Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in January, 2014
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Public Lands Access Association, Inc. (PLAA) sought a declaration that the public may use certain roads and bridges to access Ruby River. In 2008, the district court granted PLAA summary judgment on the issue of public access to the Ruby River from Lewis Lane. In 2012, the district court denied the public access to Ruby River at Seyler Lane and Seyler Bridge. PLAA appealed, and James Kennedy, who intervened as a defendant, cross-appealed. The Supreme Court consolidated the appeal and cross-appeal. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded, holding (1) the district court erred in deciding that the County had a secondary easement that was independent and separate from the public road right-of-way at the intersection of Seyler Lane and Ruby River; (2) in determining the width of the public right-of-way at the intersection of Seyler Lane and Ruby River, the trial court’s blanket exclusion of recreation use evidence was improper; (3) the scope of use of the public road right-of-way was not limited to the adverse usage; and (4) the district court did not effectuate an unconstitutional taking of Kennedy’s property when it ruled that the public may access Ruby River at Lewis Lane. View "Pub. Lands Access Ass'n, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Madison County" on Justia Law

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Defendant pleaded guilty to felony theft pursuant to a plea agreement. Although both parties recommended that the district court follow the plea agreement in sentencing Defendant, the district court rejected the plea agreement and sentenced Defendant to the Department of Corrections (DOC) for ten years, with five years suspended. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the district court committed plain error and violated his due process rights by rejecting the plea agreement and failing to afford him the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err when it rejected the plea agreement’s sentencing recommendation without giving Defendant the opportunity to withdraw his plea; and (2) Defendant’s trial attorney did not provide ineffective assistance. View "State v. Olson" on Justia Law

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Rober Spoja represented Duste White regarding White’s probation revocation. The sentencing court sentenced White but did not mention whether the sentence was to be served concurrently with other sentences. White petitioned to correct his sentence. The court entered an amended re-sentencing order allowing him to serve his term concurrently with other sentences, resulting in an earlier discharge date. Believing he was incarcerated for fourteen months longer than his actual sentence, White retained Bryan Tipp to represent him in a civil action against Spoja and Spoja’s law firm. After Tipp discovered the sentencing court had not ordered concurrent sentences, Tipp moved successfully to dismiss the case without informing Spoja. Spoja subsequently filed a civil action against White, Tipp, and Tipp’s law firm. The district court dismissed Spoja’s claims. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the entry of summary judgment against Spoja’s attorney deceit claim, and the award of costs, as a trier of fact could find Tipp acted deceitfully and intended to do so; and (2) affirmed the dismissal of Spoja’s malicious prosecution claim and the award of summary judgment against his abuse of process claim. View "Spoja v. White" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed a complaint against a law firm and its attorneys (Defendants), alleging that Defendants committed legal malpractice when they advised Plaintiff, their former client, to sign a release with an insurer regarding his underlying suit arising from a vehicle accident. Defendants served discovery requests on Plaintiff, but Plaintiff’s responses to the requests for admission were not timely. Defendants moved for summary judgment based in large part on the fact that the requests for admission had not been timely answered and deemed admitted. Plaintiff filed a motion to withdraw or amend his admissions. The district court denied Plaintiff's motion, concluding that while granting Plaintiff’s motion would subserve the presentation of the merits of his case, it would prejudice Defendants. The court then granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to allow Plaintiff to withdraw or amend his admissions, as nothing in the record showed Defendants suffered prejudice sufficient to bar amendment of Plaintiff’s admissions. Remanded. View "Bates v. Anderson" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff brought this action to challenge a decision by county commissioners (the Commissioners) to permit elected county officials to receive cash payments in lieu of county contributions on their behalf to a group health insurance program. Plaintiff claimed the Commissioners violated Montana’s open meetings statute and his constitutional right of participation, requested a declaration that the “cash in lieu” policy was unlawful, and filed a writ for mandamus that the county attorney commence an action to recover any illegal payments. The district court (1) dismissed Plaintiff’s right to know and right of participation claims as time barred; (2) dismissed Plaintiff’s declaratory claim for lack of standing; and (3) dismissed the mandamus claim, determining that mandamus did not apply. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiff had standing to pursue his right to know and right of participation claims; and (2) Plaintiff’s right to know and right of participation claims were time barred, but Plaintiff’s allegations qualified for application of equitable tolling principles. Remanded. View "Schoof v. Nesbit" on Justia Law

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The Boulder Monitor, which regularly attended meetings of the full Jefferson County High School Board, sued Jefferson High School District No. 1, claiming that a meeting of the Board’s budget subcommittee violated statutory open meeting and public participation requirements because there was a quorum of the Board present at the subcommittee meeting, the meeting discussed personnel matters in addition to the 2012-2013 budget, that all Board members present participated in the discussion, and that the public notice of the subcommittee meeting was inadequate. The district court granted summary judgment to the Monitor, concluding that the Board violated Montana law in the manner in which the budget subcommittee meeting was conducted. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that summary judgment in this case was improper because contested issues of fact existed that may not be resolved on summary judgment. Remanded. View "Boulder Monitor v. Jefferson High Sch. Dist. No. 1" on Justia Law

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Defendant pled guilty to forgery and issuing bad checks and received a deferred sentence. Defendant subsequently violated the conditions of his supervision. The district court imposed two consecutive commitments to the Department of Corrections, with all time suspended. The district court subsequently found that Defendant violated the terms of his probation and revoked Defendant’s suspended sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) neither the relevant statutes nor due process require the State to produce independent evidence corroborating an offender’s admission of a violation of the conditions of his or her supervision; and (2) the district court did not violate Defendant’s right to confront adverse witnesses during the revocation hearing. View "State v. Macker" on Justia Law

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Linda and Gerald Cintron gave Defendant a down payment of $180,000 and a promissory note to buy three five-acre lots from Defendant. The Cintrons never received title to the land, nor did Defendant refund the Cintrons’ money. Based on this incident, the State charged Defendant with felony theft by deception. Defendant entered a no contest plea to the charge in return for a six-year deferred sentence and a restitution obligation. After a restitution hearing, the district court imposed a total restitution in the amount of $164,861, which represented the $180,000 investment less the $125,000 Defendant had already paid, plus the Cintrons’ tax liability resulting from their use of their retirement accounts to raise the down payment, including an excise tax. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Defendant should not be required to make restitution for the income tax liabilities the Cintrons faced when they received restitution for the $180,000; but (2) Defendant may be required to pay restitution of the excise tax. View "State v. Cerasani" on Justia Law

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C.B. was adjudicated a youth in need of care and placed in foster care due to Mother’s abuse of prescription drugs. The district court ordered Mother to complete a treatment plan to deal with her substance abuse issues. The court subsequently determined that Mother had not complied with the conditions of her treatment plan and, accordingly, terminated her parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the statutory criteria for termination were satisfied and in terminating Mother’s parental rights because (1) Mother failed to complete her treatment plan, (2) Mother’s prescription drug abuse was unlikely to change within a reasonable time, and (3) C.B.’s best interests would be served by terminating the parent-child relationship. View "Matter of C.B." on Justia Law

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In 2004, Petitioner was hired as a production supervisor for Holcim Inc.’s cement manufacturing plant. In 2008, Petitioner was diagnosed with angina. After Petitioner left Holcim, Petitioner filed a claim under the Montana Human Rights Acts for discrimination. The Montana Department of Labor and Industry dismissed Petitioner’s complaint, concluding that Holcim did not discriminate against Petitioner on the basis of disability. The Montana Human Rights Commission upheld the dismissal, and the district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in affirming the hearing officer’s determination that Petitioner did not prove that he belonged to a protected class, as Petitioner failed to establish that he was disabled within the meaning of the Human Rights Act. View "Estate of Welch v. Holcim, Inc." on Justia Law