. to district court. The Youth Court issued a summons and, when J.A. did not appear, the court issued a warrant for his arrest. J.A. was not picked up on the warrant until May 2010, when he was 21-years-old. J.A. appealed the order entered by the Youth Court denying his motion for release from custody due to lack of jurisdiction. The court held that the Youth Court Act, section 46-18-203(2), MCA, did not provide for continuing jurisdiction in youth court over revocation proceedings after youth turned 21, even where a petition to transfer had previously been filed and therefore, the court held that it could not extend the Youth Court's jurisdiction beyond what the Legislature had clearly provided. Accordingly, the court held that the Youth Court erred in denying J.A.'s motion and reversed the Youth Court's order, remanding for further proceedings.

Defendant appealed from the judgment and conviction of deliberate homicide, felony murder. At issue was whether the district court erred by denying defendant's motion to suppress and by denying defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence at the close of the State's case-in-chief. Also at issue was whether defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel. The court held that the district court's findings of fact, considering the totality of the circumstances, were not clearly erroneous, and its conclusions of law were correct where defendant's waiver was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently given. The court also held that the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to find the elements of the crime had been committed beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore, the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence. The court further held that defendant failed to demonstrate that his counsel was ineffective and the court declined to address certain related issues on appeal and to apply plain error review. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.