Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying as untimely Defendant's motion for substitution of judge, holding that the substitution motion was timely because federal law halts any proceedings in the state court once a notice of removal is filed unless and until the case is remanded.Plaintiffs sued Defendant in the Seventh Judicial District Court based on Defendant's denial of an insurance claim. After a summons was issued and served upon Defendant, Defendant filed a notice of removal to the United States District Court for the District of Montana on the basis of diversity of citizenship. The federal district court granted Plaintiffs' motion for remand to state court after determining that the parties lacked complete diversity. Ninety-five days after it was served Defendant filed a motion for substitution of judge. The trial court ruled the motion was untimely. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Defendant filed its motion for substitution the same day the state court clerk received notice that the federal court had ordered remand and returned the original state court documents, the motion was timely. View "Sage Financial Properties, LLC v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Roseburg Forest Products Company's motion to set aside default judgment, holding that the district court did not slightly abuse its discretion in denying Roseburg's motion to set aside default judgment.Jerome Frye, a former employee at Roseburg, filed a complaint alleging violations of the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act. The clerk of court entered default against Roseburg after Roseburg did not file an appearance or an answer to the complaint with the district court. Roseburg later moved to set aside the entry of default judgment. The district court denied the motion, determining that Roseburg failed to proceed with diligence and that Roseburg's neglect was not excusable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Roseburg's neglect in answering the complaint was not excusable. View "Frye v. Roseburg Forest Products Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court holding that Montana law precluded a jury trial on Plaintiff's federal discrimination claims even though federal law allows a jury trial for federal claims, holding that the district court erred when it concluded that Montana procedural law applied under the Montana Human Rights Act (MHRA) and denied Plaintiff a jury trial on his federal claims.Plaintiff, who has a visual disability, brought claims alleging that the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services engaged in intentional employment discrimination on the basis of his sex and/or disability, in violation of state and federal anti discrimination statutes. The district court concluded that state law precluded a jury trial on Plaintiff's federal discrimination claims because Montana's antidiscrimination statutes do not provide for a trial by jury and because state procedural rules govern procedures in state courts. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff's claims were separate and distinct from his state law claims and that Plaintiff had a right to a jury trial on his federal claims in state district court. View "Spillers v. Third Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court granting Daniel Boudette's motion to extinguish an Arizona Decree of Dissolution of Marriage that Tammy Boudette registered in Montana under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, holding that the court was not required to apply Arizona law in this case.Six years after Tammy registered the Arizona the Arizona judgment in Montana, Daniel moved to extinguish the registered Arizona judgment because Arizona's statute of limitations for enforcing judgments had expired. In response, Tammy argued that Montana's longer statute of limitations applied to foreign judgments filed in Montana. The district court granted the motion to extinguish, ruling that the Full Faith and Credit Clause required that Arizona law be applied. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Montana law allows a registered foreign judgment to be enforced just as a Montana judgment would be, and the principle of full faith and credit does not require forum states to apply foreign rendering states' statutes of limitation for enforcement; and (2) therefore, the Arizona judgment registered in Montana was subject to Montana's statute of limitations. View "Oskerson v. Boudette" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court entering summary judgment in favor of the City of Missoula declaring that a city ordinance was not prohibited under Montana law, holding that the district court erred by concluding that the City may require background checks on firearm transfers without violating the statutory prohibition upon local government regulation of the "purchase, sale or other transfer" of firearms.In 2016, the City of Missoula, a self-governing municipality, adopted Ordinance 3581, which imposed a requirement upon persons purchasing or otherwise receiving a firearm in the City to pass a national instant background check. The Attorney General issued an opinion concluding that cities with self-government powers were prohibited by Montana law from enforcing a local regulation or ordinance requiring background checks of firearm sales or transfers. The City filed this action challenging the Attorney General's opinion and seeking a declaration that the ordinance was lawful. The district court concluded that the ordinance was authorized under the statutory exception in Mont. Code Ann. 45-8-351(2) and entered summary judgment for the City. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the express statutory prohibition upon cities in section 45-8-351(1) is a limitation on the City's self-governing powers. View "City of Missoula v. Fox" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Appellant's motion to transfer venue to Flathead County, holding that the venue provisions of the Montana Uniform Trust Code (MUTC), Mont. Code Ann. 72-38-205(1), controlled in this case and that the district court did not err when it denied Appellant's motion to transfer venue.Appellant was appointed as the successor trustee to the David William Betts Trust. The trustor's children, who were remainder beneficiaries, decided to remove Appellant and appoint a successor trustee and filed a petition in Missoula County requesting that the court enforce the appointment of a nonprofit entity located in Missoula. Appellant agreed to step down as trustee. Thereafter, the Trust filed a separate action in Missoula County alleging, among other things, that Appellant breached his fiduciary duty and his duty as trustee. Appellant filed a motion for change of venue to Flathead County, but the district court denied the motion. Appellant appealed, arguing that the district court erred by applying the venue provisions of the MUTC because the applicable venue provision was Mont. Code Ann. 25-2-122. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, as the more specific statute in this instance, the MUTC venue provision controlled. View "Betts v. Gunlikson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court dismissing the third-party complaint filed by HRC Two Rivers LLC and HRC Cottages Inc. (collectively, the General Partners) against Aultco Construction Inc. as barred under the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel, holding that a prior suit by the partnership entity precluded the General Partners from pursuing their claims against Aultco.The HRC entities were general partners of Two Rivers Apartments LLLP, which contracted with Aultco Construction Inc. to build an apartment building. In 2015, Two Rivers filed suit against Aultco for negligent construction resulting in mold in that apartments' attic. The case was litigated, settled, and dismissed with prejudice. The apartment tenants then filed suit against Two Rivers Apartments and the General Partners alleging that they were not given the required disclosure of mold testing and its results. The General Partners filed a third-party complaint against Aultco for contribution and indemnity. The district court granted Aultco's motion to dismiss on the grounds of either res judicata or collateral estoppel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing the third-party complaint on the grounds of res judicata and collateral estoppel. View "HRC Two Rivers, LLC v. Aultco Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the district court that a confessed judgment was unreasonable and the product of collusion, and, on the basis of these findings, reversed and remanded the district court’s amended judgment with instructions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice, holding that the district court abused its discretion when it opted to reduce the settlement amount rather than dismiss the action.Plaintiff brought this action against a contractor after it discovered construction defects and associated problems with a massive luxury home. The district court entered a $12 million stipulated judgment against the contractor. The Supreme Court reversed with instructions for the district court to address an insurer’s request to intervene to challenge the reasonableness of the confessed judgment and whether it was the product of collusion. On remand, the district court reduced the judgment to approximately $2.4 million. The Supreme Court held (1) the confessed judgment was unreasonable and the product of collusion; (2) the district court should have dismissed the action rather than reduce the settlement amount; and (3) the district court properly awarded attorney fees and costs to the insurer, but the case is remanded for recalculation of the award to include only costs allowable under Mont. Code Ann. 25-10-201. View "Abbey/Land, LLC v. Glacier Construction Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Water Court denying Little Big Warm Ranch, LLC’s (LBWR) motion to reopen proceedings and its request to substitute as an objector, holding that the Water Court did not err when it denied LBWR’s motion to reopen cases 40M-171 and 40M-238 and when it denied LBWR’s request for substitution in those cases.At issue was two water rights from Big Warm Springs Creek and Little Warm Springs Creek - one claim for stock water and the other claim for irrigation. The Water Court in this case determined that LBWR was not entitled to substitute itself as an objector to Claimants’ water rights in Cases 40M-171 and 40 M-238 and denied LBWR’s request for substitution and its motion to reopen. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Water Court did not err. View "Little Big Warm Ranch, LLC v. Doll" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting Victory Insurance Company’s (Victory) motion to change venue, holding that the specific venue provision in Mont. Code Ann. 33-2-1118 controlled over the general venue provision in Mont. Code Ann. 25-2-124.Appellant Matthew Rosendale filed a complaint against Victory, a Montana workers’ compensation insurance company with its principal office located in Custer County, Victory’s president, and a living trust formed under the laws of South Dakota and a Victory shareholder, seeking statutory fines and to enjoin Victory pursuant to alleged violations of Montana’s Holding Company Act. Appellant filed the complaint in the First Judicial District Court in Lewis and Clark County. Victory filed a motion to change venue to Custer County. The district court granted the motion on the basis that section 33-2-1118 controlled and that venue was proper in Custer County. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded that venue was proper in Custer County for all defendants. View "Rosendale v. Victory Insurance Co." on Justia Law