Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated assault. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in refusing to dismiss the charges against Defendant when, after Defendant disclosed information and defense strategies to the State Medical Examiner, communication occurred between the Medical Examiner and the County Attorney; (2) the district court properly determined that the State's witnesses were not unnecessarily cumulative or unfairly prejudicial to Defendant; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the State's evidence was not so prejudicial as to render the trial fundamentally unfair; (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial on the grounds of prosecutorial misconduct; and (5) Defendant's counsel did not provide ineffective assistance. View "State v. Ugalde" on Justia Law

Dean and Nancy Ziehl contended that they owned a prescriptive easement over a portion of dock located on the Swan River that extended onto Gayle Pederson's property. The Ziehls argued that the easement allowed them to maintain and use the entire dock. The district court concluded that the Ziehls did not hold a prescriptive easement and ordered that the intruding portion of dock be removed and costs be awarded to Pederson. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by determining that the Ziehls failed to use the dock adversely for the required statutory period in order to obtain the prescriptive easement. View "Pedersen v. Ziehl" on Justia Law

Carol Miller, the owner of two adjacent parcels of real property, conveyed one of the parcels to the Biggerstaffs in 2005. In the conveyance, Miller purported to reserve an easement over the Biggerstaffs' parcel for the benefit of her retained parcel. In 2006, Miller conveyed her retained pracel to Yorlum Properties. Later, a dispute arose among Yorlum, the Biggerstaffs, and Lincoln County concerning the validity of the reserved easement. In 2011, Yorlum filed the instant action seeking to quiet title to its property and access rights. The district court granted summary judgment to Yorlum. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the easement over the Biggerstaffs' parcel was valid; (2) The Biggerstaffs and Lincoln County failed to establish any basis that Miller lacked title to convey to Yorlum; and (3) Yorlum's complaint was not barred by equitable principles. View "Yorlum Props., Ltd. v. Lincoln County" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of attempted deliberate homicide. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentence, holding (1) the district court correctly denied Defendant's motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct; (2) the district court id not err by failing to inquire into Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim and the voluntariness of his decision to represent himself; (3) the district court correctly concluded that Defendant was not deprived of his right to speedy trial; (4) the district court did not err by admitting evidence of Defendant's prior assault of his wife; (5) a jury instruction on mitigated deliberate homicide did not rise to the level of plain error; and (6) the district court properly imposed parole conditions. View "State v. MacGregor" on Justia Law

Heath and Vail Freyer, the parents of Alicia Freyer, were all riding in their vehicle, which was insured by State Farm, when the vehicle rolled over, causing Health's death. In Freyer I, the Court held that the subject policy provided coverage for Alicia's claim for derivative damages stemming from Health's death. After remand, State Farm paid the disputed coverage amounts. The Freyers then brought claims against State Farm for the wrongful denial of coverage for Alicia's derivative claims. The district court granted summary judgment to State Farm. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding that the district court (1) erred in concluding that State Farm had not breached the insurance contract when it failed to indemnify Vail for Alicia's derivative claims based on State Farm's "reasonable basis in law" defense; (2) properly granted summary judgment to State Farm on the common-law bad faith and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims; and (3) did not err in granting summary judgment to State Farm on the Unfair Trade Practices Act claims. View "State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Freyer" on Justia Law

While attending Wolf Point High School, Dalton Gourneau committed suicide in his home. Roxanne Gourneau, acting individually and on behalf of Dalton, filed a complaint against Wolf Point, the State, and the District Superintendent, alleging that Dalton's death was the direct and proximate result of Wolf Point's negligence. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Wolf Point. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record did not substantiate Roxanne's speculation that Wolf Point reasonably should have known Dalton's state of mind or that its conduct created a reasonable possibility of harm, and thus, Wolf Point owed no legal duty because Dalton's suicide was unforeseeable by Wolf Point. View "Gourneau v. Wolf Point Sch. Bd." on Justia Law

Pam, Allan, and Charles and Mary Lou Dees (the Dees) started a business, Great Falls Portables, Inc. (GFP), with Allan acting as sole manager of the business. Pam subsequently took over management. The Dees later filed a complaint against Pam, GFP, and others. A month later, Pam and Allan, who were married but separated, entered into a settlement agreement that provided that Pam would be responsible to the Dees for any obligation owed them in connection with their interest in GFP. In litigation with the Dees, Pam filed a third-party complaint against Allan, alleging (1) the Dees' complaint arose out of Allan's fraudulent activity (Count I), (2) Allan had fraudulently induced Pam to enter the agreement assigning responsibility for the Dees' interest (Count II), and (3) Allan must indemnify her from liability to the Dees (Count III). The district court granted summary judgment to Allan on all three counts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly determined that (1) Pam failed to plead fraud with sufficient particularity; (2) Pam failed to show reliance on Allan's representations; and (3) Count III of Pam's complaint was dependent on and related back to Counts I and II. View "Fossen v. Fossen" on Justia Law

After leaving her job as a bus driver, Plaintiff applied for unemployment benefits with the Montana Department of Labor and Industry. The Department determined that Plaintiff was not qualified to receive unemployment benefits. The Boar of Labor Appeals affirmed. Plaintiff subsequently filed a petition for review in the district court. The district court denied Plaintiff's petition for failure to comply with Rule 2 of the Montana Uniform District Court Rules because Plaintiff had not filed a supporting brief or stated issues of law for review. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred when it denied Plaintiff's petition for failure to include a supplemental brief because the provisions of Rule 2 do not apply to a petition for judicial review. View "Jacky v. Avitus Group" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked for Union Pacific Railroad Company as a locomotive engineer until his retirement in 2008. After an MRI showed evidence that Plaintiff suffered from a degenerative disc disease, Plaintiff filed a report of personal injury with Union Pacific. Three years later, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Union Pacific under the Federal Employers' Liability act (FELA) for the back and leg injuries he allegedly sustained during his employment. Union Pacific filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Plaintiff's claim was time-barred under FELA's three-year statute of limitations because Plaintiff sought medical help as early as 2000. The district court granted Union Pacific's motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's claim was time-barred, and Union Pacific was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Bridgman v. Union Pac. R.R. Co" on Justia Law

Terry Willis purchased a tract of property with funds that were apparently the proceeds from illegal drug sales. After Willis failed to make a payment, David Ferterrer contributed approximately half of the late payment. Willis was later sentenced to life imprisonment for drug-related crimes, which left him unable to pay for the property as the contract for deed contemplated. The parties agreed that Ferterrer would be responsible for completing the payments to purchase the property. Ferterrer also removed funds from Willis's checking account to prevent federal authorities from seizing those funds. Armed with a notarized agreement allegedly from Willis to sell the property to Ferterrer (the Deed), Ferterrer obtained a loan to purchase the property. Willis subsequently filed an action challenging Ferterrer's ownership of the property, also alleging that Ferterrer had converted the funds from Willis's bank account. The district court affirmed the validity of the Deed and concluded that Fertterer had not converted any funds belonging to Willis. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the district court's findings of fact; and (2) the district court properly determined that Willis failed to prove that Fertterer had converted funds from Willis's bank account. View "Willis v. Fertterer" on Justia Law