Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of felony sexual abuse of children for having engaged in sexually-related conduct online with a deputy sheriff who represented himself as a fourteen-year-old female. Defendant was arrested based on his potential plans to travel to Montana to meet the supposed fourteen-year-old in person. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding (1) Montana's sexual abuse of children statute does not violate the First Amendment and the Commerce Clause by sweeping too broadly; and (2) the district court properly authenticated extensive internet chat logs and properly admitted them into evidence, and the court's ruling did not unfairly prejudice Defendant. View "State v. Hantz" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated assault. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in refusing to dismiss the charges against Defendant when, after Defendant disclosed information and defense strategies to the State Medical Examiner, communication occurred between the Medical Examiner and the County Attorney; (2) the district court properly determined that the State's witnesses were not unnecessarily cumulative or unfairly prejudicial to Defendant; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the State's evidence was not so prejudicial as to render the trial fundamentally unfair; (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial on the grounds of prosecutorial misconduct; and (5) Defendant's counsel did not provide ineffective assistance. View "State v. Ugalde" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of attempted deliberate homicide. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentence, holding (1) the district court correctly denied Defendant's motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct; (2) the district court id not err by failing to inquire into Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim and the voluntariness of his decision to represent himself; (3) the district court correctly concluded that Defendant was not deprived of his right to speedy trial; (4) the district court did not err by admitting evidence of Defendant's prior assault of his wife; (5) a jury instruction on mitigated deliberate homicide did not rise to the level of plain error; and (6) the district court properly imposed parole conditions. View "State v. MacGregor" on Justia Law

Thomas Madsen, a sheriff's deputy, was charged with mistreating prisoners pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 45-5-204 for his behavior toward K.J., a female juvenile who was brought to the county law and justice center at the request of her parents for assistance in getting her transported to residential treatment. Madsen moved to dismiss the charge, contending that K.J. was not a prisoner under section 45-5-204. The district court agreed and dismissed the charge against Madsen because K.J. was a juvenile, had not been convicted of an offense, and was not being held in a State facility. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that, under the circumstances, K.J. was a prisoner under section 45-5-204(1), and the charging information filed in this case was adequate to state an offense. View "State v. Madsen" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of three counts of omitting material facts relating to his offer and sale of a security. Defendant appealed, arguing that the multiple charges statute, Mont. Code Ann. 46-11-410, precluded his convictions on two of the three counts with which he was charged. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment as to two of Defendant's convictions, holding (1) the State's assertion that "each count had a different element" was incorrect, as each count had the same statutory element, and the offenses arose from the same transaction; and (2) therefore, the district court erred in denying Defendant's motion under section 46-11-410. Remanded. View "State v. Parks" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexual intercourse without consent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly concluded that Defendant was not denied his right to a speedy trial; (2) Defendant failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to object to evidence at trial; (3) the State did not violate Defendant's right to due process by using Defendant's silence after receiving Miranda warnings against him at trial, as the issue was raised during cross-examination of Defendant and focused on Defendant's alibi; and (4) Defendant failed to establish that his conviction should be reversed based upon cumulative error, as there was no error in his conviction. View "State v. Morsette" on Justia Law

In 1992, Petitioner was convicted of incest. Petitioner was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment, and the sentencing court required that Petitioner register as a sexual offender. In 2012, Petitioner filed a petition requesting relief from his requirement to register as a sexual offender, filed pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 46-23-506(3)(b). After a hearing, the district court concluded that Petitioner failed to establish the statutory requirements necessary to be relieved from the requirements of registration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court exercised proper discretion in denying Petitioner's petition, as (1) the court correctly interpreted section 46-23-506(3)(b); and (2) the petition was not well founded. View "Langford v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to sexual assault and sexual intercourse without consent before Judge Lympus. At sentencing, Judge Lympus imposed a forty-year sentence with twenty suspended, as requested by the State pursuant to the plea agreement, and also imposed a ten-year restriction on eligibility for parole among other requirements. Defendant filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing (1) his sentence was unfair because the judge used personal feelings against him and did not adequately explain his reasons for imposing the ten-year parole restriction, and (2) his defense counsel was ineffective. The district court dismissed the petition without a hearing. The Supreme Court, holding (1) Defendant's challenges the legality of his sentence were procedurally barred; and (2) Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel. View "Fletcher v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant Tammy Zunski appealed a district court's grant of summary judgment to the Frenchtown Rural Fire Department Board of Trustees (Board) against her right to know and right to participate claims. The issues before the Supreme Court were: (1) whether the District Court correctly determined that the Board's actions at an August 8, 2011, meeting rescinded the actions taken at an improper July 20, 2011, meeting thereby defeating Zunksi's open meeting and public participation claims; and (2) whether the District Court correctly determined that the Board had responded to Zunski's document request in a reasonably timely manner. Zunski admitted that the Board had provided all documents responsive to her right to know request. Because of Zunski's admission, the Supreme Court concluded the district court properly found that no further controversy existed regarding Zunski's right to know claims: "[w]e are left with no reasonable expectation that the Board would fail to comply with any future right to know requests made by Zunski. The District Court correctly resolved Zunski's right to know claims." View "Zunski v. Frenchtown Rural Fire Dep" on Justia Law

Respondent-appellant N.A. was committed to Montana State Hospital for 90 days by a District Court order. N.A. appealed that order. Respondent was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. After some treatment at the Phoenix House, professionals there became concerned that he was a danger to himself and others. The State instituted an involuntary civil commitment proceeding. At his initial appearance, N.A. was informed of his right to a jury trial and the subsequent hearing that would occur, which would include a prehearing mental health evaluation. N.A. did not want evaluation by professionals who had evaluated him in the past because he believed them to be guilty of perjury. N.A. informed the court that he needed more time to find and choose an evaluator. The court gave N.A. a one-day continuance to obtain his chosen professional, but he failed to provide a name to his attorney in time for her to contact the evaluator. When the commitment proceeding resumed, the District Court found that N.A. had been given a reasonable choice of evaluator, and denied the continuance. After the State had finished presenting its case, N.A. moved for a jury trial, which the court rejected as untimely. Upon careful consideration of the District Court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the District Court properly denied N.A.'s motions for continuance and for a jury trial, and his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were not supported by sufficient evidence that he was prejudiced by his attorney's actions. View "Matter of N.A." on Justia Law