Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of threats and other improper influence in official matters, criminal trespass, and disorderly conduct. The Supreme Court affirmed the improper influence conviction and reversed the conviction for criminal trespass, holding (1) the Court declines to consider in this appeal Defendant’s argument that the improper influence statute is unconstitutionally overbroad; (2) the State presented sufficient evidence to convict Defendant of improper influence; (3) the State did not present sufficient evidence to convict Defendant of criminal trespass; (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing evidence of prior incident with the arresting officer; and (5) the Court declines to consider whether Defendant’s counsel provided deficient representation by failing to object to the jury instructions on mental state. View "State v. Spottedbear" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of sexual assault and sexual intercourse without consent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not violate Defendant’s constitutional right to a public trial when it closed to the public a hearing on the admissibility of the victim’s prior allegations of sexual abuse; (2) did not abuse its discretion in preventing Defendant from questioning the victim about prior allegations of sexual abuse; and (3) did not err by not disclosing information contained in sealed records after conducting an in camera review. View "State v. Hoff" on Justia Law

Jason Talbot was seriously injured in Montana when he was struck by a vehicle driven by an employee of WMK-Davis, LLC. At the time of the accident, Talbot was employed by Cudd Pressure Control, Inc. Talbot, who was a resident of Oklahoma, filed a workers’ compensation claim in Oklahoma. Talbot then filed a complaint in Yellowstone County against WMK-Davis’s employee. Cudd, in turn, successfully moved to intervene in order to assert a workers’ compensation subrogation lien against Talbot’s potential tort recovery. Such an action is allowable under Oklahoma law, but Oklahoma law directly conflicts with Montana’s rule that a party may not subrogate until the injured worker has been whole. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Talbot, concluding that Montana applied and Cudd was prohibited from asserting a workers’ compensation subrogation lien in the underlying action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in determining that Montana courts will not conduct a choice of law analysis when determining the validity of a workers’ compensation subrogation lien; and (2) because the Montana Constitution applies in this case, and Cudd stipulated that Talbot will not be made whole under Montana law, Talbot was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. View "Talbot v. Cudd" on Justia Law

This case concerned three retirement plans established by the Montana Legislature under the Montana Public Employee Retirement System (PERS). Plaintiffs, who elected to participate in the Defined Contribution Retirement Plan (DC Plan) and Montana University System Retirement Plan (University Plan), filed suit against the State and PERS, alleging that they were treated unequally from similarly-situated participants in the Defined Benefit Retirement Plan (DB Plan) and that requiring State employers of DC and University Plan participants to contribute to the trust that funds the retirement benefits of all DB Plan participants (DB Trust) violates Plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants, concluding (1) participants in the DB Plan, DC Plan, and University Plan are not members of similarly situated classes under an equal protection analysis, and (2) employer contributions to the DB Trust that are calculated based on the salaries of DC and University Plan participants do not violate substantive due process. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in its judgment. View "Wrzesien v. Mont. Pub. Employee Ret. Admin." on Justia Law

Carbon County Resource Council and Northern Plains Resources Council (collectively, Resource Councils) challenged the Montana Board of Oil and Gas Conservation’s (the Board) approval of well stimulation activities at an exploratory gas well in Carbon County. Specifically, Resource Councils claimed that the Board’s permitting process violated their constitutional right to meaningfully participate in government decisions. The district court concluded that Resource Councils’ constitutional challenge was not ripe for judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of the Board. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Resource Councils’ claims are ripe for judicial review; but (2) the Board did not violate Resource Councils’ right to participate in its consideration of the permit at issue in this case. View "Carbon County Res. Council v. Bd. of Oil & Gas Conservation" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated burglary, elder abuse, and failure to comply with licensing requirements. Defendant was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison for aggravated burglary, ten years in prison for elder abuse, and six months in jail for the licensing violation. All sentences were to run concurrently. Defendant appealed, arguing that receiving multiple convictions for elder abuse and aggravated burglary violated Mont. Code Ann. 46-11-410(2)(d) and that her counsel’s failure to object constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that elder abuse and aggravated burglary do not constitute multiple convictions for the same offense and do not violate section 46-11-410(2)(d), and therefore, Defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must fail. View "State v. Hooper" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with criminal possession of dangerous drugs with intent to distribute with a persistent felony offender designation. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized in the search of his car, asserting that the arresting officers lacked a particularized suspicion of wrongdoing involving narcotics sufficient to justify a canine sniff of his car. The district court denied the motion. Defendant entered a plea agreement admitting to the charges but reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the facts of this case, the district court did not err in determining that there was particularized suspicion to support the canine search of Defendant’s car. View "State v. Marino" on Justia Law

In September 2013, Defendant was arrested for possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia and was jailed for more than ten months while he awaited testing results from the State Crime Lab. Trial was finally held at the end of July 2014. By then, Defendant had been incarcerated for 309 days. Before trial, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the case for lack of a speedy trial. The district court denied the motion. The jury subsequently found Defendant guilty of both charges. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial because he did not receive protection of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. View "State v. Velasquez" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with escape in Powell County. The State later stipulated that venue was proper in Yellowstone County. The Powell County District Court subsequently granted the State’s motion to dismiss the escape charge and dismissed the case without prejudice. Nearly seven months later, the State filed the escape charges in Yellowstone County. Before trial, Defendant moved to dismiss the case for lack of a speedy trial, alleging that his right to a speedy trial had attached upon his initial appearance on the Powell County charge. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Defendant’s right to a speedy trial had not attached until the charges were re-filed in Yellowstone County. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court erred in calculating the length of the delay, as the speedy trial clock began running when charges first were filed in Powell County; (2) the time period from the dismissal of the charge initially filed against Defendant in Powell County to the filing of the charge in Yellowstone County is not counted for purposes of determining the length of the delay; and (3) the delay in this case did not establish a constitutional speedy trial violation. View "State v. Butterfly" on Justia Law

When Chrysler Group, LLC filed with the Montana Department of Justice, Motor Vehicle Division a notice of intent to establish an additional Chrysler-Jeep dealership in Billings, Lithia Motors, Inc. filed an administrative protest. The Department sustained Lithia’s protest. Rimrock Chrysler, Inc. sought judicial review, but the district court dismissed the petition on the grounds of mootness and lack of a justiciable controversy. While Rimrock’s appeal was pending, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that section 747 of the United States Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010 preempted state regulation of new dealerships issued under certain dealership protest laws. The Montana Supreme Court dismissed Rimrock’s appeal. On remand, Rimrock moved to vacate the Department’s administrative decision and to dismiss the the judicial review proceeding on the ground that section 747 preempted Montana dealer protest laws and deprived the state of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the administrative claim. The district court denied Rimrock’s motion and dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s order denying Rimrock’s motion to vacate and to dismiss, holding that Rimrock waived its section 747 preemption defense when it entered into the settlement agreement; and (2) reversed the district court’s order dismissing Rimrock’s petition for judicial review, holding that Rimrock’s petition involved a justifiable controversy, and the court erred in concluding otherwise. View "Rimrock Chrysler, Inc. v. Lithia Motors, Inc." on Justia Law