Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in this case alleging a violation of Article 9A of Montana's adopted version of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), holding that the district court erred when it concluded that Article 9 no longer applied to the agreement between the parties.Plaintiffs and Defendants entered into an installment sale contract and security agreement to buy a mobile home. When Plaintiffs continually missed payments on the mobile home Defendants sent a notice of default and then demanded the outstanding balance on the agreement. Plaintiffs moved out of the mobile home and voluntarily returned it to Defendants. After Defendants sold the mobile home to a new buyer Plaintiffs brought suit alleging that Defendants violated provision of Article 9A. The district court denied Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and entered judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to Defendants' UCC violations, and Plaintiffs were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on that issue. View "Christman v. Clause" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court granting summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim to an accounting and recovery of surplus proceeds on the resale of her mobile home after she returned it to RJC Investment, Inc. holding that the district court erred in holding that Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) was inapplicable in this case.Plaintiff entered into an installment sale contract and security agreement to purchase a mobile home. The contract was assigned to RJC. Plaintiff later allowed RJC to take possession of the mobile home and signed a full release of contract relinquishing all rights to the mobile home. After RJC resold the mobile home RJC failed to provide an accounting of the sale and did not refund any surplus to Plaintiff. Plaintiff sued RJC. The district court granted summary judgment for RJC. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the release between Plaintiff and RJC did not terminate application of the UCC's requirement for an accounting and surplus after RJC sold the collateral; (2) the district court erred in granting RJC summary judgment on the ground that RJC satisfied the elements of the acceptance of collateral in full satisfaction pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 30-9A-620; and (3) RJC was not entitled to summary judgment on other grounds. View "Hutzenbiler v. RJC Investment, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of RJC Investment, Inc. on Deneige Kapor’s complaint alleging that RJC failed to pay her the surplus allegedly realized on the resale of her mobile home after she returned it to RJC when she could not make the payments, as required by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), holding that the district court erred in granting RJC summary judgment based on its determination that Kapor was equitably estopped from pursuing her claims.Specifically, the Court held that the district court (1) erred in determining that the release agreement Kapor signed terminated any further application of the UCC; (2) erred in determining that the release constituted an acceptance of the collateral in full satisfaction of Kapor’s secured obligation; and (3) correctly held that Kapor was equitably estopped from pursuing her claims because all six elements of equitable estoppel could not be satisfied here. View "Kapor v. RJC Investment, Inc." on Justia Law

The City of Dillon filed a civil action against George Warner seeking to recover the costs of installation of a water meter. Judge Gregory Mohr ruled on several motions filed by the city and conducted a scheduling conference. Warner subsequently filed an affidavit of disqualification against Mohr. The judge that presided over the disqualification proceeding (1) found Warner's affidavit of disqualification was insufficient as a matter of law and was therefore void; and (2) ordered that Mohr would maintain jurisdiction. The district court dismissed Warner's appeal, finding that the city court order concerning Warner's attempt to disqualify Mohr was an interim order and was therefore not appealable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly dismissed Warner's appeal, as it was from an interim order and not a final judgment; and (2) the district court's orders dismissing the appeal were interim orders and thus not appealable to the Court. View "City of Dillon v. Warner" on Justia Law

Campbell Farming Corporation had its shares controlled by three shareholders: Stephanie Gately controlled fifty-one percent of the shares, and H. Robert Warren and Joan Crocker controlled the remaining forty-nine percent. Stephanie awarded her son, Robert Gately, who was president of the company, a bonus after a vote by the shareholders. Warren and Crocker filed a derivative and direct action against the company and the Gatelys in federal district court seeking to void the bonus. The district court entered judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court accepted certification from the Tenth Circuit to answer several questions and held (1) the safe harbor provision of Mont. Code Ann. 35-1-462(2)(c) can be extended to cover a conflict-of-interest transaction involving a bonus that lacks consideration and would be void under Montana common law; (2) the business judgment rule does not apply to situations involving a director's conflict-of-interest transaction; and (3) the holding in Daniels v. Thomas, Dean & Hoskins does not apply to the claim challenging Stephanie's role in the director conflict of interest transaction, but the Daniels test does apply to the claim of breach of fiduciary duties alleged by the minority shareholders against Stephanie in her capacity as majority shareholder. View "Warren v. Campbell Farming Corp." on Justia Law

Gary Martin and Lewistown Miller Construction Company entered into a written contract for the construction of a dwelling on Martin's property. When construction was completed, Martin refused to pay additional amounts above the bid price, and LMCC filed a construction lien on the property. LMCC then filed suit, seeking damages for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and foreclosure of the lien. Martin counterclaimed for declaratory relief that the lien was invalid and to quiet title, among other things. The district court (1) granted foreclosure of LMCC's construction lien and awarded damages to LMCC; and (2) denied LMCC's and Martin's request for attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court did not err in ordering foreclosure of the construction lien, and the award of damages was not clearly erroneous; but (2) the district court erred in failing to award statutorily mandated attorney fees to LMCC, as it established its lien. Remanded. View "Lewistown Miller Constr. v. Martin" on Justia Law

Meril Curtis's houseguest took his credit card and made over $7,000 in unauthorized charges. After acknowledging that the charges were unauthorized and that Curtis was not personally liable for the charges, Citibank referred the account to a collection agency called Professional Recovery Services (PRS). Curtis filed suit against Citibank, alleging libel and credit libel and violation of the Montana Consumer Protection Act (MCPA). The district court granted summary judgment to Citibank, finding that Curtis's claims were preempted by the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in finding that Curtis' state law claims were preempted by the FCRA because the FCRA does not regulate collection agencies such as PRS. Remanded.

Appellant Angela O'Connell was involved in a theft scheme whereby Appellant's husband would steal property from a local business and sell the stolen goods for cash. Appellant pled guilty to accountability for theft pursuant to a plea agreement. Upon sentencing, Appellant was prohibited from entering bars and casinos and consuming alcohol, and was ordered to pay restitution to the business she stole from in the amount of $159,606. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) because the district court's determination of lost profits in this matter was based upon speculation and not supported by substantial evidence, the district court erred by ordering payment of lost profits, in addition to the replacement value of the stolen property, as part of Appellant's restitution obligation, and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting Appellant from entering bars as a condition of her sentence because the restriction furthered Appellant's rehabilitation. Remanded for recalculation of restitution based upon the replacement value of the stolen property.

Sheryl Crasco secured three payday loans from three different lenders. After the payor banks returned the checks for insufficient funds, the payday lenders assigned the checks to Credit Service, a collection agency. Credit Service filed an action against Crasco to recover the face value of the checks, a service fee per check, and bad check penalties of $500 per check. The county justice court concluded (1) Crasco must pay to Credit Service the face amount of each check and the service charge on each check, (2) Credit Service could not collect the bad check penalties, and (3) Crasco could recover damages for Credit Service's illegal pursuit of the bad check penalties. The district court reversed, determining that Credit Service could collect the bad check penalties. The Supreme Court reversed, holding a collection agency cannot charge bad check penalties for checks assigned to it from payday lenders when the payday lenders themselves are statutorily prohibited from charging such penalties. Remanded to determine whether the justice court incorrectly awarded Crasco damages.

Victor Tacke failed to pay real property taxes on his property in Lake County from 2005 to 2008. In 2006, the County conducted a tax sale for the year 2005, at which the County purchased the tax lien. In 2009, the County assigned its interest in the tax lien to Montana Lakeshore Properties (Lakeshore) in exchange for payment of the past due taxes and issued a tax sale certificate to Lakeshore. The County subsequently issued a tax deed to Lakeshore. In 2010, Tacke filed an action to quiet title in the property, seeking a judicial declaration that the tax deed was void. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Lakeshore. At issue on appeal was whether Lakeshore violated Mont. Code Ann. 15-17-212(3) by paying the back taxes two hours and forty-five minutes short of two weeks after giving notice to Tacke. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by granting summary judgment upholding the tax deed obtained by Lakeshore because this case fit within the general principle that "the law regards the day as an indivisible unit" and discards fractional days in most time computations.