Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This appeal stemmed from a construction contract dispute between Total Industrial Plant Services, Inc. (TIPS) and Turner Industries Group, LLC (Turner). Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland (Fidelity) was the surety for Turner's substitution bond filed in lieu of TIPS's construction lien. TIPS filed a complaint against Turner and Fidelity, alleging various causes of action. The trial court granted TIPS's motion for partial summary judgment and ordered Turner to return the retainage it had withheld. After a trial, the district court found in favor of Defendants and dismissed TIPS's remaining claims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court did not err by (1) denying TIPS's claim for additional compensation under a theory of either quantum meruit or breach of contract; (2) failing to find that TIPS was the prevailing party and awarding costs and fees to Turner; (3) finding TIPS's construction lien was barred by the ninety-day statute of limitations; (4) granting partial summary judgment to TIPS and ordering Turner to return the retainage; and (5) dismissing Turner's bill of costs for being untimely. The Court, however, found the district court erred by denying TIPS prejudgment interest on the retainage. Remanded. View "Total Indust. Plant Servs. v. Turner Indust. Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Terance Perry filed for dissolution of his marriage to Karen Perry. Terance named Gail Goheen as his counsel of record. Karen filed a motion to disqualify Goheen after speaking with Goheen over the telephone. Before the disqualification hearing, Karen filed a motion to strike office memorandums and affidavits filed by Terance regarding Goheen's conversation with Karen as privileged communications between attorney and client. The district court denied Karen's motion to disqualify, finding no attorney-client relationship existed between Karen and Goheen. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by (1) denying Karen's motion to disqualify; (2) permitting Goheen to testify at the disqualification hearing; (3) relying on communications between Goheen and Karen in making its decision; and (4) determining that Karen abused the rules of disqualification. The court also found that Goheen did not violate her duty to Karen under Rule 19 of the Montana Rules of Professional Conduct. View "In re Marriage of Perry" on Justia Law

Defendant owned a building and leased spaced in the building to Company. Plaintiff worked as an independent contractor for Company, providing cleaning services. After Plaintiff injured himself while working in Defendant's building, Plaintiff sued Defendant. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in applying construction industry liability standards to this case and in determining that Defendant owed no duty that Defendant as a property owner had a duty of care to Plaintiff because Plaintiff was an independent contractor working for Company; and (2) the court further erred in granting summary judgment to Defendant based upon the determination that "no reasonable jury" could find that Defendant had breached the duty of ordinary care under the facts of the case. View "Steichen v. Talcott Props., LLC " on Justia Law

After a jury trial, the youth court found that E.M.R., a youth under the age of eighteen, had committed five misdemeanor offenses of "dog at large" and one felony offense of aggravated animal cruelty. The convictions stemmed from E.M.R.'s treatment of her dogs and horses. E.M.R. appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded, holding (1) the youth court's instruction to the jury on the legislative purpose of the Youth Court Act was prejudicial error and required reversal of the aggravated animal cruelty adjudication; and (2) the youth court correctly declined to dismiss the "dog at large" charges.View "State v. E.M.R." on Justia Law

MCR, LLC filed an action for condemnation of a compressor station site on property owned by Appellees. Appellees counterclaimed against MCR for damage to their property and claimed punitive damages. Appellees sought restoration costs as the measure of damages for their contract, trespass, and nuisance claims. The parties stipulated to the substitution of MCR Transmission, LLC (MCR-T) for MCR on the condemnation claim. The district court dismissed MCR-T's condemnation claim and granted Appellees' summary judgment motion allowing Appellees to seek restoration costs. The jury awarded restoration costs and punitive damages to Appellees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding that the district court (1) erred in dismissing MCR-T's motion to condemn Appellees' property for a compressor station, as genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether Appellees' property was necessary for the compressor station; (2) properly determined that Appellees were entitled to seek restoration costs as the measure of their damages; and (3) properly admitted evidence at trial that MCR had jumped Appellees' bid on state trust land leases. View "McEwen v. MCR, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs commenced a lawsuit against several power companies alleging that the Colstrip power facility, which bordered land owned by Plaintiffs, contaminated groundwater under their property. The parties proceeded with mediation after three years of litigation. The mediation ended with the transmission of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to the parties' counsel. After some of Plaintiffs expressed reservations about accepting the settlement, the power companies filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement, arguing that the MOU was a written and signed settlement agreement. After a hearing, the district court granted the motion to enforce the settlement agreement, finding that the MOU was a binding, enforceable settlement agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err by finding the MOU was an enforceable settlement agreement; (2) did not err by allowing parol evidence to change an option to purchase into a right of first refusal; and (3) erred in admitting evidence protected by the mediation confidentiality statute, but the error was harmless. View "Kluver v. PPL Mont., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff The Big Sky Colony, Inc., a signatory to the Hutterian Brethren Church Constitution, organized itself as a religious corporation under Montana law. Plaintiff Daniel Wipf was the Colony's first minister and corporate president. Plaintiffs brought suit against the Montana Department of Labor and Industry, claiming that the requirement to provide workers' compensation coverage for the Colony's members engaged in certain commercial activities contained in HB 119 violated the Colony's rights under the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause and also violated the Colony's right to equal protection. The district court found in favor of the Colony. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the provisions of HB 119 that incorporated the Colony into the definition of "employer" and the Colony's members into the definition of "employee" under the Workers' Compensation Act did not violate the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, or the Colony's right to equal protection of the laws. View "Big Sky Colony, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus." on Justia Law

Boyne USA, Inc. filed an action for breach of contract against Blixseth Group, Inc. that covered a land sale for fifteen acres of property, seeking specific performance. Boyne joined Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC (Yellowstone) as a party due to Yellowstone's acquisition of the contested property. Meanwhile, Yellowstone conveyed the property to Spanish Peaks Development, LLC (SPD). SPD, in turn, conveyed the property to Lone Mountain Holdings, LLC (LMH). Boyne joined SPD and LMH as parties. Boyne further alleged abuse of the legal process and deceit. The district court dismissed Blixeth Group and Yellowstone due to Yellowstone's bankruptcy. After a jury trial, (1) the jury awarded Boyne $300,000 from each SPD and LMH based on its determination that Defendants had deceived Boyne and had abused the legal process, (2) the district court awarded Boyne specific performance on the agreement; and (3) the court awarded attorney fees to Boyne. The Supreme Court affirmed subject to one minor modification, holding that the district court did not err in its judgment, and that Boyne was entitled to legal fees on appeal. View "Boyne USA, Inc. v. Spanish Peaks Dev., LLC" on Justia Law