Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs were employed as by the Town of West Yellowstone. Plaintiff contended that the Town's on-call policy for police officers prior to 2009 was so restrictive that they could not engage in personal activities between shifts, and therefore, they should have been compensated for all their time spent on call, and not just for call outs, under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). After a jury trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the Town. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict in favor of the Town, and Plaintiffs failed to show that the jury's verdict was either inherently impossible to believe or that there was a complete absence of evidence in support of the verdict. View "Stubblefield v. Town of W. Yellowstone" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of accountability for deliberate homicide, robbery, tampering with physical evidence, and burglary. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made during a custodial interrogation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant did not invoke his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent when he said "I don't really have anything to talk about" because he did not articulate a desire to remain silent sufficiently clearly that a reasonable officer in the circumstances would have understood Defendant's statements to be an invocation of his Miranda right to remain silent as required by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Berghuis v. Thompkins; and (2) the district court's finding that Defendant's Miranda waiver and subsequent statements to the police were voluntary was supported by substantial credible evidence, and its conclusions of law were correct. View "State v. Nixon" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of negligent homicide and two counts of negligent endangerment. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's challenge of a prospective juror for cause; (2) did not err by excluding Defendant's expert witness from testifying on complex partial seizures; (3) did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant's request to instruct the jury on DUI as a lesser-included offense of vehicular homicide while under the influence; and (4) erred by ordering Defendant to pay $600 in restitution to the State and an undisclosed amount to the victims and their family members for mental health treatment. Accordingly, the Court vacated the $600 restitution award to the State and reversed the open-ended restitution award for the victims' mental health treatment. Remanded for entry of an amended judgment specifying the amount for such treatment. View "State v. Jay" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of violating a permanent order of protection and tampering with a witness. Defendant's written sentence contained twenty-six terms and conditions that were not expressly stated during oral pronouncement of sentence. Defendant appealed, claiming his attorney was ineffective in ordering erroneous jury instructions and in failing to file a motion to conform the written sentence to the orally-pronounced sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) Defendant's counsel did not provide ineffective assistance with respect to proposed jury instructions; and (2) the district court's inclusion of five conditions in Defendant's written judgment and order were not sufficiently related to Defendant's charges nor were they reasonably related to the objectives of rehabilitation and protection of the victim and society. Remanded with instructions to strike the five conditions. View "State v. Andress" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who operated a cattle ranch, owned a truck that had been modified with the attachment of a feedbox, hoist and tailgate. Plaintiff was cited for violating Mont. Code Ann. 15-70-330 after a Montana Department of Transportation (MDOT) officer discovered that the fuel in the tank of Plaintiff's vehicle was dyed and in excess of the legal concentration allowed to be in a fuel tank in a non-exempt vehicle being driven on a public highway. Plaintiff requested a review of his citation, arguing that the modifications made to his vehicle rendered its primary use off-road and off-highway, and therefore, he was entitled to a special exemption from the prohibition against dyed fuel on public roadways. After a hearing, MDOT determined Plaintiff was not entitled to any exemption. The State Tax Appeal Board (STAB) affirmed. The district court affirmed, determining that Plaintiff's vehicle's alterations simply enhanced its capability to transport property, whether on a public highway or on a ranch. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by affirming STAB's determination that Plaintiff violated section 15-70-330 and that his truck was not entitled to a special exemption under Mont. Admin. R. 18.10.110(1) and (2). View "Coleman v. State ex rel. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of deliberate homicide, attempted deliberate homicide, and negligent homicide. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court violated his fundamental right to be present at all critical stages of the proceedings when he was absent from a sidebar conference after which the district court removed a juror from the pool of potential jurors. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the record sufficiently established that the only potential prejudice to Defendant arose from his loss of an opportunity to participate in the decision of whether the keep the disputed juror in the potential jury pool; and (2) the trial court mooted this potential prejudice when it announced that the juror had been removed from the potential jury pool by stipulation. View "State v. Wilson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexual assault, incest, and attempted sexual intercourse without consent. The victim was thirteen years old during the abuse and fourteen at the time of trial. During trial, the court allowed a child sex abuse expert to testify, but the expert did not discuss the specifics of Defendant's case and did not offer an opinion of whether the victim had been abused. Defendant appealed, contending that the expert's testimony improperly invaded the jury's obligation to assess the victim's credibility. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the expert's testimony did not impinge upon the jury's obligation to ultimately decide the victim's credibility; and (2) moreover, the district court alleviated any concern of unfair prejudice by giving the jury a cautionary instruction before Defendant testified. View "State v. Robins" on Justia Law

Defendant purchased a vacation home in Ptarmigan Village in Montana. Defendant lived primarily in Arizona. Ptarmigan Owner's Association (Ptarmigan), which managed the units that comprised the Ptarmigan homeowner's association, filed a lien on Defendant's house when Defendant stopped paying fees and dues to Ptarmigan. After Ptarmigan filed a complaint to foreclose on its lien, it mailed the summons and complaint to an Arizona Postal Plus mailbox that Defendant had on file with Ptarmigan. The Arizona constable failed to locate Defendant through the mailbox and informed Ptarmigan that Defendant had not been served. Ptarmigan published the complain and summons, and after Defendant failed to appear in response to the summons, the district court granted default judgment in favor of Ptarmigan. Defendant filed a motion to set aside the default judgment, claiming that Ptarmigan never properly served him. The district court failed to set aside the default judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circumstances here authorized service by publication; and (2) Ptarmigan did not act in bad faith or deliberately conceal the lawsuit from Defendant. View "Ptarmigan Owner's Ass'n v. Alton" on Justia Law

Mother and Child were seriously injured in an automobile accident. Mother and her husband (Husband) hired Viscomi & Gersh (Viscomi) to represent Mother and Child in their claims for damages resulting from the accident. Matthew O'Neill was subsequently appointed to act as guardian ad litem (GAL) and conservator for Child. After Mother's case settled, Mother and Husband agreed with Morales Law Office (Morales) that Morales would represent Child. Morales then filed a motion to disqualify counsel. The district court denied the motion because it did not contain the consent of Viscomi and O'Neill. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when Mother and Husband consented to the appointment of a GAL and conservator to act in Child's best interests in the legal claims she had arising from the accident, they divested themselves of the right to determine who should represent Child in her personal injury claim; (2) Mont. Code Ann. 37-61-403 and Mont. Code Ann. 72-5-427 are not unconstitutional as applied in this case; and (3) section 37-61-403 does not conflict with the Montana Rules of Professional Conduct. View "In re Estate of C.K.O." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident and received medical treatment at Benefis Health System, Inc. Plaintiff had healthcare coverage as a TRICARE beneficiary and also had medical payments coverage through his insurance carrier, Kemper. Plaintiff's medical treatment costs totaled $2,073. Benefis accepted $662 from TRICARE as payment in full satisfaction of the bill pursuant to a preferred provider agreement (PPA) between Blue Cross Blue Shield and Benefis. Benefis subsequently received $1,866 from Kemper, upon which Benefis reimbursed TRICARE's payment in full. Plaintiff filed an individual and class action complaint, claiming that he was entitled to the additional $1,204 that Benefis received from Kemper over and above the TRICARE reimbursement rate. Plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, asking the district court to find Benefis breached its contract with TRICARE and that Benefis was liable for Plaintiff's damages. The district court converted the motion into a motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment, holding (1) Plaintiff was not entitled to pocket the difference between the TRICARE reimbursement rate and the amount Benefis accepted from Kemper; and (2) Plaintiff failed to establish any damages that resulted from the alleged breach. View "Conway v. Benefis Health Sys., Inc." on Justia Law