Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Franz Weinheimer filed a notice of water appropriation in 1971 which listed a point in Section 4 as the point of diversion. Franz's son Francis filed a claim with the water court in 1981. Francis transferred the property interests in the claim to Weinheimer Ranch (Ranch) in 1991. The Ranch filed a motion to amend the claim in 2002 and a supplement to the motion in 2003 seeking to amend the claim's historical right, priority date, and source. The water court denied the Ranch's motion to amend the claim's historic rate and priority date. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the facts in the record did not require an inference that the Ranch's predecessor in interest mistakenly had listed Section 9 instead of Section 4 on his 1986 notice of appropriation, and the water court reasonably declined to infer such a finding; and (2) the water court properly determined that the Ranch had failed to present substantial evidence in support of its motion to amend its claim. View "Weinheimer Ranch, Inc. v. Pospisil" on Justia Law

On December 14, 2012, the district court issued an alternative writ of mandate directing several irrigation districts to comply with Mont. Code Ann. 85-7-1956 and -1957 before executing a water use agreement with the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Nation and the United States. On February 15, 2013, the district court issued another writ of mandate that rescinded and superseded the alternative writ of mandate. The writ of mandate enjoined the irrigation districts from entering into the proposed agreement. The Supreme Court vacated both the district court's writ of mandate and injunction and the court's alternative writ of mandate, holding that the district court (1) issued an appealable order, making the appeal from the district court's writ of mandate and injunction as well as the issue of whether the statutes apply to the water use agreement properly before the Court; (2) improperly granted the writ of mandate and injunction; and (3) incorrectly compelled the irrigation districts to comply with sections 85-7-1956 and -1957 before they executed the water use agreement. View "W. Mont. Water Users Ass'n, LLC v. Mission Irrigation Dist." on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to the aggravated assault of his wife (Wife). As part of his sentence, the district court ordered Defendant to pay $44,112 in restitution, including $19,866 for Wife's medical expenses arising from her suicide attempt two and a half months after Defendant's assault. Defendant appealed the portion of his sentence involving the restitution for Wife's suicide attempt. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order of restitution, holding (1) the district court did not err in determining that Wife's suicide attempt was "a result of" Defendant's criminal conduct; and (2) substantial evidence in the record supported the restitution obligation. View "State v. Jent" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of negligent homicide and criminal endangerment. Prior to trial, Defendant filed a motion in limine requesting that five photos of the victim's body be excluded from evidence at trial. Defendant argued that the photos were highly prejudicial in that they depicted death, and the photos had no probative value. The district court granted Defendant's request as to one photo but allowed the State to use the remaining photos. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it admitted the photos of the victim into evidence where the court correctly balanced the probative value of the photos against their prejudicial effect. View "State v. Buslayev" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the offense of partner of family member assault (PFMA), a felony. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and remanded for correction of the written judgment, holding (1) Defendant's attorney did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to the mental state instructions given at trial, as the district court properly instructed the jury in the applicable law on the mental state for the PFMA offense; and (2) an error in the district court's written judgment imposing terms and conditions of parole or conditional release required that the written judgment be amended. Remanded. View "State v. Birthmark" on Justia Law

To help finance her purchase of a condominium (condo) for $395,000, Mary McCulley sought a residential loan from Heritage Bank (Bank) for $300,000. American Land Title Company (ALTC) provided a commitment for title insurance. McCulley signed a promissory note and signed a deed of trust as collateral. Subsequently, ALTC changed the designated use of the condo in the deed from residential to commercial. After closing, McCulley discovered the Bank had issued her an eighteen-month, $300,000 commercial property loan rather than the thirty-year residential property loan for which she applied. When she was unable to obtain long-term refinancing on the property, McCulley signed a warranty deed transferring ownership of the condo to the Central Asia Institute and used the proceeds to pay off the loan. McCulley then sued ALTC and the Bank (collectively, Defendants) for, inter alia, negligence, breach of contract, slander of title, and fraud. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the district court's order of summary judgment in favor of the Bank on the issue of fraud, as genuine issues of material fact existed relative to McCulley's claim of fraud on the part of the Bank; and (2) otherwise affirmed. View "McCulley v. Am. Land Title Co." on Justia Law

This dispute stemmed from the actions of a former Bank employee, Diane Becker, who pleaded guilty to federal fraud and money laundering charges. Becker had previously assisted Marilyn Feller with her banking and finances. Feller filed a complaint against the Bank, alleging, inter alia, negligent supervision, wrongful conversion, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, claiming that her financial standing and credit reputation were damaged by Becker and the Bank. The district court entered summary judgment for the Bank, determining (1) Feller's state law causes of action were preempted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act, (2) Feller failed to provide sufficient evidence to support her emotional distress claims, and (3) Feller failed to establish the element of unauthorized control on her conversion claim. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in entering summary judgment in favor of the Bank on all of Feller's claims. View "Feller v. First Interstate Banksystem, Inc." on Justia Law

The State petitioned the district court to involuntarily commit Appellant to the Montana State Hospital (MSH) for ninety days. The district court appointed counsel to represent Appellant and informed her of her right to be present at the commitment hearing. Appellant did not appear at the commitment hearing. The district court proceeded with the hearing and committed Appellant to MSH for a period not exceeding ninety days. Appellant appealed, contending that the district court erred and violated her due process rights by proceeding with the commitment hearing without first "obtaining a valid waiver" of her right to be present under Mont. Code Ann. 53-21-119. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, while Appellant's attorney could inform the district court of Appellant's desire to waive her right to be present, the district court should have made further inquiry to determine whether Appellant was capable of making an intentional and knowing waiver decision. View "In re P.A.C." on Justia Law

K.E.G., a fifteen-year-old male, admitted to committing acts of vandalism on two consecutive nights. The county attorney then filed a petition alleging that K.E.G. was a delinquent youth for having committed criminal mischief. Other youths involved in the vandalism were similarly charged. K.E.G. admitted to the allegations. At issue before the youth court was whether the State should hold K.E.G. jointly and severally liable for all damages caused by the vandalism, given that K.E.G. participated in only two of the eleven nights of vandalism. The youth court adjudicated K.E.G. a delinquent youth and ordered him to pay $78,702 in restitution, concluding that K.E.G. was jointly and severally liable for the full amount of restitution for damages caused by the youths. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the youth court's failure to fully consider K.E.G.'s ability to pay prior to imposing aggregate restitution constituted plain error. Remanded for a new restitution hearing. View "In re K.E.G." on Justia Law

Appellant rented second-floor office space and owned one of the upper-floor residential units in the Baxter Hotel. In 2008, the Baxter Homeowners Association (BHA) restricted access to the hotel's elevator by only permitting unit owners and their tenants to access the elevator via swipe key cards. After Appellant filed a complaint with the Montana Human Rights Bureau (Bureau), the BHA board installed a time clock system that would keep the elevator unlocked during business hours and locked at night. Appellant subsequently moved his law office out of the building. Ultimately, a hearing officer with the Bureau concluded that BHA violated Mont. Code Ann. 49-2-304(1)(a) when it failed to provide a reasonable alteration to the elevator to permit disabled persons to have unfettered access to the second floor business offices in the hotel during business hours, awarded $6,000 in damages to Appellant, and denied both parties' requests for attorneys' fees. The Human Rights Commission affirmed. The district court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant did not possess proper standing to file a complaint of discrimination on behalf of his unidentified and potential clients. View "Baxter Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Angel" on Justia Law