Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs in this case were individuals who were in committed same-sex relationships. Plaintiffs sued the State, contending that there was a statutory structure in Montana law that prohibited them from enjoying significant relationships and family protections and obligations provided to similarly-situated different-sex couples who marry. Plaintiffs expressly did not challenge Montana law's restriction of marriage to heterosexual couples and did not seek the opportunity to marry. Instead, Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the State's failure to provide them access to the statutory scheme available to different-sex couples denied them the rights guaranteed by Mont. Const. art II. The district court granted the State's motion to dismiss, noting that Plaintiffs did not seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of a specific statute but rather a direction to the legislature to enact a statutory arrangement, which was unprecedented in Montana law. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the district court did not err in finding Plaintiffs' requested relief exceeded the bounds of a justiciable controversy; but (2) Plaintiffs should be afforded the opportunity to amend their complaint. View "Donaldson v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of sexual intercourse without consent and one count of sexual assault. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the circumstances presented here, the district court's application of Montana's rape shield statute did not violate Defendant's right to a fair trial under the Montana and United States Constitutions; and (2) the district court did not err in refusing to dismiss Counts I and IV on grounds that the State failed to prove venue, as the State showed that the only rational conclusion to be drawn from the facts and testimony was that the crime was committed in the county alleged. View "State v. Patterson" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to the felony offense of criminal possession with intent to distribute. The district court sentenced him to a three-year deferred imposition of sentence. Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence, contending that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress and dismiss because a drug task force agent did not have probable cause to believe a crime was occurring in his residence, and thus there was no basis for the agent to contact Defendant and request to search his residence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress and dismiss, as (1) the information Defendant's neighbor provided to law enforcement officers was reliable; and (2) the court's findings regarding Defendant's consent to the initial search of his home and the court's findings regarding the validity of the search warrant were supported by substantial credible evidence and were not clearly erroneous. View "State v. Deshaw" on Justia Law

Plaintiff gave birth to Child at Hospital. Complications arose prior to and after Child's delivery, leading to problems with Child's brain development. Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of Child, later sued the doctor who delivered Child and Hospital. Plaintiff subsequently settled her claims with the doctor. The district court granted summary judgment to Hospital on all of Plaintiff's claims. This appeal arose out of pre-trial rulings made by the district court in Plaintiff's litigation with Hospital. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) extending discovery deadlines; (2) granting summary judgment to Hospital on Plaintiff's agency claims; (3) granting summary judgment to Hospital on Plaintiff's Consumer Protection Act Claim; (4) granting summary judgment to Hospital on Plaintiff's joint venture claim; and (5) granting summary judgment to Hospital on Plaintiff's negligent credentialing claim. View "Brookins v. Mote" on Justia Law

After a youth violated the terms of his initial probation agreement, the judicial district youth court revoked that agreement and entered a dispositional order that extended the youth's probationary period for an additional three years. The youth appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the youth court did not exceed its statutory authority and correctly and interpreted and applied the Youth Court Act by imposing on revocation an additional three-year probationary term that lasted until the youth's twenty-first birthday; and (2) the imposition of an additional three-year term of probation did not violate the youth's constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. View "In re S.M.K." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of incest. The district court sentenced Defendant to 100 years in the Montana State Prison with a possibility of parole after fifty years. The district court designated Defendant a Level 3 sexual offender. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to conduct cross-examination of the State' witnesses at the sentencing hearing or failing to call any witnesses on Defendant's behalf; and (2) trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by making no alternative sentencing recommendation. View "State v. Peart" on Justia Law

In this dispute over real property, Roslyn Shephard, in her capacity as personal representative of the estates of real property owners (Lessors), terminated the third lease of Lessees based on an alleged violation of the terms of the lease. Shephard then sued Lessees, seeking to invalidate Lessees' third lease due to the fact that she had not signed it on Lessors' behalf. Shephard alternatively sought an order declaring that Lessees had breached the terms of the lease. Lessees counterclaimed, alleging that Shephard had breached the terms of the lease by wrongfully terminating the lease and by failing to provide notice to them of the alleged breach. The district court found in favor of Lessees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly determined that the lease was valid without Shephard's signature; (2) substantial evidence supported the district court's finding that Lessees had not violated the lease; and (3) the district court correctly determined that the terms of the lease entitled Lessees to notice of their alleged breach and an opportunity to cure. View "Shephard v. Widhalm" on Justia Law

Brenette Garrett and Jason LeProwse were the biological parents of T.G. In September 2011, the justice court issued a temporary order of protection (TOP) against LeProwse pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 40-15-201. Shortly thereafter, the justice court case was removed to the district court where the parties had been involved in a parenting action since 2008. The district court held a hearing on the TOP in October 2011 at which it heard considerable testimony from numerous witnesses. In January 2012, the court dissolved the TOP. The Supreme Court dismissed Garrett's appeal without prejudice, holding that the order dissolving the TOP was not immediately appealable because a final decision and resolution of all issues raised in the case had not yet been rendered. View "LeProwse v. Garrett" on Justia Law

Helena Sand and Gravel, Inc. (HSG) challenged Lewis and Clark County's decision to adopt a citizen-initiated proposal to configure a zoning district that favored residential uses and prohibited mining. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the County, concluding that the County had properly adopted the zoning pattern and regulations creating the district, and the County's zoning decision did not constitute a taking of HSG's property. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and remanded, holding (1) the County's decision to adopt the zoning pattern and regulations for the district was not clearly unreasonable or an abuse of discretion; (2) the County's adoption of zoning regulations prohibiting sand and gravel mining did not constitute illegal reverse spot zoning; and (3) because HSG had a constitutionally protected property interest in property within the district, the Court granted HSG's request for remand to the district court for the parties to brief the Penn Central takings test, narrowly limited to whether the County's adoption of the zoning pattern and regulations in the district constituted a taking of HSG's real property interest without just compensation. View "Helena Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n" on Justia Law