Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge of operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more. Defendant appealed, arguing that the municipal court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an investigative stop. Specifically, Defendant claimed that the ordinances of the City of Missoula that impose a $500 fine for refusing to give a breath sample were invalid and that the arresting officer unlawfully administered a breath test despite her initial refusal. The district court affirmed the decision of the municipal court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Missoula has authority to enact ordinances creating a misdemeanor penalty for the refusal to submit to a requested breath test; (2) the arresting officer did not violate statutory procedures by administering a post-arrest breath test with Defendant’s consent; and (3) the Missoula ordinances criminalizing the refusal to submit to a breath test do not unconstitutionally impair Defendant’s freedom of speech. View "City of Missoula v. Armitage" on Justia Law

In 2014, Lawrence J.C. VanDyke filed his declaration of nomination as a candidate for election to the Montana Supreme Court. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a complaint in the district court seeking to have VanDyke’s candidacy invalidated on the basis that VanDyke was not admitted to the practice of law in Montana for at least five years prior to the date of election as required by the Montana Constitution. The district court ruled that VanDyke did not meet the minimum eligibility requirements because, although VanDyke was a member of the State Bar of Montana continuously from 2005 to the present day, when VanDyke elected to assume inactive status from 2007 until 2012, he was not authorized or qualified to practice law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that VanDyke’s admission to the practice of law in Montana in 2005 satisfied the Constitution’s requirement that a candidate for Supreme Court Justice be “admitted to the practice of law in Montana for at least five years prior to the date of appointment or election,” notwithstanding VanDyke’s choice to take inactive status for some of those years. View "Cross v. VanDyke" on Justia Law

In 2002, Elizabeth “Betsy” Baumgart was appointed to be the administrator of the Montana Tourism and Promotion Division of the Department of Commerce (DOC). In 2010, after Dore Schwinden was appointed as DOC director, Schwinden terminated Baumgart’s employment, citing a lack of management competencies and sufficient understanding of the Division’s budgeting process. Baumgart sued the DOC and Schwinden, individually and as DOC’s agent, alleging that DOC wrongfully discharged her and discriminated against her on political grounds because she was a Republican and Schwinden was a Democrat. The district court granted DOC’s motion for summary judgment as it pertained to Baumgart’s political affiliation discrimination claims and all claims against Schwinden. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Baumgart failed to establish a prima facie case for political discrimination, the district court did not err in granting DOC’s motion for summary judgment on this issue; (2) the district court correctly dismissed the individual claims against Schwinden, as Schwinden was entitled to statutory immunity under the circumstances of this case; and (3) the district court correctly concluded that the DOC had good cause to terminate Baumgart.View "Baumgart v. Dep’t of Commerce" on Justia Law

Martin Vincent Lau was charged with deliberate homicide. Lau claimed that the fatal shooting was an act of self-defense. Lau sought to offer his own out-of-court statement to prove that at the time of the shooting, he knew of specific instances of violence by the victim. The State moved in limine to prohibit Lau from introducing the statement on hearsay grounds. Lau, in turn, argued that the exclusion of his statement would limit his ability to put forth a defense and that he would be required to testify in order to establish his knowledge of specific instances of conduct by the victim. The district court ruled that Lau would be permitted to cross-examine witnesses about the victim's specific acts of violence and Lau’s knowledge of those acts, as contained in his statement. The Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for writ of supervisory control, holding that the Montana Rules of Evidence did not permit Lau to offer his own out-of-court statement in support of his claim of justifiable use of force.View "State v. District Court" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with trespass to property and possession of dangerous drugs, both misdemeanor offenses. Defendant subsequently decided to enroll in the Mineral County Treatment Court. Defendant was aware that he could be sanctioned with incarceration if he was dishonest during his participation in the Treatment Court. During his participation in the Treatment Court Defendant tested positive for drug use and was interviewed by the Treatment Team regarding the results. Subsequently, a member of the Treatment Team sent a report to law enforcement detailing the information he learned from the interviews with Defendant. Defendant was subsequently charged with distribution of dangerous drugs and two counts of possession of dangerous drugs. Defendant filed motions to suppress and dismiss, arguing that the State violated the confidentiality provision of Mont. Code Ann. 46-1-1111(4) and his Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination by disclosing the confidential Treatment Court material to law enforcement. The district court denied the motions. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motions to suppress and dismiss, holding that the State violated section 46-1-1111(4) by disclosing confidential drug testing information to law enforcement in order to investigate a new criminal offense.View "State v. Plouffe" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of deliberate homicide. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction on appeal. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief alleging that the State had failed to disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence relevant to the case in violation of Brady v. Maryland and that his trial attorneys failed to provide effective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly denied Defendant’s postconviction petition because the petition did not fulfill the elements of a Brady violation; and (2) any alleged error on the part of trial counsel did not prejudice Defendant, and therefore, the trial court did not err in concluding that Defendant had not received ineffective assistance of counsel.View "McGarvey v. State" on Justia Law

In 2011, Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and disorderly conduct. Defendant pleaded not guilty and requested a jury trial. The trial court later informed Defendant that his scheduled trial was rescheduled because an older case had been set for trial on the same day. Before his rescheduled trial, Defendant moved to have his case dismissed for lack of a speedy trial. The municipal court granted the motion. The district court reversed. On remand, Defendant was convicted of DUI and acquitted of disorder conduct. The Supreme Court reversed the district court ruling reversing the municipal court’s dismissal of the charges, holding that the City failed to meet its burden of showing “good cause” for the delay in bringing Defendant to trial.View "City of Helena v. Broadwater" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with felony driving under the influence (DUI) and misdemeanor driving without valid liability insurance. Defendant entered pleas of not guilty and then filed a motion to dismiss for denial of his right to a speedy trial. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Defendant then changed his plea to guilty on both charges, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his speedy trial motion. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for dismissal of the charges, holding that the delay in bringing Defendant to trial violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial.View "State v. Zimmerman" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of deliberate homicide. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress statements he made to the police. The Supreme Court remanded with instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing. After a hearing on remand, the district court suppressed Defendant’s statements to the police on the grounds that the statements were made involuntarily and granted Defendant a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in concluding that Defendant’s statements were made involuntarily and in ordering a new trial.View "State v. OldHorn" on Justia Law

After a trial, Appellant was convicted of sexual intercourse without consent and sexual assault. The Supreme Court affirmed. Thereafter, Appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief raising numerous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Appellant’s petition for postconviction relief, holding (1) counsel was not ineffective for failing to request dismissal of the charges against Defendant for the State’s alleged destruction of evidence or a jury instruction regarding the State’s failure to collect and preserve the subject evidence; and (2) counsel did not act unreasonably when he withdrew a proposed jury instruction on sexual assault as a lesser included offense.View "Taylor v. State" on Justia Law