Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Wesley Benn was convicted by a jury of sexual intercourse without consent and sexual assault. Benn appealed and then died the following month. Counsel for Benn filed a notice advising that Benn had passed away, and the State moved for dismissal, arguing that Benn's death had mooted the appeal. Benn's counsel filed a response opposing the State's motion, suggesting that the Supreme Court's precedent was unclear about the effect of a defendant's death upon the proceeding. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding (1) abatement of the proceeding ab initio is an inappropriate resolution of a case when the defendant has died; (2) a criminal case is not moot if the appeal involves concrete interests which are not individual to the defendant and survive the defendant; and (3) in this case, Benn's appeal was moot because his challenge to his sexual assault conviction and his contention that his counsel was ineffective were individual to him, and therefore, the Court could not grant effective relief. View "State v. Benn" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Richard Covington was convicted of robbery and deliberate homicide. The court issued a life sentence without the possibility of parole based on Covington's two previous robbery convictions pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 56-18-219(1)(b)(iv). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Covington failed to meet his burden of establishing that the district court infringed on an enhanced right to a jury trial under the Montana Constitution in his argument that the existence of facts, including a prior conviction, that triggers the application of the sentence enhancement process of section 46-18-219(1)(b)(iv) must be submitted to the jury; and (2) the district court did not err by refusing to suppress evidence obtained from Convington's binder and notebooks. View "State v. Covington" on Justia Law

Appellant Charles Clary was charged with aggravated burglary and assault with a weapon. The day before the omnibus hearing, Clary's attorney filed a motion to have Clary transported to the proceeding. The district court did not rule on the motion, and the omnibus hearing proceeded without Clary present. Clary subsequently insisted on proceeding pro se, which the district court allowed. The jury found Clary guilty as charged. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) Clary's right to be present at all critical stages of his criminal proceeding was not violated by his absence from the omnibus hearing where the hearing did not constitute a critical stage requiring Clary's presence; and (2) the district court did not err in allowing Clary to continue pro se without conducting further inquiry into Clary's complaints regarding his attorney where substantial evidence supported the court's finding that Clary made a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel and Clary did not request substitute counsel. View "State v. Clary" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Susan Miner was convicted of the offense of assault on a peace officer, a felony. Miner appealed, arguing that she received ineffective assistance of counsel because her counsel did not move for a mistrial when two consecutive prosecution witnesses inadvertently mentioned Miner's potential DUI charge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Miner was not prejudiced by the statements, there was no reasonable possibility that the testimony of the witnesses contributed to Miner's conviction; and (2) therefore, the second prong of Strickland v. Washington was not met because Miner was not prejudiced by her counsel's failure to make a motion for a mistrial, and her trial was fundamentally fair. View "State v. Miner" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Rhonda Hall was sentenced on her conviction of charges of obstructing a peace officer, disorderly conduct, and assault with a bodily fluid. At the conclusion of the City's case, the district court judge expressed her concern that the City had not presented sufficient evidence to meet its burden of proof. Defense counsel subsequently filed a motion that the case be dismissed for insufficient evidence, which the trial court granted. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment, finding that inasmuch as the court dismissed the City's case against Hall for insufficient evidence, Hall stood acquitted and could not be retried, and the City had no appeal from the district court's decision. View "City of Cut Bank v. Hall" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant Blaine Fadness was convicted of three counts of attempted deliberate homicide. One of the conditions of Defendant's suspended sentence was that he not own, possess, or be in control of any firearms of deadly weapons. The county attorney subsequently filed a petition for order of disposing of evidence, seeking an order giving him authority to sell Defendant's firearms, dangerous weapons, ammunition, and other equipment that the government had seized for use in the investigation and trial. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order in part, holding that the district court (1) erred in permitting the State to sell items that were not firearms, ammunition, or deadly weapons, as Defendant was entitled to have those items returned; (2) did not err in denying Defendant possession of the firearms, ammunition, and deadly weapons; and (3) did not abuse its discretion in allowing the State to sell Defendant's firearms, ammunition, with the proceeds to go to Defendant's father as an agent for Defendant, rather than releasing the items to Defendant's parents, who had no plan for selling them and little or no knowledge about how to do so. Remanded. View "State v. Fadness" on Justia Law

T.M.L. was seventeen when he pled guilty to felony burglary and misdemeanor criminal trespass to vehicles. The youth court entered a dispositional order providing that T.M.L. be placed on probation until he reached age eighteen, after which supervision was to be transferred to the district court and adult probation and parole department. After T.M.L. turned eighteen, the youth court transferred T.M.L.'s matter to district court and transferred T.M.L.'s supervision to adult supervision under the department of corrections. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the youth court's denial of T.M.L.'s motion to dismiss where the youth court had jurisdiction over T.M.L.; and (2) remanded the matter for the limited purpose of striking the condition that T.M.L. register as a sexual offender as a condition of T.M.L.'s sentence, as the youth court did not have the power to require T.M.L. to register as a sexual offender. View "In re T.M.L." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Charles Branham was found guilty of mitigated deliberate homicide for the fatal stabbing of Miachel Kinross-Wright and was sentenced to forty years' incarceration without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit evidence offered by Branham to show Kinross-Wright's propensity for violence where the evidence was unknown to Branham at the time of the stabbing; (2) Branham failed to demonstrate that the prosecutor made improper comments during trial and that he was denied a fair trial; and (3) the district court provided sufficient reasons for limiting parole eligibility. View "State v. Branham" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Western Tradition Partnership (WTP), Champion Painting, and Montana Shooting Sports Foundation (MSSF), sued the Montana Attorney General and the Commissioner of Political Practices, seeking a declaration that Mont. Code Ann. 13-35-227(1) violated their freedom of speech protected by the state and federal Constitutions by prohibiting political expenditures by corporations on behalf of or opposing candidates for public office. The district court declared the statute unconstitutional, granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs, enjoined enforcement of the statute, and denied the motion of Champion and MSSF for an award of attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed and entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants after applying the principles enunciated in Citizens United v. F.E.C., holding that Montana has a compelling interest to impose the challenged rationally-tailored statutory restrictions. View "Western Tradition P'ship v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Bryan LeMay was convicted of numerous offenses ranging from disorderly conduct to assault with a weapon, in three separate causes of action. The Supreme Court consolidated the causes of action into this opinion and affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err when it denied LeMay's motion to dismiss on the grounds of outrageous government conduct; (2) the assistance of LeMay's counsel was reasonable considering all the circumstances; (3) the district court properly denied LeMay's motion to withdraw his nolo contendere pleas, as they were voluntarily entered; (4) the district court did not err when it denied LeMay's motion to suppress because the officer had sufficient facts to form a particularized suspicion of wrongdoing to initiate an investigative stop; and (5) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied LeMay's motion to dismiss for lack of state criminal jurisdiction. View "State v. LeMay" on Justia Law