Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

For more than a century, Asarco LLC and its predecessors operated a lead smelting facility (the Site). For almost fifty years, Atlantic Richfield Company’s predecessor operated a zinc fuming plant on land leased from Asarco at the Site. Atlantic Richfield subsequently sold the plant and related property to Asarco. Due to extensive contamination at the Site, the Environmental Protection Agency determined that Asarco was obligated to fund cleanup efforts at the Site. After conducting extensive remediation at the Site, Asarco filed a complaint seeking contribution pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) from Atlantic Richfield, asserting that Atlantic Richfield was liable under CERCLA for its equitable share of costs related to the Site’s cleanup. The federal district court granted summary judgment for Atlantic Richfield, concluding that Asarco’s claims were untimely under CERCLA’s statute of limitations. Asarco then commenced the present action against Atlantic Richfield alleging several state-law claims. The district court granted Atlantic Richfield’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the doctrine of claim preclusion barred Asarco’s claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that claim preclusion barred Asarco’s action because Asarco could have brought its state-law claims before the federal district court in Asarco I. View "Asarco LLC v. Atlantic Richfield Co." on Justia Law

The case at issue in this proceeding was originally assigned to the Twentieth Judicial District Court Judge James Manley. Judge Deborah Christopher assumed jurisdiction after a defendant moved for substitution. At the request of Judge Christopher, Chief Justice Mike McGrath called in retired District Judge Douglas Harkin to preside over the case. The plaintiff subsequently requested substitution. In response, Judges Christopher and Manley entered an order returning jurisdiction to Judge Manley. Petitioner asked the Supreme Court to exercise supervisory control over the District Court by directing Christopher and Manley to vacate their order returning jurisdiction of the case to Judge Manley. Petitioner also asked that Chief Justice McGrath deny the motion to substitute judge filed by the plaintiff. The Supreme Court granted the petition for writ of supervisory control and ordered that Judge Manley assign a new judge to preside over the case, holding that specific assignments of retired judges under Mont. Code Ann. 19-5-103 are within the intended scope of the right to substitution under Mont. Code Ann. 3-1-804 and that the right of substitution applies. View "Cushman v. Twentieth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Forquest Ventures was formed to operate a placer mining enterprise in Helena, Montana. Ken Hagman relied on purported assay reports of the site allegedly performed by Advanced Analytical before incorporating Forquest. Following incorporation, Forquest sold or issued stock to investors, including Investors. Because there was little precious metal content at the site, Forquest realized no profits and Investors received no return on their investments. Emilio and Candice Garza, individually and on behalf of all similarly situated Forquest investors, sued. The Garzas then filed an amended complaint adding the other Investors as named plaintiffs. Forquest filed a third-party complaint against Advanced Analytical. The district court granted summary judgment to Investors on their Montana Securities Act (Act) claims and granted Advanced Analytical’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) correctly determined that Investors timely asserted their claims under the Act; (2) did not err in determining that the non-Garza Investors’ claims relate back to the original complaint’s filing date; (3) correctly determined that there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding Forquest’s failure to use reasonable care in the sale of securities to Investors; but (4) erred in dismissing Advanced Analytical for lack of personal jurisdiction. View "Garza v. Forquest Ventures, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2014, the Montana Commissioner of Political Practices (COPP) issued a decision finding sufficient evidence that Terry Bannan had violated Montana’s campaign practices laws during the 2010 primary election and that civil adjudication of the violations was warranted. The COPP forwarded the sufficiency decision to the Lewis and Clark County Attorney for consideration. Bannan filed an action for declaratory relief in the Gallatin County District Court alleging that the COPP acted unlawfully by referring its sufficiency findings to the Lewis and Clark County Attorney rather than the Gallatin County Attorney. The Lewis and Clark County Attorney waived his right to participate in the action, citing Mont. Code Ann. 13-37-124(2). Thereafter, the COPP filed an enforcement action against Bannan in the Lewis and Clark County District Court. Bannan filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the COPP was obligated to assert its claims in the Gallatin County declaratory judgment action. The district court in Lewis and Clark County denied Bannan’s motion to dismiss. Bannan appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed Bannan’s appeal as premature, holding that Bannan’s appeal must be characterized as one seeking relief from the denial of a motion to dismiss, and orders denying motions to dismiss are not appealable. View "Motl v. Bannan" on Justia Law

At dispute in this case was a home inspection Don Hall performed of a home purchased by Gregory Hall. Gregory brought this action against Don, the seller of the home, and two real estate brokers, alleging that Defendants failed to disclose material defects in the property. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of all defendants with the exception of Don on the grounds that Gregory received a disclosure statement and had imputed knowledge of the defects. The district court entered default judgment against Don after determining that Don had not filed a sufficient answer to the complaint. After a writ of execution was issued, Don requested that the default judgment be set aside and later sought to claim exemptions. The district court denied the requests. The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court striking Don’s motion to set aside default judgment, holding that, under the circumstances of this case and in the interests of justice, Don was entitled to relief from judgment. Remanded. View "Hall v. Hall" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a candidate in 2010 for the State Senate in Senate District 31, which included all of Park County and most of Sweet Grass County. The Commissioner of Political Practices filed a civil enforcement action against Plaintiff in the Lewis and Clark County District Court following an investigation of alleged violations of campaign practice and finance laws. Plaintiff initiated a declaratory action in the Sixth Judicial District Court, Park County, raising issues similar to those raised in the enforcement action. The Sixth Judicial District Court, ordered, sua sponte, that the declaratory judgment action be transferred to Lewis and Clark County. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) as to Plaintiff, the declaratory action in Park County was duplicative, and this was an appropriate basis on which to transfer the matter; but (2) the district court’s transfer of the action to a specific department and judge within the the First Judicial District was improper. View "Wagman v. Motl" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of felony sexual assault. This appeal concerned Defendant’s motion to vacate his conviction and dismiss the charges. In his motion Defendant claimed that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the charges were not brought by a grand jury process and that Montana law did not allow a court to obtain jurisdiction over a felony without this process. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction under Montana’s Constitution and state law. View "Montgomery v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with aggravated assault, criminal mischief, and elder abuse for his conduct during one incident. Defendant filed a pretrial motion requesting that the court order the State to elect between prosecuting him for either aggravated assault or elder abuse, arguing that his federal double jeopardy protections and the protections of Montana’s “multiple charges” statute would be violated if he were prosecuted for both offenses. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the elder abuse statute was neither a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault nor a specific instance of aggravated assault. The Supreme Court dismissed Defendant’s appeal, holding (1) Defendant may be prosecuted for more than one offense arising out of the same transaction; and (2) Defendant’s double jeopardy claim and reliance on the protections of the multiple charges statute were premature. View "State v. Violette" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs here challenged the constitutionality of two laws: a 2011 law requiring a parental notification before a minor may obtain an abortion, and a 2013 law requiring parental consent before a minor may obtain an abortion. In 1999, a district court held unconstitutional a similar 1995 law requiring parental notification before a minor may obtain an abortion. Plaintiffs claimed that the 1999 district court order prevented the State from defending the constitutionality of the laws at issue in the current challenge on grounds of issue preclusion. The Supreme Court held that because the laws that were the subject of the current challenge differed from the 1995 law in substantive respects, issue preclusion did not apply in this case. View "Planned Parenthood of Mont. v. State" on Justia Law

S.C.B. was born in 2006 to Father and Mother. In 2014, Grandmother filed a petition in Flathead County seeking to establish a parenting plan in which she would be designated as S.C.B.’s primary care giver. Grandmother then moved for a restraining order against Mother and for an interim parenting plan. While Grandmother’s motions were pending, Mother filed a motion for change of venue seeking to transfer the proceeding to Hill County. The district court granted Mother’s motion and transferred the proceeding to a district court in Hill County. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) even if Hill County could be considered a proper county for venue purposes, so too was Flathead County, and because there were two proper counties in which the parenting proceeding could have commenced, it was error for the district court to grant a change of venue; and (2) for purposes of determining the propriety of venue, there was sufficient prima facie evidence of a parent-child relationship between Grandmother and S.C.B. View "In re Parenting of S.C.B." on Justia Law