Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Emily Blodgett petitioned the Supreme Court for a Writ of Supervisory Control alleging that the Missoula County Justice Court violated sections 3-10-231 through -234, MCA; Article VII Sections 1 and 5 of the Montana Constitution, and several of the Court's prior decisions when it allowed a retired district court judge to preside over her jury trial. Petitioner contended that the presiding justice of the peace improperly called the judge to preside over the case even though the justice was present in her court but otherwise involved with another case. Finding that though the retired judge was qualified by his training and experience to act as a substitute justice of the peace, he was not one at the time he presided over Petitioner's trial because the statutory procedures to vested him with the power to perform judicial functions as a substitute justice of the peace had not been followed. Consequently, any purported judicial acts performed by the judge in this case were void ab initio. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's request for a Writ of Supervisory Control and held that Petitioner's jury trial was void ab initio. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Blodgett v. Missoula JP Court" on Justia Law

This matter involved two cases, one involving two youths who appeared in youth court for detention hearings and one involving an adult who pled guilty to driving under the influence in justice court. After appearing in district court, the youths filed motions to substitute district court judge, and the court denied the motions as untimely. After the adult pled guilty in justice court, she appealed only the justice court's denial of her pretrial suppression motion, which the district court denied as untimely. The Supreme Court granted a petition for writ of supervisory control for the youths and denied it for the adult, holding (1) the district court improperly determined that the youths had filed untimely motions for substitution of district judge; and (2) the district court correctly denied the adult's motion for substitution of district court judge, as no right exists under Mont. Code Ann. 3-1-804 to substitute a district judge in an appeal of a specific pre-trial legal ruling from justice court. View "Bledsoe v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Appellant James Davis appealed from his conviction of one count of criminal distribution of dangerous drugs by accountability, claiming that the State presented insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he provided assistance in the drug deal that preceded his charge. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could not have found that Davis purposely promoted or facilitated the sale of drugs, and therefore, the district court erred when it denied Davis' motion to dismiss the charge of criminal distribution of dangerous drugs by accountability on the basis of insufficient evidence. View "State v. Davis" on Justia Law

Appellant Michael Miller was convicted of the deliberate homicide after a jury trial. The Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. Miller subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance and that his appellate counsel's failure to raise his trial counsel's ineffectiveness on direct appeal constituted ineffective assistance. The district court dismissed Miller's petition for failure to state a claim, reasoning that Miller had exhausted his remedy of appeal and that his ineffectiveness claims were record-based assertions which he did or reasonably could have raised on appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Miller's claims against his trial counsel were without merit, and thus, he could not state a claim of ineffectiveness against his appellate counsel for failing to raise ineffectiveness claims against his trial counsel in his direct appeal. View "Miller v. State" on Justia Law

The State charged Anthony Leyva with sexual intercourse without consent. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the State dismissed the charge and filed an amended information charging Leyva with burglary by remaining unlawfully in the victim's home with the purpose to commit a sexual assault therein. Defendant was subsequently convicted of burglary following his plea of guilty. The district court sentenced him to twenty years in prison, fifteen years of which the court suspended on numerous conditions. Leyva appealed the conditions of his suspended sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court erred in imposing a condition designating Leyva as a Level II sexual offender, as, pursuant to controlling precedent, a district court cannot attach a sexual offender designation to a burglary conviction. Remanded for correction of the sentence. View "State v. Leyva" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant Cale Hauer was convicted of unlawful restraint, assault with a weapon, partner or family member assault, and aggravated assault. Hauser was sentenced to eighteen months' incarceration and forty-five years' imprisonment. The convictions stemmed from three separate arrests occurring in Missoula. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err when it prohibited Hauer from testifying that an altercation leading to the first arrest was caused by Hauer walking in on the victim purposely cutting herself; and (2) Hauer was not prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel agreed not to introduce evidence of the victim's intentional cutting. View "State v. Hauer" on Justia Law

Thomas Evans pleaded guilty to felony issuance of bad checks and received a suspended sentence. Evans was subsequently charged with misdemeanor partner or family member assault. As a result, the district court revoked Evans' suspended sentence after revocation proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court did not lack jurisdiction to conduct the revocation proceedings; (2) Evans received due process of the law; (3) the State established grounds for revocation by a preponderance of the evidence; but (4) the district court erred in failing to award Evans credit for time served in jail prior to the revocation of his suspended sentence. Remanded. View "State v. Evans" on Justia Law

While driving his motorcycle, William Cleary struck a deer. Cleary was transported to the hospital, where a consensual blood alcohol content test revealed a BAC of .18. The State filed an information charging Cleary with felony driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs (DUI). The felony charges were based upon Cleary's Montana driving record, which reported three previous DUIs, two in Montana and one in South Dakota. Cleary moved to have the felony dismissed, arguing that he should not be subject to the enhanced felony charges because the DUI issued in South Dakota was not a "prior conviction." The district court denied his motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Cleary's South Dakota offense was neither a conviction nor a sentence for Montana purposes, and the expungement of the charge precluded it from being counted as a previous conviction for sentence enhancement purposes. Remanded. View "State v. Cleary" on Justia Law

The Montana Legislature enacted Senate Bill 268 (SB 268), which submitted to the electorate the question whether certain statutory changes should be made regarding the election of justices to the Montana Supreme Court. SB 268 was to be submitted to the voters at a special election and was to appear on the ballot as Legislative Referendum No. 119 (LR-119). Plaintiffs, Montana citizens, taxpayers, and electors, sought a declaratory judgment that LR-119 was constitutionally defective. The district court granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs and ordered the Secretary of State to decertify LR-119 and enjoined the Secretary from presenting LR-119 on the election ballot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the non-retiring justices on the Court were not required to recuse themselves from participating in the decision of this appeal; (2) Plaintiffs' constitutional challenge to LR-119 was justiciable; (3) LR-119's proposed amendments to the qualifications and structure of the Supreme Court were facially unconstitutional; and (4) the constitutionally infirm provisions of LR-119 were not severable from the remainder of the referendum. View "Reichert v. State" on Justia Law

At issue in these two consolidated appeals was whether the district court properly calculated the time period in which to file a motion for substitution of district judge in youth court and on an appeal from justice court. Petitioners, two youths who appeared in court or detention hearings and a defendant who pled guilty in justice court to driving under the influence, petitioned for writ of supervisory control, claiming that the district court incorrectly denied as untimely their motions for substitution of district court judge in those cases. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the district court improperly determined that the youths had filed untimely motions for substitution of district judge; and (2) the district court properly calculated the time period in which to file a motion for substitution of district court on the appeal from justice court. View "Bledsoe v. Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law