Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the offense of partner of family member assault (PFMA), a felony. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and remanded for correction of the written judgment, holding (1) Defendant's attorney did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to the mental state instructions given at trial, as the district court properly instructed the jury in the applicable law on the mental state for the PFMA offense; and (2) an error in the district court's written judgment imposing terms and conditions of parole or conditional release required that the written judgment be amended. Remanded. View "State v. Birthmark" on Justia Law

Appellant rented second-floor office space and owned one of the upper-floor residential units in the Baxter Hotel. In 2008, the Baxter Homeowners Association (BHA) restricted access to the hotel's elevator by only permitting unit owners and their tenants to access the elevator via swipe key cards. After Appellant filed a complaint with the Montana Human Rights Bureau (Bureau), the BHA board installed a time clock system that would keep the elevator unlocked during business hours and locked at night. Appellant subsequently moved his law office out of the building. Ultimately, a hearing officer with the Bureau concluded that BHA violated Mont. Code Ann. 49-2-304(1)(a) when it failed to provide a reasonable alteration to the elevator to permit disabled persons to have unfettered access to the second floor business offices in the hotel during business hours, awarded $6,000 in damages to Appellant, and denied both parties' requests for attorneys' fees. The Human Rights Commission affirmed. The district court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant did not possess proper standing to file a complaint of discrimination on behalf of his unidentified and potential clients. View "Baxter Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Angel" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of accountability for deliberate homicide, robbery, tampering with physical evidence, and burglary. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made during a custodial interrogation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant did not invoke his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent when he said "I don't really have anything to talk about" because he did not articulate a desire to remain silent sufficiently clearly that a reasonable officer in the circumstances would have understood Defendant's statements to be an invocation of his Miranda right to remain silent as required by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Berghuis v. Thompkins; and (2) the district court's finding that Defendant's Miranda waiver and subsequent statements to the police were voluntary was supported by substantial credible evidence, and its conclusions of law were correct. View "State v. Nixon" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of negligent homicide and two counts of negligent endangerment. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's challenge of a prospective juror for cause; (2) did not err by excluding Defendant's expert witness from testifying on complex partial seizures; (3) did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant's request to instruct the jury on DUI as a lesser-included offense of vehicular homicide while under the influence; and (4) erred by ordering Defendant to pay $600 in restitution to the State and an undisclosed amount to the victims and their family members for mental health treatment. Accordingly, the Court vacated the $600 restitution award to the State and reversed the open-ended restitution award for the victims' mental health treatment. Remanded for entry of an amended judgment specifying the amount for such treatment. View "State v. Jay" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of violating a permanent order of protection and tampering with a witness. Defendant's written sentence contained twenty-six terms and conditions that were not expressly stated during oral pronouncement of sentence. Defendant appealed, claiming his attorney was ineffective in ordering erroneous jury instructions and in failing to file a motion to conform the written sentence to the orally-pronounced sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) Defendant's counsel did not provide ineffective assistance with respect to proposed jury instructions; and (2) the district court's inclusion of five conditions in Defendant's written judgment and order were not sufficiently related to Defendant's charges nor were they reasonably related to the objectives of rehabilitation and protection of the victim and society. Remanded with instructions to strike the five conditions. View "State v. Andress" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of deliberate homicide, attempted deliberate homicide, and negligent homicide. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court violated his fundamental right to be present at all critical stages of the proceedings when he was absent from a sidebar conference after which the district court removed a juror from the pool of potential jurors. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the record sufficiently established that the only potential prejudice to Defendant arose from his loss of an opportunity to participate in the decision of whether the keep the disputed juror in the potential jury pool; and (2) the trial court mooted this potential prejudice when it announced that the juror had been removed from the potential jury pool by stipulation. View "State v. Wilson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexual assault, incest, and attempted sexual intercourse without consent. The victim was thirteen years old during the abuse and fourteen at the time of trial. During trial, the court allowed a child sex abuse expert to testify, but the expert did not discuss the specifics of Defendant's case and did not offer an opinion of whether the victim had been abused. Defendant appealed, contending that the expert's testimony improperly invaded the jury's obligation to assess the victim's credibility. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the expert's testimony did not impinge upon the jury's obligation to ultimately decide the victim's credibility; and (2) moreover, the district court alleviated any concern of unfair prejudice by giving the jury a cautionary instruction before Defendant testified. View "State v. Robins" on Justia Law

Defendant purchased a vacation home in Ptarmigan Village in Montana. Defendant lived primarily in Arizona. Ptarmigan Owner's Association (Ptarmigan), which managed the units that comprised the Ptarmigan homeowner's association, filed a lien on Defendant's house when Defendant stopped paying fees and dues to Ptarmigan. After Ptarmigan filed a complaint to foreclose on its lien, it mailed the summons and complaint to an Arizona Postal Plus mailbox that Defendant had on file with Ptarmigan. The Arizona constable failed to locate Defendant through the mailbox and informed Ptarmigan that Defendant had not been served. Ptarmigan published the complain and summons, and after Defendant failed to appear in response to the summons, the district court granted default judgment in favor of Ptarmigan. Defendant filed a motion to set aside the default judgment, claiming that Ptarmigan never properly served him. The district court failed to set aside the default judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circumstances here authorized service by publication; and (2) Ptarmigan did not act in bad faith or deliberately conceal the lawsuit from Defendant. View "Ptarmigan Owner's Ass'n v. Alton" on Justia Law

Two police officers observed Defendant in a bar holding a beer can. Believing that Defendant was younger than twenty-one years old, the officers asked how old Defendant was then asked for identification to verify Defendant's age. The officers subsequently told Defendant to accompany the officers outside. After Defendant provided a false first name and birthdate, the officers placed Defendant under arrest. After confirming that Defendant was under twenty-one years old, the State charged Defendant with minor in possession and obstructing a police officer. The city court granted Defendant's motion to suppress. The district court affirmed, determining the officers had violated Defendant's right against self-incrimination by requesting Defendant's name, birthdate, and identification. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the officers had sufficient particularized suspicion to approach Defendant and ask his age, but the officers improperly expanded their investigation by taking Defendant outside without additional articulable facts. View "State v. Driscoll" on Justia Law

Appellant was a fifty-five-year-old male with a history of schizoaffective disorder. The State filed a petition to involuntarily commit Appellant, alleging that Appellant was unable to care for his basic needs and appeared to pose a danger to himself and others. After a hearing, the district court granted the State's petition and involuntarily committed Appellant to the Montana State Hospital (MSH), authorizing MSH to administer appropriate medication involuntarily. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not violate Appellant's statutory and due process rights when it failed to obtain a personal waiver of rights under Mont. Code Ann. 53-21-119(1), as Appellant effectively waived his rights by allowing his counsel to inform the judge of his desire to do so; and (2) the district court complied with the statutory requirements in ordering Appellant to take medications as prescribed by his doctors, and this directive was sufficient to authorize involuntary medication. View "In re R.W.K." on Justia Law