Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court dismissed Defendant's conviction, entered after a second trial, for sexual intercourse without consent and bail jumping, holding that the district court abused its discretion in declaring and mistrial and erred in concluding that double jeopardy did not bar Defendant's retrial.Defendant was originally charged with incest and a jury was impaneled. Nearing the conclusion of the State's case the court reporter had either a heart attack or a stroke and was taken to the hospital. The court declared a mistrial, and a retrial was scheduled. Before the second trial, the State amended its charge to correct a deficiency in the original charging documents. Defendant was subsequently convicted. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant's subsequent prosecution for sexual intercourse without consent and bail jumping for the same incident as his first prosecution was barred by the United States and Montana Constitutions protections against double jeopardy; and (2) the district court abused its discretion in declaring a mistrial. View "State v. Newrobe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of felony theft by possession of stolen property and four misdemeanor, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on any of his claims of error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court acted within its discretion in denying Defendant's motions for mistrial after two separate references to Defendant's "jail" status were made by State witnesses; (2) the district court did not err in declining to give a jury instruction on unauthorized use of a motor vehicle as a lesser-included offense of the charged theft by possession of stolen property; and (3) Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims would more appropriately be addressed through a petition for postconviction relief. View "State v. Denny" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for three felony counts of privacy in communications, in violation of Mont. Code Ann. 45-8-213(1)(a), holding that there were no prejudicial errors in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the Privacy in Communications statute, Mont. Code Ann. 45-8-213(1)(a), is not facially overbroad, nor does it constitute a content-based restriction on speech in violation of the "freedom of speech" clauses of the Montana and United States Constitutions; (2) the district court correctly interpreted the Privacy in Communications statute; (3) there was insufficient evidence to conclude that there was jurisdiction when the threatening communication was made to a person located outside of Montana; and (4) the district court fully and fairly instructed the jury in accordance with the charges and evidence presented. View "State v. Lamoureux" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court concluding that Erik Miller was justified when he used deadly force against Nicholas Tyson Frazier, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.Frazier, who was suicidal, was shot by Miller, a police officer, in his home after he pointed his gun at the Miller. The Estate brought this complaint against Miller alleging assault, wrongful death, negligence, and a violation of Frazier's rights under the Montana Constitution. The district court entered judgment in favor of Miller, holding that Miller's use of force was justified. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err by refusing to submit a separate constitutional tort theory to the jury; (2) the special verdict form clearly and fairly presented the jury with the ultimate questions of fact; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to record all sidebar discussions of evidentiary objections. View "Estate of Frazier v. Miller" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for sexual intercourse without consent (SIWOC) and his sentence of seventy-five years' imprisonment, with twenty-five years suspended, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on any of his claims of error.On appeal, Defendant argued (1) the district court erred by allowing the presentation of combined expert and lay testimony without providing a cautionary instruction or notice to counsel, (2) the court violated his due process rights by failing to exclude the prosecutor from a hearing regarding defense counsel's representation; and (3) his counsel provided ineffective assistance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) plain error review was not warranted for either issue one or issue two; and (2) Defendant failed to establish his ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal. View "State v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of incest, holding that the district court did not err by precluding Defendant from introducing extrinsic evidence to challenge the victim's credibility.On appeal, Defendant argued that his defense was prejudiced because he was prohibited from demonstrating the victim's bias or motive to testify falsely and that the court's evidentiary ruling violated his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Mont. Const. art. II, 24. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not misapply the rules or abuse its discretion in its ruling on the admissibility of evidence; and (2) the district court properly exercised its discretion by imposing reasonable limits on Defendant's evidentiary inquiries. View "State v. Quinlan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part Defendant's convictions for deliberate homicide and tampering with physical evidence, holding that Defendant's constitutional right of confrontation was violated, requiring reversal of his conviction of tampering with physical evidence.On appeal, Defendant argued that he was denied his right under the United States and Montana Constitutions to confront witnesses against him when the State presented a foundational witness in real time by two-way videoconference. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) furtherance of an important public policy to allow the witness to testify via two-way videoconferencing was not demonstrated in this case, and therefore, the first prong of the analysis set forth in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990), was not satisfied; and (2) Defendant's right to a fair trial was not undermined by the prosecutor's closing argument. View "State v. Mercier" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order terminating Mother's parental rights to her three children, holding that Mother's attorney did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel.At issue was whether counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance when he stipulated to the request of the Department of Public Health and Human Services, Child and Family Services Division that no reunification services be provided to Mother. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's termination of Mother's parental rights, holding (1) Mother was not prejudiced by any alleged failure on her attorney's part to object to the Department's request not to provide reunification services; (2) the district court had grounds to terminate Mother's parental rights and made the findings necessary to support termination; and (3) the district court did not err in finding that termination would be in the children's best interests. View "In re D.A.D." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the district court that the Montana Board of Pardons and Parole did not violate Appellant's statutory or constitutional rights in denying Appellant's parole request, holding that the district court did not err.Appellant sought judicial review of the Board's decision, claiming that the Board denied him his right to know, right to participate, or right to due process when it denied him parole without first furnishing him a copy of documents on which the Board relied in making its decision. Appellant further argued that the Board unlawfully relied on a guideline without having adopted it as an administrative rule pursuant to the Montana Administrative Procedure Act. The district court granted summary judgment for the Board. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) where the guideline was not the reason for the Board's decision, Appellant could not demonstrated the likelihood of a different outcome; and (2) the Board did not violate Appellant's right to know, right to participate, or due process rights. View "Miller v. Montana Board of Pardons & Parole" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Workers' Compensation Court that Mont. Code Ann. 39-71-703(2) did not violate Appellant's right to equal protection by denying an impairment award to a worker with a Class 1 impairment who has suffered no wage loss, holding that the statute passes rational basis muster under the Equal Protection Clause of the Montana Constitution.Section 39-71-703(2) allows impairment awards for claimants without actual wage loss only if they have a Class 2 or higher impairment rating. Appellant, who was designated as Class 1 and was denied an impairment award, challenged the statute, arguing that it violated her constitutional right to equal protection because other workers with different injuries but the same whole-person impairment percentage would receive the award. The WCC denied the challenge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the WCC did not err in its determination that section 39-71-703(2) did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. View "Hensley v. Montana State Fund" on Justia Law