Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Susan Overfield was charged with assault and disturbing the peace after appearing to speak at a City Commission meeting about perceived conflicts of interest between City officials and the Animal Foundation of Great Falls. Overfield subsequently sued the City. Before the City and Overfield settled the case, the district court concluded (1) the Animal Foundation, its trustee, and its attorney (Petitioners), who were non-parties in the underlying case, were in contempt for wrongfully redacting information from documents produced to Overfield, and (2) the Foundation was in contempt for failing to appear at a deposition with subpoenaed documents. After the case was settled, the district court entered an order awarding Overfield attorney fees against the Petitioners based on the contempt orders. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the contempt orders of the district court, holding that the district court properly considered and decided the contempt issues below without referral to another judge, and the contempt orders were supported by substantial evidence; but (2) vacated the district court's order to arrest the trustee, the court's imposition of sanctions against an attorney who filed a protective order on behalf of the Foundation, and the court's order awarding attorney fees. Remanded. View "Animal Found. of Great Falls v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Charley Johnson entered a nolo contendere plea to intimidation for repeated sexually assaultive behavior against his stepdaughter. During sentencing, the district court (1) sentenced Johnson to a ten-year commitment to the department of corrections, (2) required Johnson to pay for counseling costs previously incurred by his stepdaughter as well as an undetermined amount for future counseling costs she would incur the period of Johnson's sentence, and (3) imposed a condition restricting Johnson from places where children can congregate. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed, holding that Johnson failed to preserve for appellate review the issue of whether the district court erred in imposing restitution for past and future counseling expenses incurred by the victim, but (2) remanded for calculation for future restitution in compliance with Mont. Code Ann. 46-18-244. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

After a police officer arrested Jason Jenkins for driving a motorcycle under the influence of alcohol, Jenkins agreed to a breath test. Jenkins was subsequently convicted of driving under the influence (DUI). On appeal, Jenkins contended that the district court erred by admitting field certification documents as part of the foundation for the admission of the results of his breath test, alleging that they were hearsay because the officer who submitted the documents was not the author or custodian of the documents. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the results of the breath test because case law has established that when a district court is determining whether there is adequate foundation for admission of breath test results in a DUI prosecution, Mont. R. Evid. 104(4)(a) authorizes the court to do so without regard to whether the certification forms are hearsay. View "State v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

Bill Thomas was convicted and sentenced for deliberate homicide. Thomas subsequently field a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the district court denied. Thomas filed a notice of appeal. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Court would continue to consider a party's appeal from a district court's denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus as an original petition. The Supreme Court held (1) a district court's denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus in a criminal proceeding is not appealable to the Court; (2) because a writ of habeas corpus may be granted by either a district court or the Supreme Court, the district court's denial of such a writ is not res judicata because it does not divest the Court of jurisdiction to grant a subsequent petition; and (3) a party must file an original petition for writ of habeas corpus for the Court to consider it. The Court then (1) granted Thomas's motion to proceed on appeal without payment of a filing fee; and (2) ordered that Thomas's appeal from the district court's order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus be dismissed with prejudice. View "Thomas v. John Doe" on Justia Law

Brent Wilson appealed from his conviction for involvement in a fraudulent scheme to illegally take possession of real property. Prior to and throughout the jury trial, Wilson invoked his constitutional right to represent himself. On appeal, Wilson argued, inter alia, that he was not competent to waive his constitutional right to counsel and the district court should have compelled standby counsel to represent him. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was substantial credible evidence that Wilson unequivocally waived his right to counsel knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently; and (2) Wilson's sentence was legal because the length of the commitment was within the district court's statutory authority, the court took the sentencing criteria of Mont. Code Ann. 46-18-225(2) into account, and the court did not punish Wilson for refusing to confess to his crimes. View "State v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Ross Habets pled guilty to aggravated assault. The district court sentenced Habets to a one-year commitment to the Department of Corrections followed by placement at the state prison for nineteen years. Habets appealed, arguing that (1) the district court failed to account for Habets's mental illness and his attempts to seek health treatment before the incident in violation of Montana's sentencing policy and principles, and (2) the court failed to comply with the rehabilitative section of the sentencing policy statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court followed the law in this case by properly considering the necessary factors in sentencing Habets. View "State v. Habets" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Larry Daniels was convicted of deliberate homicide. In defense, Daniels asserted justifiable use of force. Daniels' arguments on appeal pertained to the 2009 legislative changes to the justifiable use of force statutes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) justifiable use of force is still an affirmative defense, and the defendant has the initial burden of providing evidence to raise the defense, and then the burden of proof shifts to the State; (2) the district court correctly disallowed cross-examination concerning specific instances of the victim's violent acts under Mont. R. Evid. 405(a); (3) proper foundation was necessary before the victim's character evidence could be admitted, and under the facts of this case, the district court correctly required Daniels to lay a proper foundation by testifying; and (4) the district court correctly refused Daniels' proposed jury instructions on justifiable use of force in defense of an occupied structure and burglary as a forcible felony.

Rodrick Cameron was charged with driving under the influence (DUI). Cameron filed a motion to suppress, claiming that the deputy sheriff that stopped Cameron's vehicle lacked particularized suspicion to stop him. The justice court denied Cameron's motion. Cameron entered a guilty plea to DUI while reserving his right to appeal the justice court's denial of his motion to suppress. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the district court did not err in affirming the justice court's denial of Cameron's motion to suppress because, based on the totality of the circumstances, the deputy sheriff had sufficient facts to form a particularized suspicion of wrongdoing to initiate an investigative stop.

Miles Kingman was charged with attempted deliberate homicide for the brutal assault of a man outside a bar. A jury acquitted Kingman of the homicide charge but convicted him of aggravated assault, a lesser-included offense. Kingman was sentenced to twenty years' incarceration. On appeal, Kingman (1) claimed that the publicity surrounding the incident had prejudiced the community to such an extent that he could not get a fair trial by jurors drawn from that community, and (2) argued that the prosecutor improperly characterized him at the sentencing hearing as an "animal" that "needed to be caged." The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Kingman did not show a sufficient basis for presuming that the entire community jury pool was corrupted by the pre-trial publicity; and (2) although the prosecutor's remarks were inappropriate, there was no indication that the remarks had factored into the district court's decision to impose the maximum sentence for aggravated assault.

In this consolidated appeal, each Appellant was charged with DUI, and each took a breath test on the Intoxilyzer 8000. Each Appellant sought source code and other information related to the Intoxilyzer 8000 during the prosecution of their cases. The district court limited the requests of each Appellant. After these rulings, each Appellant pled guilty. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court on all issues, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion (1) by giving full faith and credit to a Kentucky court's determination that the source code was a trade secret of CMI, Inc. and determining that Appellants did not show undue hardship requiring the court to order CMI to make the source code available to Appellants; and (2) by quashing portions of Appellants' subpoena duces tecum seeking information regarding the use of every Intoxilyzer 8000 in the state after finding the request was unreasonable and oppressive.