Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After Defendant was discharged from prison, he was required to register as a sexual offender. The State later charged Defendant with failure to give notice of change of address. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted and sentenced to 100 years in the Montana State Prison, with sixty years suspended. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim must be raised in a petition for postconviction relief; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the jury to review a portion of the trial transcript during deliberation; and (3) the written judgment unlawfully increased Defendant’s sentence. Remanded. View "State v. Greene" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who leased commercial property from Defendant, filed a complaint with the Montana Human Rights Bureau, alleging that Defendant violated the Montana Human Rights Act (MHRA) by sexually harassing her. The Montana Human Rights Commission ruled that Plaintiff could proceed with her claim because the MHRA “prohibits unlawful discrimination in commercial property transactions, as well as all other real estate transactions.” The district court vacated the Commission’s decision and reinstated the hearing officer’s, ruling that the Commission violated Defendant’s right to due process by analyzing Plaintiff’s action under the MHRA’s real estate provisions. The Supreme Court remanded, directing the district court to resolve the issue that formed the alternate basis for Defendant’s challenge to the Commission’s decision - whether the MHRA’s real estate provisions applied to Plaintiff’s commercial lease. On remand, the district court ruled that the MHRA’s real estate provisions prohibit discrimination in commercial real estate transactions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the MHRA applies to Plaintiff’s commercial lease. View "Bates v. Neva" on Justia Law

On May 4, 2010, Defendant was arrested and cited with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), driving while license suspended, and traveling the wrong way on a one-way street. On September 18, 2012, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. The justice court denied Defendant’s motion, concluding that the six-month limit of Mont. Code Ann. 46-13-401(2) had not been violated because most of the delay was attributable to Defendant. After a trial at which Defendant failed to appear, the justice court found Defendant guilty of DUI per se and driving the wrong direction on a one-way street. Defendant appealed, challenging the denial of his motion to dismiss. The district court affirmed, concluding that Defendant had disengaged from the process, and therefore, Defendant’s right to a speedy trial had not been violated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly refused to reverse the justice court’s decision, as Defendant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated. View "State v. Hodge" on Justia Law

The State charged Appellant, a forty-year-old developmentally disabled man, with three counts of felony sexual intercourse without consent and one count of felony sexual assault. Appellant pleaded guilty to sexual assault, and the district court accepted the plea. The district court subsequently sentenced Appellant to forty years imprisonment. Nearly one year after issuance of an amended judgment, Appellant moved to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court concluded that Appellant’s motion was timely brought but refused to allow Appellant to withdraw his guilty plea, finding it had been entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s motion to withdraw plea was not time-barred; and (2) the district court did not err when it concluded that Appellant’s guilty plea was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. View "State v. Garner" on Justia Law

Section 11-41-2 of the Helena City Code (the Ordinance) places limitations on roofing materials used on structures located within the wildland-urban interface (WUI) district. The City filed suit against homeowners whose property was situated within the WUI zoning district (Homeowners), alleging violation of the Ordinance. Homeowners answered the complaint and petitioned for a declaratory judgment that the Ordinance was invalid on statutory and constitutional grounds. The district court granted summary judgment for Homeowners, concluding that the Ordinance was a building regulation, and the City was not authorized to adopt building regulations under the guise of a zoning ordinance. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err by determining that the Ordinance was an impermissible building code and not a zoning ordinance; (2) erred by concluding that Homeowners were ineligible for an award of attorney fees; and (3) did not err by denying and dismissing Homeowners' constitutional arguments. View "City of Helena v. Svee" on Justia Law

After the City decided to undertake road improvements along South Avenue in Missoula, Montana, Plaintiffs, a group of landowners who owned property along South Avenue, contested the City’s assessment of the width of the right-of-way on a section of the street. The district court concluded that the City’s actions constituted a taking. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded for a redetermination of damages. Plaintiffs filed a petition for rehearing asking the Court to award both attorney’s fees and costs incurred for the appeal. The Supreme Court denied the petition. On remand, Plaintiffs agreed to reduce their “taken property” value and asked the district court to assess both attorney’s fees and costs against the City for the appeal. The district court determined that Plaintiffs were the prevailing party on appeal and awarded them appellate attorney’s fees and costs. The City appealed, arguing that the Court’s refusal to award fees in its order on rehearing constituted “law of the case.” The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s award of appellate attorney’s fees and costs, holding that the district court correctly concluded that Plaintiffs had a constitutional right to be made whole through an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal. View "Wohl v. City of Missoula" on Justia Law

Appellant petitioned for release of certain documents under the Right to Know provision of Mont. Const. art. II, 9 from the Cascade County Attorney relating to the termination of a county detention officer, Jason Carroll. The district court granted summary judgment against Appellant. Appellant moved for reconsideration in light of the recently decided Schoof v. Nesbit. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Appellant's situation was distinguishable from Schoof because Appellant, who was neither a resident nor subject to the jurisdiction of Cascade County, lacked standing to request the documents. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Article II, Section 9 grants a right to judicial relief to a Montana citizen alleging denial of access to a document of a Montana public body; and (2) as a Montana citizen, Appellant had standing to bring his claim. View "Shockley v. Cascade County" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge of operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more. Defendant appealed, arguing that the municipal court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an investigative stop. Specifically, Defendant claimed that the ordinances of the City of Missoula that impose a $500 fine for refusing to give a breath sample were invalid and that the arresting officer unlawfully administered a breath test despite her initial refusal. The district court affirmed the decision of the municipal court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Missoula has authority to enact ordinances creating a misdemeanor penalty for the refusal to submit to a requested breath test; (2) the arresting officer did not violate statutory procedures by administering a post-arrest breath test with Defendant’s consent; and (3) the Missoula ordinances criminalizing the refusal to submit to a breath test do not unconstitutionally impair Defendant’s freedom of speech. View "City of Missoula v. Armitage" on Justia Law

In 2014, Lawrence J.C. VanDyke filed his declaration of nomination as a candidate for election to the Montana Supreme Court. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a complaint in the district court seeking to have VanDyke’s candidacy invalidated on the basis that VanDyke was not admitted to the practice of law in Montana for at least five years prior to the date of election as required by the Montana Constitution. The district court ruled that VanDyke did not meet the minimum eligibility requirements because, although VanDyke was a member of the State Bar of Montana continuously from 2005 to the present day, when VanDyke elected to assume inactive status from 2007 until 2012, he was not authorized or qualified to practice law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that VanDyke’s admission to the practice of law in Montana in 2005 satisfied the Constitution’s requirement that a candidate for Supreme Court Justice be “admitted to the practice of law in Montana for at least five years prior to the date of appointment or election,” notwithstanding VanDyke’s choice to take inactive status for some of those years. View "Cross v. VanDyke" on Justia Law

In 2002, Elizabeth “Betsy” Baumgart was appointed to be the administrator of the Montana Tourism and Promotion Division of the Department of Commerce (DOC). In 2010, after Dore Schwinden was appointed as DOC director, Schwinden terminated Baumgart’s employment, citing a lack of management competencies and sufficient understanding of the Division’s budgeting process. Baumgart sued the DOC and Schwinden, individually and as DOC’s agent, alleging that DOC wrongfully discharged her and discriminated against her on political grounds because she was a Republican and Schwinden was a Democrat. The district court granted DOC’s motion for summary judgment as it pertained to Baumgart’s political affiliation discrimination claims and all claims against Schwinden. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Baumgart failed to establish a prima facie case for political discrimination, the district court did not err in granting DOC’s motion for summary judgment on this issue; (2) the district court correctly dismissed the individual claims against Schwinden, as Schwinden was entitled to statutory immunity under the circumstances of this case; and (3) the district court correctly concluded that the DOC had good cause to terminate Baumgart.View "Baumgart v. Dep’t of Commerce" on Justia Law