Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with criminal possession of dangerous drugs in violation of Mont. Code Ann. 45-9-102. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence resulting from the search of her purse by police officers, arguing that the tip the officers received failed to establish particularized suspicion and that her consent to search was involuntary, and therefore, the seizure and search were illegal. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err by concluding that the search of Defendant’s baggage was lawfully executed based upon Defendant’s voluntary consent; and (2) erred in its written judgment by altering Defendant’s sentence from its oral pronouncement. View "State v. Dupree" on Justia Law

Missoula County Sheriff’s Department (MCSD) deputies accompanied Christine Robutka to a rural property to assist with a civil standby while Robutka removed her belongings from the property. Robutka had been sharing a residence on the property with two men, including Defendant. While assisting with the civil standby, the deputies observed marijuana plants at the property. Robutka subsequently told detectives that Defendant was growing marijuana at the property. Thereafter, MCSD deputies obtained a warrant to search the property and executed the search, which resulted in the seizure of multiple adult marijuana plants. Defendant was charged with cultivating marijuana. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence gathered from the civil standby on the search. The district court denied the motion to suppress, and Defendant eventually pleaded guilty. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress and his resulting conviction, holding that the deputies did not violate Defendant’s constitutional rights when they entered the driveway to conduct the civil standby, and the plain view observation of marijuana plants by MCSD deputies provided probable cause for the search warrant. View "State v. Urziceanu" on Justia Law

In 2012, M.C. was born to Mother and Father, who were unmarried. After Mother told Father that she intended to live in Ohio with M.C., Father petitioned the district court for establishment of a parenting plan, proposing that he should become M.C.’s primary caregiver. Mother proposed a parenting plan that would allow her to reside in Ohio as M.C.’s primary caregiver. After a hearing, the district court concluded that if Mother chose to live in Montana, the parties would be directed to submit parenting plans naming Mother as M.C.’s primary caregiver, and that if Mother chose to live in Ohio, the parties would be directed to submit proposed parenting plans naming Father as M.C.’s primary caregiver. The Supreme Court affirmed the parenting plan, holding that the district court did not violate Mother’s fundamental right to travel by ordering that M.C. should reside in Montana. View "In re Parenting of M.C." on Justia Law

On March 5, 2012, Appellant was charged with bail jumping. On April 19, 2012, Appellant pleaded guilty to the offense. On June 27, 2013, Appellant was sentenced for bail jumping. Appellant appealed the judgment of conviction and sentence, arguing that the fourteen-month delay between entry of his guilty plea and sentencing violated his speedy trial rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the constitutional right to a speedy trial does not extend from conviction to sentencing, but a criminal defendant does have a constitutional and statutory due process right to have sentence imposed in a timely manner; (2) because Appellant failed to assert a statutory claim, only his constitutional violation would be considered; and (3) although the delay in Appellant’s sentencing was unacceptable, Appellant’s prejudice from the delay was neither substantial nor demonstrable, and therefore, the unacceptable delay did not warrant finding a constitutional due process violation. View "State v. Betterman" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs here challenged the constitutionality of two laws: a 2011 law requiring a parental notification before a minor may obtain an abortion, and a 2013 law requiring parental consent before a minor may obtain an abortion. In 1999, a district court held unconstitutional a similar 1995 law requiring parental notification before a minor may obtain an abortion. Plaintiffs claimed that the 1999 district court order prevented the State from defending the constitutionality of the laws at issue in the current challenge on grounds of issue preclusion. The Supreme Court held that because the laws that were the subject of the current challenge differed from the 1995 law in substantive respects, issue preclusion did not apply in this case. View "Planned Parenthood of Mont. v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI). Defendant was arraigned on May 23, 2012, and trial was set for August 27, 2012. Defendant’s trial, however, was postponed upon his motion to vacate the initial trial date for a change of plea. On October 1, 2012, the municipal court rearraigned Defendant, and he pled not guilty to the DUI. Defendant subsequently moved to dismiss on the grounds that his right to a speedy trial had been violated. The municipal court summarily denied Defendant’s motion without conducting any analysis. Defendant moved for reconsideration of his motion to dismiss under both the misdemeanor speedy trial statute and constitutional speedy-trial provisions. On May 9, 2013, Defendant pled guilty to DUI. The district court denied Defendant’s appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant’s statutory speedy-trial right was not violated because his motion to vacate his trial date for a change of plea made the misdemeanor speedy-trial statute inapplicable; but (2) in regards to Defendant's constitutional speedy-trial violation claim, the delay in Defendant’s case was sufficient to trigger analysis under the factors set forth in State v. Ariegwe. Remanded. View "City of Helena v. Heppner" on Justia Law

After Defendant was discharged from prison, he was required to register as a sexual offender. The State later charged Defendant with failure to give notice of change of address. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted and sentenced to 100 years in the Montana State Prison, with sixty years suspended. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim must be raised in a petition for postconviction relief; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the jury to review a portion of the trial transcript during deliberation; and (3) the written judgment unlawfully increased Defendant’s sentence. Remanded. View "State v. Greene" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who leased commercial property from Defendant, filed a complaint with the Montana Human Rights Bureau, alleging that Defendant violated the Montana Human Rights Act (MHRA) by sexually harassing her. The Montana Human Rights Commission ruled that Plaintiff could proceed with her claim because the MHRA “prohibits unlawful discrimination in commercial property transactions, as well as all other real estate transactions.” The district court vacated the Commission’s decision and reinstated the hearing officer’s, ruling that the Commission violated Defendant’s right to due process by analyzing Plaintiff’s action under the MHRA’s real estate provisions. The Supreme Court remanded, directing the district court to resolve the issue that formed the alternate basis for Defendant’s challenge to the Commission’s decision - whether the MHRA’s real estate provisions applied to Plaintiff’s commercial lease. On remand, the district court ruled that the MHRA’s real estate provisions prohibit discrimination in commercial real estate transactions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the MHRA applies to Plaintiff’s commercial lease. View "Bates v. Neva" on Justia Law

On May 4, 2010, Defendant was arrested and cited with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), driving while license suspended, and traveling the wrong way on a one-way street. On September 18, 2012, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. The justice court denied Defendant’s motion, concluding that the six-month limit of Mont. Code Ann. 46-13-401(2) had not been violated because most of the delay was attributable to Defendant. After a trial at which Defendant failed to appear, the justice court found Defendant guilty of DUI per se and driving the wrong direction on a one-way street. Defendant appealed, challenging the denial of his motion to dismiss. The district court affirmed, concluding that Defendant had disengaged from the process, and therefore, Defendant’s right to a speedy trial had not been violated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly refused to reverse the justice court’s decision, as Defendant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated. View "State v. Hodge" on Justia Law

The State charged Appellant, a forty-year-old developmentally disabled man, with three counts of felony sexual intercourse without consent and one count of felony sexual assault. Appellant pleaded guilty to sexual assault, and the district court accepted the plea. The district court subsequently sentenced Appellant to forty years imprisonment. Nearly one year after issuance of an amended judgment, Appellant moved to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court concluded that Appellant’s motion was timely brought but refused to allow Appellant to withdraw his guilty plea, finding it had been entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s motion to withdraw plea was not time-barred; and (2) the district court did not err when it concluded that Appellant’s guilty plea was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. View "State v. Garner" on Justia Law