Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Carbon County Resource Council and Northern Plains Resources Council (collectively, Resource Councils) challenged the Montana Board of Oil and Gas Conservation’s (the Board) approval of well stimulation activities at an exploratory gas well in Carbon County. Specifically, Resource Councils claimed that the Board’s permitting process violated their constitutional right to meaningfully participate in government decisions. The district court concluded that Resource Councils’ constitutional challenge was not ripe for judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of the Board. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Resource Councils’ claims are ripe for judicial review; but (2) the Board did not violate Resource Councils’ right to participate in its consideration of the permit at issue in this case. View "Carbon County Res. Council v. Bd. of Oil & Gas Conservation" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated burglary, elder abuse, and failure to comply with licensing requirements. Defendant was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison for aggravated burglary, ten years in prison for elder abuse, and six months in jail for the licensing violation. All sentences were to run concurrently. Defendant appealed, arguing that receiving multiple convictions for elder abuse and aggravated burglary violated Mont. Code Ann. 46-11-410(2)(d) and that her counsel’s failure to object constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that elder abuse and aggravated burglary do not constitute multiple convictions for the same offense and do not violate section 46-11-410(2)(d), and therefore, Defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must fail. View "State v. Hooper" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with criminal possession of dangerous drugs with intent to distribute with a persistent felony offender designation. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized in the search of his car, asserting that the arresting officers lacked a particularized suspicion of wrongdoing involving narcotics sufficient to justify a canine sniff of his car. The district court denied the motion. Defendant entered a plea agreement admitting to the charges but reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the facts of this case, the district court did not err in determining that there was particularized suspicion to support the canine search of Defendant’s car. View "State v. Marino" on Justia Law

In September 2013, Defendant was arrested for possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia and was jailed for more than ten months while he awaited testing results from the State Crime Lab. Trial was finally held at the end of July 2014. By then, Defendant had been incarcerated for 309 days. Before trial, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the case for lack of a speedy trial. The district court denied the motion. The jury subsequently found Defendant guilty of both charges. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial because he did not receive protection of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. View "State v. Velasquez" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with escape in Powell County. The State later stipulated that venue was proper in Yellowstone County. The Powell County District Court subsequently granted the State’s motion to dismiss the escape charge and dismissed the case without prejudice. Nearly seven months later, the State filed the escape charges in Yellowstone County. Before trial, Defendant moved to dismiss the case for lack of a speedy trial, alleging that his right to a speedy trial had attached upon his initial appearance on the Powell County charge. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Defendant’s right to a speedy trial had not attached until the charges were re-filed in Yellowstone County. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court erred in calculating the length of the delay, as the speedy trial clock began running when charges first were filed in Powell County; (2) the time period from the dismissal of the charge initially filed against Defendant in Powell County to the filing of the charge in Yellowstone County is not counted for purposes of determining the length of the delay; and (3) the delay in this case did not establish a constitutional speedy trial violation. View "State v. Butterfly" on Justia Law

When Chrysler Group, LLC filed with the Montana Department of Justice, Motor Vehicle Division a notice of intent to establish an additional Chrysler-Jeep dealership in Billings, Lithia Motors, Inc. filed an administrative protest. The Department sustained Lithia’s protest. Rimrock Chrysler, Inc. sought judicial review, but the district court dismissed the petition on the grounds of mootness and lack of a justiciable controversy. While Rimrock’s appeal was pending, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that section 747 of the United States Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010 preempted state regulation of new dealerships issued under certain dealership protest laws. The Montana Supreme Court dismissed Rimrock’s appeal. On remand, Rimrock moved to vacate the Department’s administrative decision and to dismiss the the judicial review proceeding on the ground that section 747 preempted Montana dealer protest laws and deprived the state of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the administrative claim. The district court denied Rimrock’s motion and dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s order denying Rimrock’s motion to vacate and to dismiss, holding that Rimrock waived its section 747 preemption defense when it entered into the settlement agreement; and (2) reversed the district court’s order dismissing Rimrock’s petition for judicial review, holding that Rimrock’s petition involved a justifiable controversy, and the court erred in concluding otherwise. View "Rimrock Chrysler, Inc. v. Lithia Motors, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to felony burglary. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant and erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made to law enforcement officers. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence found in his home pursuant to a search warrant; and (2) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress statements he made while in custody and statements he made while being interrogated. View "State v. Kasparek" on Justia Law

In 1990, Gregg and her four-year-old son, Aaron, moved into Hanson’s home. They moved out in 1992. After they broke up, Gregg became concerned about Aaron's nightmares and anger, bed-wetting, locking the door when he bathed, and hiding when someone came to the door. Gregg contacted Detective Lamb, who interviewed Aaron, who testified that he and Hanson would shower together and wash each other’s genital areas and that Aaron performed oral sex on Hanson. Hanson was convicted of sexual assault and deviate sexual conduct, MCA 45-5-502(1); 45-5-505(1), and sentenced to 20 years.The Montana Supreme Court affirmed. After his pro se petition for state post-conviction relief was rejected, Hanson’s federal habeas petition was dismissed as procedurally defaulted. The Ninth Circuit affirmed in 2003. In 2012, by counsel, Hanson sought a hearing on "newly discovered evidence" that potential witnesses had contacted Lamb (now deceased) and told her Gregg was lying; Lamb told these witnesses “to stay away” and did not inform Hanson’s attorney. The petition claimed voicemails left by Gregg should have been played for the jury because they indicated she was angry with Hanson for ending their relationship. Because of a warrant for his arrest, Hanson failed to appear for three scheduled depositions. The district court dismissed Hanson’s petition. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, noting that Hanson had been warned of the possible sanction and the prejudice to the state. View "Hanson v. State" on Justia Law

At 1:37 a.m., Haddad reported to Missoula 911 that he was driving on Hillview when a black Acura 2.0 CL with gold badging pulled out in front of him; that the driver was swerving; that he could not describe the driver due to the vehicle’s tinted windows nor see the license plate; and that he would “possibly” be willing to sign a complaint. He provided his name and phone number, but declined to provide his address, indicating he was willing to be contacted by law enforcement. Officers Jones and Horton responded; on Hillview, Horton passed a vehicle that fit Haddad’s description. Jones saw it turn onto 34th Street, searched the area and found a black Acura 2.0 CL in an apartment complex parking lot. Tye was standing near the vehicle. Jones observed that she was swaying, had watery eyes and slow, slurred speech, and smelled of alcohol, and determined Tye was intoxicated. Tye admitted she had several drinks before driving down Hillview. Jones arrested her, then discovered that Haddad lied about his location. Haddad admitted calling 911 from his residence after Tye left that location intoxicated. Haddad did not want Tye to know he was the complainant. The court heard evidence that 911 dispatchers do not regularly use the GPS system, but rely on the information callers provide because it is more accurate, concluded that Jones reasonably relied on Haddad’s information, and denied a motion to suppress. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, based on the “Pratt” factors: whether the informant identifies himself and exposes himself to criminal and civil liability if the report is false; whether the report is based on the informant’s personal observations; and whether the officer’s own observations corroborated the informant’s information. View "Missoula v. Tye" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of one count each of sexual intercourse without consent, sexual assault, and sexual abuse of children. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an adequate inquiry into his request for substitute counsel and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant’s request for substitute counsel, and further investigation by the court was unnecessary; and (2) Defendant’s claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel is dismissed without prejudice to raising it in a postconviction relief proceeding. View "State v. Cheetham" on Justia Law