Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order terminating Mother's parental rights to her three children, holding that Mother's attorney did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel.At issue was whether counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance when he stipulated to the request of the Department of Public Health and Human Services, Child and Family Services Division that no reunification services be provided to Mother. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's termination of Mother's parental rights, holding (1) Mother was not prejudiced by any alleged failure on her attorney's part to object to the Department's request not to provide reunification services; (2) the district court had grounds to terminate Mother's parental rights and made the findings necessary to support termination; and (3) the district court did not err in finding that termination would be in the children's best interests. View "In re D.A.D." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the district court that the Montana Board of Pardons and Parole did not violate Appellant's statutory or constitutional rights in denying Appellant's parole request, holding that the district court did not err.Appellant sought judicial review of the Board's decision, claiming that the Board denied him his right to know, right to participate, or right to due process when it denied him parole without first furnishing him a copy of documents on which the Board relied in making its decision. Appellant further argued that the Board unlawfully relied on a guideline without having adopted it as an administrative rule pursuant to the Montana Administrative Procedure Act. The district court granted summary judgment for the Board. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) where the guideline was not the reason for the Board's decision, Appellant could not demonstrated the likelihood of a different outcome; and (2) the Board did not violate Appellant's right to know, right to participate, or due process rights. View "Miller v. Montana Board of Pardons & Parole" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Workers' Compensation Court that Mont. Code Ann. 39-71-703(2) did not violate Appellant's right to equal protection by denying an impairment award to a worker with a Class 1 impairment who has suffered no wage loss, holding that the statute passes rational basis muster under the Equal Protection Clause of the Montana Constitution.Section 39-71-703(2) allows impairment awards for claimants without actual wage loss only if they have a Class 2 or higher impairment rating. Appellant, who was designated as Class 1 and was denied an impairment award, challenged the statute, arguing that it violated her constitutional right to equal protection because other workers with different injuries but the same whole-person impairment percentage would receive the award. The WCC denied the challenge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the WCC did not err in its determination that section 39-71-703(2) did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. View "Hensley v. Montana State Fund" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of vehicular homicide while under the influence, holding that Mont. Code Ann. 61-8-411 does not violate either the substantive due process or equal protection guarantees of the state and federal constitutions.Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges, arguing that section 61-8-411 was facially unconstitutional as a violation of his substantive due process rights. The district court denied the motion to dismiss. On appeal, Defendant argued that the legislature could have made a more scientifically based policy choice to keep drivers impaired by THC off the road and that the statute unconstitutionally creates classifications. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Mont. Code Ann. 61-8-411 is rationally related to the government's compelling interest in keeping drug-impaired drivers off the road. View "State v. Jensen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed the charges against Defendant, holding that Defendant was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial and was presumptively prejudiced by the delay.The State filed an information charging Defendant with burglary and theft of more than $800. Nearly five years after his arrest Defendant had still not been brought to trial. Defendant filed a pro se motion to dismiss the charges, arguing that the five-year delay violated his right to a speedy trial. The district court denied the motion. Defendant pleaded guilty, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his speedy trial motion. The Supreme Court dismissed the charges against Defendant, holding that Defendant was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. View "State v. Chambers" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Defendant's motion to exclude evidence obtained during a traffic stop and to dismiss the charges against him, holding that an officer has a lawful right of access to reach into a vehicle and seize plainly visible contraband observed by the officer during a lawful traffic stop.Defendant was charged with criminal possession of dangerous drugs and criminal possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant moved to exclude the evidence obtained during the traffic stop and to dismiss the charges, arguing that the deputy sheriff's warrantless seizure of a plastic bag found on Defendant's lap was unlawful. The district court denied the motion. Defendant then pled guilty, preserving his right to appeal the denial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the officer's warrantless seizure of the bag was not unlawful because the officer was lawfully present next to Defendant's truck during the traffic stop, could plainly see readily apparent contraband fall onto Defendant's lap, and had a lawful right of access to that contraband. View "State v. Tenold" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's felony conviction of criminal possession with intent to distribute, holding that the district court did not err in determining that the State was not required to disclose the identity of its confidential informant.After Defendant was charged, he moved to dismiss the case on the basis that the State had failed to disclose the confidential informant's identity within the discovery timeframe. The district court summarily denied Defendant's motion to dismiss, declining to require disclosure of the confidential informant's identity. Defendant pled guilty, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err as a matter of law in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss and did not abuse its discretion in denying disclosure of the confidential informant's identity. View "State v. Soto" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court revoking Defendant's deferred sentence for criminal possession of dangerous drugs, holding that the district court did not violate Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses during his revocation and did not abuse its discretion in determining that Defendant absconded.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not violate Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him by relying on statements made in a report of violation by Defendant's previous probation officer; and (2) the State presented sufficient evidence at Defendant's revocation hearing to establish that Defendant failed to report for the purpose of avoiding supervision and that the probation office made reasonable efforts to contact him. View "State v. Fetveit" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Defendant's motion to suppress testimony regarding statements he made during a phone conversation with the victim, holding that the testimony was not subject to exclusion.A.O. and her friend Tricia alleged that Defendant had committed sexual offenses against A.O. While A.O. was at the police department, Defendant called A.O. Police officers listened in on the conversation, during which Defendant admitted to raping A.O. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence. The district court ruled that the officer testimony regarding the conversation would be excluded but that A.O. and Tricia, as private actors, could testify as to the conversation. Defendant appealed, arguing that the testimony of A.O. and Tricia as to the contents of the conversation must be excluded as attributable to an unconstitutional privacy intrusion by a government actor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly denied the motion to suppress because A.O. and Tricia's testimony resulted from their own private actions, not from unconstitutional monitoring and recording by police. View "State v. Wolfe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Mont. Code Ann. 46-5-105 prohibits detention center employees who are booking a person into the general population of a detention facility from conducting a visual body cavity search without reasonable suspicion to believe that person is concealing contraband, a weapon, or evidence of the commission of a crime.William Rogers, leading ninety-six named plaintiffs, brought this action challenging the Lewis and Clark County Detention Center policy to conduct an unclothed visual body cavity search of every detainee prior to placement in the general population of the facility as a violation of Mont. Const. art. II, 10 and 11 and Mont. Code Ann. 46-5-105. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants as to ninety-two of the named plaintiffs and denied the motion as to four plaintiffs who were never placed in the general population of the facility after they were strip searched. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Plaintiffs' diminished privacy interests did not outweigh the legitimate penological interests of the Detention Center; and (2) the plain language of section 46-5-105 unequivocally prohibits suspicionless strip searches of those arrested for minor offenses in any situation. View "Rogers v. Lewis & Clark County" on Justia Law