Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2011, Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and disorderly conduct. Defendant pleaded not guilty and requested a jury trial. The trial court later informed Defendant that his scheduled trial was rescheduled because an older case had been set for trial on the same day. Before his rescheduled trial, Defendant moved to have his case dismissed for lack of a speedy trial. The municipal court granted the motion. The district court reversed. On remand, Defendant was convicted of DUI and acquitted of disorder conduct. The Supreme Court reversed the district court ruling reversing the municipal court’s dismissal of the charges, holding that the City failed to meet its burden of showing “good cause” for the delay in bringing Defendant to trial.View "City of Helena v. Broadwater" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with felony driving under the influence (DUI) and misdemeanor driving without valid liability insurance. Defendant entered pleas of not guilty and then filed a motion to dismiss for denial of his right to a speedy trial. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Defendant then changed his plea to guilty on both charges, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his speedy trial motion. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for dismissal of the charges, holding that the delay in bringing Defendant to trial violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial.View "State v. Zimmerman" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of deliberate homicide. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress statements he made to the police. The Supreme Court remanded with instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing. After a hearing on remand, the district court suppressed Defendant’s statements to the police on the grounds that the statements were made involuntarily and granted Defendant a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in concluding that Defendant’s statements were made involuntarily and in ordering a new trial.View "State v. OldHorn" on Justia Law

After a trial, Appellant was convicted of sexual intercourse without consent and sexual assault. The Supreme Court affirmed. Thereafter, Appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief raising numerous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Appellant’s petition for postconviction relief, holding (1) counsel was not ineffective for failing to request dismissal of the charges against Defendant for the State’s alleged destruction of evidence or a jury instruction regarding the State’s failure to collect and preserve the subject evidence; and (2) counsel did not act unreasonably when he withdrew a proposed jury instruction on sexual assault as a lesser included offense.View "Taylor v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of felony sexual assault. Defendant later filed a petition for postconviction relief seeking DNA testing and alleging that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC). The district court denied the petition, but the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Defendant subsequently filed a second petition requesting that he be allowed to conduct discovery. The district court denied both Defendant’s petition for DNA testing and his request to conduct discovery but granted relief as it pertained to his IAC claim. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err in denying Defendant’s petition for DNA testing; and (2) erred in granting Defendant’s petition as it pertained to IAC of appellate counsel, as any error on appellate counsel’s part was harmless. View "Golden v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to tampering with witnesses and informants. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the district court denied. Defendant appealed, arguing that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because his counsel misinformed him about his eligibility for a persistent felony offender designation. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order denying Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, holding (1) the district court correctly determined that Defendant was fully aware of the direct consequences of his plea and that the plea was not induced by misrepresentation; and (2) therefore, Defendant failed to show that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, he would not have entered a guilty plea.View "State v. Hendrickson" on Justia Law

In 1988, Appellant was convicted of misdemeanor assault and felony sexual intercourse without consent and was also designated a persistent felony offender (PFO). In 2013, Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he was wrongly sentenced for both the underlying felony and his PFO status. The Supreme Court granted the petition and remanded for correction of the illegal sentence. On remand, the district court resentenced Appellant during a status conference docketed under a newly-created civil cause number when neither Defendant nor his attorney were present. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant was sentenced with a complete lack of statutory or constitutional process. Remanded for a sentencing hearing.View "State v. McEvoy" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of criminal distribution of dangerous drugs. The State subsequently filed a petition to revoke Defendant’s deferred sentence based on her possession of oxycodone in violation of the conditions of her probation. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized by her probation officer after a search of Defendant’s purse. The district court denied the motion and later revoked Defendant’s deferred sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly concluded that the probation officer conducted a legitimate probation search based on reasonable suspicion and in thereby denying Defendant’s motion to suppress.View "State v. Fischer" on Justia Law

Petitioner pled guilty to and was convicted of one count of sexual intercourse without consent. The district court sentenced Petitioner to thirty years imprisonment, with twenty years suspended. Petitioner subsequently submitted an application to the Sentence Review Division for sentence review. During a hearing, Petitioner’s counsel advocated for a more onerous sentence than the district court had originally imposed. After the hearing had concluded, Petitioner’s counsel asked that Petitioner be permitted to withdraw his application, leaving his original sentence intact. The Division declined Petitioner’s request to withdraw his application and ultimately entered an order increasing Petitioner’s sentence to thirty years imprisonment, with ten years suspended. The district court amended the previous judgment and resentenced Petitioner in accordance with the Division’s decision. Petitioner sought relief from the Division’s decision. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Division and the amended judgment of the district court and remanded with directions to reinstate the sentence as originally imposed, holding that counsel’s deficient performance rendered the proceeding before the Division fundamentally unfair. View "Avery v. Batista" on Justia Law

Defendant was a passenger in a van that was parked at a park. A police officer parked behind the van, approached the van, and asked the driver for her driver’s license and Defendant for identification. After learning that the driver did not have a license and that Defendant had an outstanding warrant, the officer placed Defendant under arrest. Defendant subsequently produced a baggie filled a methamphetamine. Defendant filed a motion to suppress her statements and the evidence, arguing that the officer lacked particularized suspicion to perform an investigatory stop when he asked her and the driver for identification. The district court denied Defendant’s motion, concluding that there had not been a seizure for which particularized suspicion was required. Thereafter, Defendant pled guilty to one count of criminal possession of dangerous drugs, a felony. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was not particularized suspicion to stop or seize the driver that could support or properly lead to the subsequent investigation of Defendant. Remanded. View "State v. Strom" on Justia Law