Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

ACORN International sued the Montana Secretary of State, Christi Jacobsen, seeking records to justify the costs of accessing the Montana voter file and a declaratory judgment that the Secretary violated the "right to know" provisions of the Montana Constitution. The Secretary charges $1,000 for a one-time request or $5,000 for an annual subscription to the voter file. ACORN argued these fees were unreasonably high and not justified under the law.The First Judicial District Court of Lewis and Clark County granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary, ruling that the fees were lawful. The court did not address ACORN's claim regarding the violation of the "right to know" provisions.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the fees charged by the Secretary for access to the voter file are lawful under Montana law, as they reflect the actual costs of maintaining the voter registration system, Montana VOTES. The court also found that the fees do not violate the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) because the NVRA does not specifically address electronic voter databases. Additionally, the court ruled that the Secretary did not violate ACORN's "right to know" under the Montana Constitution, as the Secretary's response to ACORN's request was reasonable given the information provided.The main holdings are that the Secretary's fees for the voter file are lawful and do not violate the NVRA, and that there was no violation of the "right to know" provisions of the Montana Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's ruling. View "ACORN International v. Jacobsen" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the Parental Consent for Abortion Act of 2013 (Consent Act) in Montana, which requires minors to obtain parental consent or a judicial waiver to have an abortion. The plaintiffs, Planned Parenthood of Montana and Dr. Samuel Dickman, argue that the Act violates the Montana Constitution by infringing on minors' fundamental rights to privacy and equal protection.The First Judicial District Court in Lewis and Clark County initially issued a preliminary injunction against the Consent Act, keeping the Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 2011 (Notice Act) in effect. The District Court later granted summary judgment in favor of Planned Parenthood, ruling that the Consent Act violated the Montana Constitution. The court found that the Act was not narrowly tailored to achieve the State's compelling interests, such as protecting minors from sexual offenses, ensuring informed decision-making, and promoting parental rights. The court did not address the equal protection challenge but noted that the Notice Act, while serving similar ends, was less onerous.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The Court held that the Consent Act violates minors' fundamental rights to privacy and equal protection under the Montana Constitution. The Court found that the Act's classification between minors seeking abortions and those carrying pregnancies to term was unjustified. The State failed to demonstrate that the Act was narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests, such as protecting minors from sexual victimization, psychological and physical harm, and immaturity, or promoting parental rights. The Court also found that the judicial waiver provision did not save the Act, as it introduced unnecessary delays and burdens on minors seeking abortions.The Montana Supreme Court concluded that the Consent Act infringes on minors' fundamental rights without adequate justification and does not enhance their protection. Therefore, the Court held that the Consent Act is unconstitutional. View "Planned Parenthood v. State" on Justia Law

In August 2022, Cole Levine moved from New Mexico to Missoula, Montana, to attend law school. On August 18, 2022, a woman identified as M.H. was sexually assaulted in an alley. During the incident, the assailant took M.H.'s phone but dropped another phone, which was later identified as belonging to Levine. Following an investigation, Levine was charged with several offenses, including attempted sexual intercourse without consent and aggravated assault. On October 3, 2022, the District Court issued a search warrant to Verizon Wireless for data related to Levine's phone, which was stored on servers outside Montana.Levine filed a motion to suppress the data obtained from the warrant, arguing it was an illegal extraterritorial warrant. The Fourth Judicial District Court agreed, ruling that Montana courts did not have jurisdiction to issue such a warrant to an out-of-state entity. The court relied on the reasoning from United States v. Webb and found that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply, declaring the warrant void ab initio. Consequently, the court granted Levine's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrant.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and reversed the District Court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the Secure Communications Act (SCA) grants Montana district courts jurisdiction to issue search warrants for electronic communications stored by out-of-state third parties. Additionally, Montana law under § 46-5-605(3)(a), MCA, provides an independent basis for such jurisdiction. The Supreme Court concluded that the District Court had jurisdiction to issue the search warrant and erred in granting Levine's motion to suppress. The case was remanded for continuation of proceedings. View "State v. Levine" on Justia Law

Law enforcement responded to the defendant's home after his ex-girlfriend reported that he had threatened suicide during a phone call. The officers, aware of his history of alcohol abuse and mental health issues, entered his home without a warrant after he failed to respond to their attempts to contact him. Inside, an officer shot the defendant, believing he was armed. The defendant was charged with Assault on a Peace Officer.The District Court of the Third Judicial District denied the defendant's pretrial motions to dismiss and suppress evidence obtained from the warrantless entry. The court also denied his motion for a new trial based on an alleged Brady violation, where the defendant claimed the State failed to disclose that the officer who shot him had been shot at in a prior incident. The jury found the defendant guilty.The Supreme Court of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court held that the officers' warrantless entry was justified under the community caretaker doctrine, given the exigent circumstances of a potential suicide. The court also found no Brady violation, as the undisclosed evidence about the officer's prior incident would not have changed the trial's outcome. The court concluded that the officers acted reasonably in their entry and subsequent actions, and the defendant's conviction was upheld. View "State v. Case" on Justia Law

Anthony Cordero, a student at Montana State University (MSU) during the Spring 2020 semester, sued MSU for prorated reimbursement of his tuition and fees after the university transitioned to online learning due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Cordero claimed that MSU breached an express contract to provide in-person education and services. He also asserted claims for breach of implied contract, unjust enrichment, due process violation, violation of the takings clause, and inverse condemnation.The First Judicial District Court of Lewis and Clark County dismissed four of Cordero’s six claims, including the implied contract and unjust enrichment claims, under M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The court granted summary judgment in favor of MSU on the remaining claims, including the express contract claim, and denied Cordero’s motion to certify the case as a class action. The court found that Cordero did not identify a specific, bargained-for promise by MSU to provide in-person education and that he had no compensable property interest in the tuition and fees paid.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court held that there was an express contract between Cordero and MSU, but it did not include a specific promise to provide in-person education. The court found that MSU had the right to change its regulations and policies, including transitioning to online learning during emergencies. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the implied contract and unjust enrichment claims, noting that an implied contract cannot exist when an express contract is present. The court concluded that MSU did not breach its contractual duties regarding tuition and fees, as it maintained campus facilities and services to the extent possible during the pandemic. View "Cordero v. Montana State University" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Judge Kerry L. Burman, the Glendive City Judge, and Mayor Deb Dion of Glendive, Montana. Judge Burman petitioned for a writ of mandamus to reinstate Mary York to her position as Clerk of Glendive City Court after Mayor Dion terminated York's employment. The termination occurred following a disagreement over the justification for York's attendance at a training conference. York was terminated without notice and escorted out of the court, leaving unfinished work and causing operational disruptions.The District Court initially ordered York's interim reinstatement pending further review. Judge Burman argued that Mayor Dion's actions violated state statute, the court's holding in Carlson v. City of Bozeman, and the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. Respondents contended that Mayor Dion had the statutory authority to terminate York, who was still in her probationary period, and that the court's operations were not significantly impaired.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court determined that the matter was more appropriately characterized as an application for a writ of prohibition rather than mandamus. The court found that Mayor Dion's actions disrupted the court's operations and violated § 3-1-111, MCA, which grants courts the authority to control their ministerial officers. The court held that the executive's authority to hire or fire employees must be exercised in a manner that does not impair the court's ability to conduct its business.The Supreme Court of Montana granted the petition for a writ of prohibition, arresting Mayor Dion's action of terminating York's employment. The court emphasized the need for coordination between branches of government to avoid such disruptions. View "Burman v. City of Glendive" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Candice Lea Davis, who was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI) after her vehicle was found high-centered on a rock berm. Davis had red and watery eyes, and the officer detected the smell of alcohol from her vehicle. She admitted to having a drink after her shift at work. Due to adverse weather conditions, the officer decided to conduct standardized field sobriety tests (SFSTs) at the Sheriff’s Office. Davis was handcuffed for transportation but was informed that she was not under arrest. After performing poorly on the SFSTs and a breath test at the Sheriff’s Office, Davis was arrested for DUI.Davis was convicted on all counts in Justice Court and appealed to the District Court for a trial de novo. She filed a motion to suppress, arguing that she was subjected to a custodial interrogation without being advised of her Miranda rights and that all evidence obtained after she was handcuffed should be suppressed. The State argued that the officer had particularized suspicion that Davis was driving under the influence. The District Court denied Davis's motion to suppress, reasoning that the officer had particularized suspicion to extend the stop at each step of his investigation.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court's decision. The court concluded that there was probable cause to believe Davis had committed the offense of DUI when she was placed in handcuffs and taken to the Sheriff’s Office for testing. The court also found that Davis's Miranda rights were not violated as she was not subjected to a custodial interrogation. The court held that the results of the SFSTs and breath test did not require a Miranda warning as they were not self-incriminating statements that must be suppressed in the absence of a Miranda waiver. View "State v. Davis" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Joseph Brian McElroy, who was charged with criminal possession of dangerous drugs with intent to distribute, a felony. The charge stemmed from a traffic stop initiated by Trooper Adams for speeding. During the stop, Trooper Adams noticed the smell of marijuana from the vehicle and observed signs of "hard travel." After verifying the driver's information and concluding that the driver was not under the influence, Trooper Adams questioned the occupants about the smell of marijuana. When they denied consent to search the vehicle, Trooper Adams deployed a canine for a sniff test, which led to the discovery of drugs and other items. McElroy filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the traffic stop was unlawfully extended without sufficient particularized suspicion.The District Court denied McElroy's motion to suppress the evidence. The court found that Trooper Adams had sufficient particularized suspicion to conduct the canine sniff based on the smell of marijuana, signs of hard travel, the occupants' nervousness, and their somewhat differing backstories. McElroy then entered a plea agreement, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the District Court's decision. The court found that Trooper Adams did not have sufficient particularized suspicion to expand the traffic stop into a drug possession investigation. The court held that factors such as signs of hard travel, traveling from a known drug center in a third-party vehicle, and nervous demeanor, even when considered together, do not constitute particularized suspicion. The court also noted that the smell of marijuana itself does not constitute particularized suspicion sufficient to conclude there could be drugs in the vehicle. Therefore, the court concluded that Trooper Adams's further questioning about the marijuana smell and subsequent use of the canine sniff were unlawful. The court reversed the District Court's order denying McElroy's motion to suppress evidence and the resulting judgment of conviction and sentence. View "State v. McElroy" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Neil Lanchantin, who was charged with felony DUI and four misdemeanor offenses after being pursued and arrested by a Montana Highway Patrol Trooper on private property. The property, where Lanchantin was residing with his girlfriend, was marked with a "No Trespassing" sign. Lanchantin appealed the First Judicial District Court's order denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained when law enforcement officers entered the private property without a warrant.The District Court denied Lanchantin's motion to suppress on the basis that he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy at the location of the stop. Lanchantin pled guilty to the DUI charge but reserved his right to appeal the District Court’s order. The State argued that Lanchantin had no privacy interest in the property because he did not live there, and that the "No Trespassing" signs were inadequate to convey an expectation of privacy because they were tacked to trees along the side of the road.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the District Court's decision, holding that Lanchantin had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the driveway of the property where he was residing with his girlfriend. The court found that the "No Trespassing" signs were sufficient to manifest an actual expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable. The court concluded that law enforcement cannot enter onto private property without a warrant, even in the case of a misdemeanant fleeing, unless there are exigent circumstances. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion. View "State v. Lanchantin" on Justia Law

John David Panasuk was pulled over by Officer Riediger and Lieutenant Frank Martell for towing a trailer without trailer plates. After Panasuk was unable to initially provide his license, registration, and proof of insurance, Riediger asked him to exit his vehicle. The other occupants, Camilla TalksDifferent and Dustin Hickman, were also asked to exit. Riediger and Martell knew TalksDifferent as a drug user, but they did not know Panasuk or Hickman. When Hickman produced a North Dakota driver’s license, Riediger contacted the Williams County Task Force in North Dakota and was told Hickman had a history of being a drug dealer and user. Riediger also recalled a previous incident where Panasuk was suspected of selling methamphetamine. TalksDifferent gave consent to search her purse, where Riediger found two syringes. She also told Riediger there was methamphetamine in Panasuk’s vehicle. Riediger seized the vehicle and applied for a search warrant. Law enforcement recovered 6.4 grams of methamphetamine from the vehicle’s center console after searching the vehicle. Panasuk was charged with criminal possession of dangerous drugs and drug paraphernalia.The District Court denied Panasuk’s motion to suppress the evidence, noting Panasuk’s previous incident and that TalksDifferent had said there was methamphetamine in the vehicle. The court found that law enforcement had sufficient particularized suspicion to expand the scope of a traffic stop to a drug investigation.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the District Court's decision. The Supreme Court found that the initial detention was unconstitutionally extended beyond what was necessary to effectuate the initial purpose of the stop. The court concluded that there were no articulable facts, other than prior suspected criminal histories, which were offered as justification to expand the search into a drug investigation. The court held that knowledge of a person’s prior criminal involvement is alone insufficient to give rise to the requisite reasonable suspicion. The court remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "State v. Panasuk" on Justia Law