Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At dispute in this case was a home inspection Don Hall performed of a home purchased by Gregory Hall. Gregory brought this action against Don, the seller of the home, and two real estate brokers, alleging that Defendants failed to disclose material defects in the property. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of all defendants with the exception of Don on the grounds that Gregory received a disclosure statement and had imputed knowledge of the defects. The district court entered default judgment against Don after determining that Don had not filed a sufficient answer to the complaint. After a writ of execution was issued, Don requested that the default judgment be set aside and later sought to claim exemptions. The district court denied the requests. The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court striking Don’s motion to set aside default judgment, holding that, under the circumstances of this case and in the interests of justice, Don was entitled to relief from judgment. Remanded. View "Hall v. Hall" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a candidate in 2010 for the State Senate in Senate District 31, which included all of Park County and most of Sweet Grass County. The Commissioner of Political Practices filed a civil enforcement action against Plaintiff in the Lewis and Clark County District Court following an investigation of alleged violations of campaign practice and finance laws. Plaintiff initiated a declaratory action in the Sixth Judicial District Court, Park County, raising issues similar to those raised in the enforcement action. The Sixth Judicial District Court, ordered, sua sponte, that the declaratory judgment action be transferred to Lewis and Clark County. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) as to Plaintiff, the declaratory action in Park County was duplicative, and this was an appropriate basis on which to transfer the matter; but (2) the district court’s transfer of the action to a specific department and judge within the the First Judicial District was improper. View "Wagman v. Motl" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of felony sexual assault. This appeal concerned Defendant’s motion to vacate his conviction and dismiss the charges. In his motion Defendant claimed that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the charges were not brought by a grand jury process and that Montana law did not allow a court to obtain jurisdiction over a felony without this process. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction under Montana’s Constitution and state law. View "Montgomery v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with aggravated assault, criminal mischief, and elder abuse for his conduct during one incident. Defendant filed a pretrial motion requesting that the court order the State to elect between prosecuting him for either aggravated assault or elder abuse, arguing that his federal double jeopardy protections and the protections of Montana’s “multiple charges” statute would be violated if he were prosecuted for both offenses. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the elder abuse statute was neither a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault nor a specific instance of aggravated assault. The Supreme Court dismissed Defendant’s appeal, holding (1) Defendant may be prosecuted for more than one offense arising out of the same transaction; and (2) Defendant’s double jeopardy claim and reliance on the protections of the multiple charges statute were premature. View "State v. Violette" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs here challenged the constitutionality of two laws: a 2011 law requiring a parental notification before a minor may obtain an abortion, and a 2013 law requiring parental consent before a minor may obtain an abortion. In 1999, a district court held unconstitutional a similar 1995 law requiring parental notification before a minor may obtain an abortion. Plaintiffs claimed that the 1999 district court order prevented the State from defending the constitutionality of the laws at issue in the current challenge on grounds of issue preclusion. The Supreme Court held that because the laws that were the subject of the current challenge differed from the 1995 law in substantive respects, issue preclusion did not apply in this case. View "Planned Parenthood of Mont. v. State" on Justia Law

S.C.B. was born in 2006 to Father and Mother. In 2014, Grandmother filed a petition in Flathead County seeking to establish a parenting plan in which she would be designated as S.C.B.’s primary care giver. Grandmother then moved for a restraining order against Mother and for an interim parenting plan. While Grandmother’s motions were pending, Mother filed a motion for change of venue seeking to transfer the proceeding to Hill County. The district court granted Mother’s motion and transferred the proceeding to a district court in Hill County. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) even if Hill County could be considered a proper county for venue purposes, so too was Flathead County, and because there were two proper counties in which the parenting proceeding could have commenced, it was error for the district court to grant a change of venue; and (2) for purposes of determining the propriety of venue, there was sufficient prima facie evidence of a parent-child relationship between Grandmother and S.C.B. View "In re Parenting of S.C.B." on Justia Law

The Milky Whey, Inc., a dairy broker based in Montana, bought products from Dairy Partners, LLC, a dairy supply company located in Minnesota. This appeal concerned Milky Whey’s purchase of a product from Dairy Partners that Dairy Partners shipped to Utah. When Milky Whey picked up the product, it had become moldy and unusable. Milky Whey filed suit, alleging breach of contract, breach of warranty, unjust enrichment, and breach of an obligation to pay. Dairy Partners moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the action, concluding that Dairy Partners did not come within Montana’s long-arm jurisdiction statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in determining that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Dairy Partners. View "Milky Whey, Inc. v. Dairy Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

In 1998, Steven and Susan Buck were married in California. For the next twenty years, the Bucks lived outside of the United States. In 2001, while living in Indonesia, the Bucks purchased land near Kalispell and built a house. In 2010, Susan moved to Florida, and Steven remained in Indonesia. In 2013, Susan filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in Montana. Steven moved to dismiss the petition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because Susan neither resided in nor was domiciled in Montana for the ninety days preceding her petition for dissolution. The district court denied the motion, concluding that it had jurisdiction over the matter. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that any jurisdictional defect was cured when Susan established domicile for ninety days and filed a supplemental pleading alleging as much. View "In re Marriage of Buck" on Justia Law

All but one of the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in Florida. Plaintiff sued Defendants, alleging that Defendants had procured a wire transfer from Plaintiff to a public adjusting company under false pretenses and with the intent to defraud him. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants, concluding that general personal jurisdiction did not exist because Defendants’ contacts with Montana were neither continuous nor systematic and that specific personal jurisdiction did not exist because all of the substantial activity underlying Plaintiff’s claims occurred in Florida. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded that it lacked personal jurisdiction because Defendants formed no “jurisdictionally relevant contacts” with Montana, and Plaintiff’s single act of authorizing his local bank in Montana to wire funds to the public adjusting company was insufficient to establish that his action accrued in Montana for purposes of Mont. R. Civ. P. 4(b)(1)(B). View "Tackett v. Duncan" on Justia Law

Within thirty days of the Town of Eureka’s passage of an annexation ordinance Darrell Sharp filed a petition naming himself, his wife, and “John Does 1-200” as petitioners. After the thirty-day deadline for filing the petition had passed, Sharp filed an amended petition naming himself, his wife, eighty-nine other individuals, and “John Does 1-10” as petitioners. Eureka filed a motion to dismiss. The district court converted Eureka’s motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment for Eureka, concluding that Mont. Code Ann. 7-2-4741 does not allow relation back of amended pleadings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the requirements of section 7-2-4741 do not contemplate relation back of an amendment adding the names of a majority of real property owners to the petition after the thirty-day deadline has passed; and (2) Eureka was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the petition in this case was not filed within thirty days of the passage of the annexation ordinance by a majority of real property owners in the area to be annexed. View "Sharp v. Eureka" on Justia Law