Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Pro se Defendant Ronald Petersen appealed a district court order that denied his petition for post-conviction relief and his motion to suppress his confession. In January 2009, Defendant pled guilty to Deliberate Homicide in the shooting death of Clyde Wilson. After initially pleading not guilty, Defendant executed an Acknowledgment of Rights and Plea Agreement wherein he agreed to plead guilty to the charge of Deliberate Homicide in connection with Wilson's death, and the State agreed to recommend a sentence of 100 years with no time suspended. Defendant changed his mind on the plea agreement: he claimed that he was manipulated and pressured into pleading guilty. In addition, Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress Confession claiming that his confession was coerced. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Defendant's claim that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because the District Court rejected the plea agreement, was already decided against him in his direct appeal to the Supreme Court. The doctrine of res judicata barred relitigation of that issue when it was adequately raised on direct appeal. Moreover, the Court found that Defendant waived the right to raise his remaining claims when he pled guilty. Accordingly the Court held that all of Defendant's claims raised on appeal were procedurally barred, and affirmed the district court's denial of his petition for relief. View "Petersen v. Montana" on Justia Law

Defendant Thomas Evans appealed the revocation of his suspended sentence. In 2003, Defendant pled guilty to issuing bad checks for which he was sentenced to a five-year commitment to the Department of Corrections. Defendant was given credit for nineteen days served pending final disposition. The sentence was suspended pursuant to conditions, and was to run consecutive to a prior Missioula County sentence, also for issuing bad checks. One of the conditions of his suspended sentence was that he “remain law-abiding.” Late 2010, Missoula law enforcement responded to a report that Defendant had assaulted his former girlfriend. The felony assault charge was eventually dismissed, but Defendant retained a misdemeanor PFMA count. The district court denied his motion to dismiss and revoked Defendant's suspended sentence. Defendant appealed and raised several issues on appeal: (1) the District Court lacked jurisdiction to conduct the revocation proceedings; (2) Defendant was denied due process; (3) Defendant challenged whether the State established grounds for revocation by a preponderance of the evidence; and (4) Defendant alleged that the District Court erred in failing to award him credit for time served in jail prior to the revocation of his suspended sentence. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court indeed miscalculated Defendant's credit for time served. The Court remanded the case so that the lower court could give Defendant additional credit for time served in the amount of ninety-five days for a total of 158 days. The District Court was affirmed in all other respects. View "Montana v. Evans" on Justia Law

Glacier Kitchens, Inc., CR Weaver Trust, and the Estate of Grace Weaver (collectively "Defendants") appealed the denial of their motion to set aside the default judgments issued against them in district court. Weaver filed a complaint against Plaintiff Mountain West Bank (MWB) alleging breach of contract, unfair trade practices, and a violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. MWB filed its answer and counterclaim for judicial foreclosure. MWB attempted to serve the Defendants at the residence of Weaver by personally serving Weaver’s daughter Elizabeth Weaver (Elizabeth). Elizabeth bore no relationship to the Defendants, other than she is Weaver’s daughter. Weaver filed a pro se answer to MWB’s counterclaim as it related to him. The Defendants failed to file an answer or otherwise appear. As a result, MWB applied for entries of default against them. Weaver filed a pro se motion to set aside the judgments against Defendants. In his motion, Weaver noted that Elizabeth was not legally qualified to accept service on behalf of the Defendants. MWB objected and argued that Weaver had failed to explain why Elizabeth was not authorized to accept service on behalf of the Defendants. MWB additionally contended that Weaver, as a non-attorney, could not appear on behalf of the Defendants. The Supreme Court dismissed Weaver's appeal without prejudice due to the fact that as a pro se appellant, Weaver was unable to bring an appeal on behalf of the Defendants. Defendants through counsel made a motion to set aside the default judgments arguing MWB's alleged faulty service. The Defendants' motion to set aside the default judgments was deemed denied pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 60(c) (2009) when the District Court failed to rule on them within 60 days. It is from that denial that the Defendants appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred when it failed to set aside the default judgments issued against Defendants due to the problem with service. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mtn. West v. Glacier Kitchens, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Emily Blodgett petitioned the Supreme Court for a Writ of Supervisory Control alleging that the Missoula County Justice Court violated sections 3-10-231 through -234, MCA; Article VII Sections 1 and 5 of the Montana Constitution, and several of the Court's prior decisions when it allowed a retired district court judge to preside over her jury trial. Petitioner contended that the presiding justice of the peace improperly called the judge to preside over the case even though the justice was present in her court but otherwise involved with another case. Finding that though the retired judge was qualified by his training and experience to act as a substitute justice of the peace, he was not one at the time he presided over Petitioner's trial because the statutory procedures to vested him with the power to perform judicial functions as a substitute justice of the peace had not been followed. Consequently, any purported judicial acts performed by the judge in this case were void ab initio. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's request for a Writ of Supervisory Control and held that Petitioner's jury trial was void ab initio. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Blodgett v. Missoula JP Court" on Justia Law

This matter involved two cases, one involving two youths who appeared in youth court for detention hearings and one involving an adult who pled guilty to driving under the influence in justice court. After appearing in district court, the youths filed motions to substitute district court judge, and the court denied the motions as untimely. After the adult pled guilty in justice court, she appealed only the justice court's denial of her pretrial suppression motion, which the district court denied as untimely. The Supreme Court granted a petition for writ of supervisory control for the youths and denied it for the adult, holding (1) the district court improperly determined that the youths had filed untimely motions for substitution of district judge; and (2) the district court correctly denied the adult's motion for substitution of district court judge, as no right exists under Mont. Code Ann. 3-1-804 to substitute a district judge in an appeal of a specific pre-trial legal ruling from justice court. View "Bledsoe v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Appellant James Davis appealed from his conviction of one count of criminal distribution of dangerous drugs by accountability, claiming that the State presented insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he provided assistance in the drug deal that preceded his charge. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could not have found that Davis purposely promoted or facilitated the sale of drugs, and therefore, the district court erred when it denied Davis' motion to dismiss the charge of criminal distribution of dangerous drugs by accountability on the basis of insufficient evidence. View "State v. Davis" on Justia Law

Appellant Michael Miller was convicted of the deliberate homicide after a jury trial. The Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. Miller subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance and that his appellate counsel's failure to raise his trial counsel's ineffectiveness on direct appeal constituted ineffective assistance. The district court dismissed Miller's petition for failure to state a claim, reasoning that Miller had exhausted his remedy of appeal and that his ineffectiveness claims were record-based assertions which he did or reasonably could have raised on appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Miller's claims against his trial counsel were without merit, and thus, he could not state a claim of ineffectiveness against his appellate counsel for failing to raise ineffectiveness claims against his trial counsel in his direct appeal. View "Miller v. State" on Justia Law

The State charged Anthony Leyva with sexual intercourse without consent. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the State dismissed the charge and filed an amended information charging Leyva with burglary by remaining unlawfully in the victim's home with the purpose to commit a sexual assault therein. Defendant was subsequently convicted of burglary following his plea of guilty. The district court sentenced him to twenty years in prison, fifteen years of which the court suspended on numerous conditions. Leyva appealed the conditions of his suspended sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court erred in imposing a condition designating Leyva as a Level II sexual offender, as, pursuant to controlling precedent, a district court cannot attach a sexual offender designation to a burglary conviction. Remanded for correction of the sentence. View "State v. Leyva" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant Cale Hauer was convicted of unlawful restraint, assault with a weapon, partner or family member assault, and aggravated assault. Hauser was sentenced to eighteen months' incarceration and forty-five years' imprisonment. The convictions stemmed from three separate arrests occurring in Missoula. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err when it prohibited Hauer from testifying that an altercation leading to the first arrest was caused by Hauer walking in on the victim purposely cutting herself; and (2) Hauer was not prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel agreed not to introduce evidence of the victim's intentional cutting. View "State v. Hauer" on Justia Law

Thomas Evans pleaded guilty to felony issuance of bad checks and received a suspended sentence. Evans was subsequently charged with misdemeanor partner or family member assault. As a result, the district court revoked Evans' suspended sentence after revocation proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court did not lack jurisdiction to conduct the revocation proceedings; (2) Evans received due process of the law; (3) the State established grounds for revocation by a preponderance of the evidence; but (4) the district court erred in failing to award Evans credit for time served in jail prior to the revocation of his suspended sentence. Remanded. View "State v. Evans" on Justia Law