Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of sexual intercourse without consent and sexual assault. Appellant moved for a new trial and acquittal, arguing, among other things, that testimony at trial failed to bear out the prosecution’s theory that a newspaper article reporting that Appellant had been accused of molesting a five-year-old boy prompted the complainant’s disclosure, and that the unfair prejudice caused by testimony about the newspaper article outweighed its probative value. The district court vacated the sexual assault conviction and denied the motion with respect to the remaining issues. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the probative value of the evidence regarding the newspaper article was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and should have been excluded. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Franks" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Lower Teton Joint Objectors, water users who hold appropriation rights from the lower Teton River in Chouteau County, commenced an action claiming that the Water Commissioners’ practice of diverting water out of the natural channel of the Teton River and into the Bateman Ditch harmed their appropriation rights by depriving the Teton River aquifer of recharge water. The Water Master issued a report regarding the Bateman Ditch, and the Water Judge issued an “Order Amending Master’s Report and Adopting as Amended.” The Objectors and intervenor Patrick Saylor appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Water Court erred by concluding that the Bateman Ditch diversion to supply water to Choteau Cattle Company is a private right held by Saylor; and (2) the Water Court acted properly in listing the water rights that can be diverted through the Bateman Ditch. View "Eldorado Co-op Canal Co., Lower Teton Joint Objectors" on Justia Law

Beaverhead County selected Coleman Construction to complete a stream rehabilitation and bridge replacement project. Coleman was unable to finish the project on time or for the amount of money it had estimated. Coleman subsequently sued for damages, asserting ten claims for relief. The Montana Association of Counties Joint Powers Insurance Authority (MACo), which had issued an insurance policy to the County, denied coverage, finding that the claims against the County were excluded from coverage based upon two exclusions in the policy. The district court granted summary judgment for MACo, ruling that the two exclusions each provided sufficient independent bases for denying coverage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the claims against the County were not covered by its insurance policy with MACo. View "Beaverhead County v. Mont. Ass’n of Counties Joint Powers Ins. Auth." on Justia Law

The State petitioned for permanent legal custody and the termination of Mother’s parental rights to B.W.S. because Mother failed to complete a court-ordered treatment plan. After a termination hearing, Judge Olson terminated Mother’s parental rights. The Supreme Court reversed the termination order and remanded for a new hearing before a different judge on the petition to terminate parental rights, holding (1) the district court’s failure to meet certain procedural deadlines did not affects its subject matter jurisdiction over this case; but (2) because Judge Olson served as counsel in the case, he was required to disqualify himself as a matter of law.View "In re B.W.S." on Justia Law

In 1980, the Montana Board of Livestock (Board) adopted the 12-Day Rule, which prohibits the sale of milk in Montana more than twelve days after pasteurization. In 2008, Core-Mark International, Inc. filed a petition with the Board seeking to amend or repeal the 12-day Rule. The Board held an administrative proceeding regarding Core-Mark’s petition, part of which involved a formal evidentiary hearing conducted by an independent hearing examiner. The hearing examiner issued a proposed decision recommending that the Board consider repealing the 12-day Rule. However, the Board voted unanimously to retain the 12-day Rule without modification. The district court denied Core-Mark’s petition for judicial review. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err (1) in concluding that the administrative proceeding was not a contested case proceeding and therefore not subject to judicial review; (2) by applying the arbitrary and capricious standard of review and in determining that the Board’s decision did not violate that standard; and (3) in concluding that the 12-day Rule is a valid exercise of the Board’s authority. View "Core-Mark Int’l, Inc. v. Mont. Bd. of Livestock" on Justia Law

Husband and Wife were married and had been together for more than fifty years. Wife suffered from multiple sclerosis and cognitive impairments. After Wife’s son and daughter sought and obtained appointments as Wife’s co-guardians/conservators, Husband filed two petitions to either be appointed as guardian/conservator for Wife or to terminate the guardianship. The district court appointed Wife’s brother and sister-in-law as Wife’s guardians and conservators, authorized them to restrict Husband’s access to Wife, and awarded them reasonable attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in finding that Wife’s brother and sister-in-law were best qualified to serve as permanent co-guardians/conservators and in permitting them to restrict contract between Husband and Wife, as the limited contact was necessary for Wife to receive care from the assisted living facility where she had been thriving before Husband’s interference; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees to the co-guardians/conservators incurred in the defense of Husband’s frivolous action.View "In re J.A.L." on Justia Law

In 2014, Lawrence J.C. VanDyke filed his declaration of nomination as a candidate for election to the Montana Supreme Court. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a complaint in the district court seeking to have VanDyke’s candidacy invalidated on the basis that VanDyke was not admitted to the practice of law in Montana for at least five years prior to the date of election as required by the Montana Constitution. The district court ruled that VanDyke did not meet the minimum eligibility requirements because, although VanDyke was a member of the State Bar of Montana continuously from 2005 to the present day, when VanDyke elected to assume inactive status from 2007 until 2012, he was not authorized or qualified to practice law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that VanDyke’s admission to the practice of law in Montana in 2005 satisfied the Constitution’s requirement that a candidate for Supreme Court Justice be “admitted to the practice of law in Montana for at least five years prior to the date of appointment or election,” notwithstanding VanDyke’s choice to take inactive status for some of those years. View "Cross v. VanDyke" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict finding Defendant guilty of the sexual assault of the seven-year-old daughter of Defendant’s girlfriend. Defendant subsequently moved the district court to sentence him to the misdemeanor penalty for a first conviction of sexual assault under Mont. Code Ann. 45-5-502(2)(a), arguing that the felony penalty in section 45-5-502(3) did not apply because the jury did not make a finding that the victim was younger than sixteen and a finding that Defendant was more than three years older. The district court concluded that Defendant could not be sentenced to the enhanced penalty for felony sexual assault because the jury had not made a factual finding as to the ages of the victim and Defendant as required by Apprendi v. New Jersey. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the requirements of Apprendi were met in this case because, by following the instructions and by returning a guilty verdict, the jury necessarily found as facts the respective ages of Defendant and the victim.View "State v. Ghostbear" on Justia Law

In 2002, Elizabeth “Betsy” Baumgart was appointed to be the administrator of the Montana Tourism and Promotion Division of the Department of Commerce (DOC). In 2010, after Dore Schwinden was appointed as DOC director, Schwinden terminated Baumgart’s employment, citing a lack of management competencies and sufficient understanding of the Division’s budgeting process. Baumgart sued the DOC and Schwinden, individually and as DOC’s agent, alleging that DOC wrongfully discharged her and discriminated against her on political grounds because she was a Republican and Schwinden was a Democrat. The district court granted DOC’s motion for summary judgment as it pertained to Baumgart’s political affiliation discrimination claims and all claims against Schwinden. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Baumgart failed to establish a prima facie case for political discrimination, the district court did not err in granting DOC’s motion for summary judgment on this issue; (2) the district court correctly dismissed the individual claims against Schwinden, as Schwinden was entitled to statutory immunity under the circumstances of this case; and (3) the district court correctly concluded that the DOC had good cause to terminate Baumgart.View "Baumgart v. Dep’t of Commerce" on Justia Law

San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (“San Diego”) and several NaturEner wind-energy companies (“NaturEner”) entered into two contracts, a purchase agreement and a contribution agreement, under which San Diego agreed to purchase renewable energy credits and electricity from NaturEner. The credits and electricity are generated at a wind farm in Montana. The purchase agreement contained a forum selection clause stating that the parties consented to conduct all litigation in California. San Diego filed suit in a California court seeking a declaration that NaturEner had not satisfied the “Avian Conditions” of the agreements. NaturEner filed a nearly identical suit in a Montana court seeking a declaration that it had satisfied the conditions. San Diego filed a motion to dismiss or stay, which the district court denied. San Diego then petitioned the Supreme Court to exercise supervisory control, claiming that the district court erred by accepting jurisdiction over the parties’ dispute in light of the purchase agreement’s forum selection clause, as well as forum non conveniens. The Supreme Court granted the application for writ of supervisory control, holding (1) the forum selection clause contained in the purchase agreement was mandatory in nature; and (2) related issues regarding the contribution agreement would be appropriately and justly tried in California as well.View "San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Ninth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law