Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in August, 2012
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Al Ballard and Ecosafe Gold Recovery, LLC (Ballard), appealed a district court's order entered following the Supreme Court’s remand in the first appeal of the case. The Supreme Court reversed the entry of judgment in favor of Ballard, and reversed the award of attorney fees to Ballard and remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Upon remittitur, Russell and Melissa Levens moved for an order on remand that would provide various forms of relief, including attorney fees. When Ballard did not initially respond, the District Court entered an order requiring Ballard to immediately restore a 30-foot buffer zone by appropriate filling, compacting, and buttressing. The court ordered Ballard to commence work immediately and to complete the restoration within 30 days, and imposed a $100 per day penalty for every day beyond the 30-day deadline that the restoration was incomplete. The court required Ballard to mark the boundary of the buffer zone and to pay Levens' attorney fees and costs, and scheduled a hearing to determine the proper amount of fees. The Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not err on remand of the case. "Ballard has no meritorious defense and the takings claim was raised for the first time on appeal." The District Court properly awarded attorney fees to Levens under the agreement. The Levens were likewise entitled to attorney fees on appeal. View "Ballard et al v. Levens" on Justia Law

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Appellant Robert Arthur Wing appealed his conviction on felony driving while under the influence of alcohol (fourth or subsequent offense). Appellant argued at trial that he had not been driving on the day of his arrest, and that another man, Michael Halverson, had been the driver before the vehicle was disabled. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the district court abused its discretion by preventing a defense witness from testifying about a statement against interest made by Halverson. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Halverson's alleged statements should have been admitted into evidence, and the jury should have been given the opportunity to consider it. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Montana v. Wing" on Justia Law

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In 2011, the State filed identical Petitions for Emergency Protective Services, Adjudication of Youths in Need of Care, and for Temporary Legal Custody in two causes involving K.H. and K.M., the daughters of Appellee K.H. (Mother). The children were two and five years old, respectively, at the time of the petition. The petition was ultimately dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence. Counsel for the children appealed the dismissal. The issues before the Supreme Court were whether the children had standing to appeal the dismissal of the State's petition for their adjudication as youths in need of care, and whether the district court erred in dismissing the State's petition. Upon review of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Matter of K.H. & K.M." on Justia Law

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Defendant Laurie Kay Corbino appealed a district court's judgment and order of commitment. Defendant entered into a plea agreement wherein she pled guilty to felony burglary. Defendant admitted to entering the Lendmans’ residence and taking cosmetic items that belonged to them. In the presentence investigation report, Mrs. Lendman submitted an affidavit of pecuniary loss wherein she listed as missing two large bags of personal items and a large gold ring with opal, emeralds and diamonds. Because the other items were recovered, the only restitution Mrs. Lendman requested was $1,500 for the ring. Defendant admitted to taking the personal items, but denied taking the ring. The District Court also determined that "with no current resources, [the Defendant did not have the] ability to pay for the type of programs that she needs if she were on probation, including the [Cognitive Principles and Restructuring] program." Defense counsel objected to Defendant's sentence on the grounds that she was being incarcerated based on her inability to pay. The court denied Defendant's objection because, even though she had a counselor for her drug and alcohol addictions, Defendant's compulsive thievery was different than addiction. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the District Court properly applied the law to the facts of this case, and affirmed the district court's decision. View "Montana v. Corbino" on Justia Law

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In 2007, Defendant Ralph Fox was charged with two counts of felony sexual assault against minor females, CS (Count I) and HS (Count II). A federal grand jury handed down an indictment in the United States District Court charging Defendant with three felony offenses: sexual exploitation of children, receipt of child pornography and possession of child pornography. He was convicted on all charges and sentenced to federal prison for 110 years. Subsequently, Defendant moved to dismiss the State action against him on the ground of double jeopardy. The District Court dismissed one count of sexual assault and Defendant was convicted on the remaining count. Nevertheless, the court sentenced Defendant to two fifty-year sentences (one for each count of sexual assault) and five years for failing to register as a sex offender. The fifty-year sentences were to run concurrently with each other and with the federal sentence. The five-year sentence was to run consecutively to the fifty-year sentences for assault but concurrently with the federal sentence. Defendant appealed, arguing the District Court erred when it sentenced him to a term of fifty years for the dismissed assault charge. He also claimed the court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss the remaining assault charge. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and remanded in part. The case was remanded to the District Court for correction of the illegally-imposed sentence pertaining to Count II. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss Count I. View "Montana v. Fox" on Justia Law

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This was a dispute over rights to use water from the Teton River in Montana. Giese, Kelly and Reichelt use water from the downstream portion of the Teton near Fort Benton, Montana. They claimed generally that they are damaged by diversion practices on the upstream portion of the Teton near Choteau, Montana, and that their "calls" on upstream appropriators to release water for their downstream use have been ignored. They first filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in the District Court in February, 2011, and ultimately filed second and third amended petitions seeking to halt certain water diversions from the Teton. The issue underlying this case arose in part from the decision in "Perry v. Beattie." "Perry" decreed the priority date and flow rate of about 40 water right claims in the upper Teton River west of Choteau. The District Court appointed a Water Commissioner pursuant to 85-5-101, MCA, to administer the water rights decreed in "Perry." The majority of water users on the Teton (and their successors in interest, including downstream users Giese, Kelly and Reichelt) were not parties to the Perry case. Giese, Kelly and Reichelt claimed water rights from the Teton with priority dates that are senior to or contemporary with the upstream rights decreed in Perry. Water right claimants on the Teton were participating in the Water Court’s on-going adjudication of water rights under Title 85, Chapter 2 of the Montana Code. While that process was nearing its final stages, it was not yet complete and the Water Court did not issue a final decree. Giese, Kelly and Reichelt challenged the Water Commissioner’s practice of diverting the flow of the Teton down the Bateman Ditch. They contended that their water rights pre-date the rights of many upstream Perry decree rights and pre-date the Water Commissioner’s diversion of the Teton through the Bateman Ditch. They contended that since the Bateman Ditch was not used to divert the entire river at the time of the Perry decree, the Water Commissioner lacked the authority to make the diversion. The Supreme Court restated the issue on appeal as whether the District Court erred in dismissing Appellants’ request for certification to the Chief Water Judge pursuant to 85-2-406(2)(b), MCA. Upon review, the Court reversed and remanded the case to the District Court with instructions to certify all appropriate issues to the Chief Water Judge as provided in 85-2-406(2)(b), MCA, and to grant such injunctive or other relief that, in the District Court’s discretion, it determined to be necessary and appropriate. View "Giese v. Blixrud" on Justia Law

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Louis G. Hannum, Jr. (Louis Jr.) appealed a district court's order removing him for cause as the personal representative of the estate of Louis G. Hannum, Sr. (Louis Sr.). Louis Sr. passed away in 2010, and was survived by his children, Louis Jr., Mike and Mark; and his grandchildren, Monika, Veronica, Michelle, Naomi, Zachary, Esther and Jim. Louis Sr. was predeceased by his daughter, Cheryl Gallagher, who was Esther’s and Jim’s mother. Louis Jr. filed an application for informal probate of will and appointment of personal representative of Louis. Sr.’s estate on September 2, 2010. Notice was sent to Louis Jr., Mike, Mark, Esther and Jim, but not to the remaining grandchildren. Naomi did, however, know of Louis Jr.’s appointment because Naomi was Louis Jr.’s daughter and she was acting as his counsel. It is unclear whether Zachary, Louis Jr.’s son, was aware of these proceedings. Notably, Louis Jr. did not send notice to Louis Sr.’s grandchildren Monika, Veronica and Michelle. In its Order, the District Court concluded that Louis Jr. violated numerous fiduciary duties, and as a result, his removal for cause was appropriate. In its conclusions of law, the District Court determined that Louis Jr. had failed in his duty to administer the probate according to the 2005 Will, a duty imposed by 72-34-101, MCA, when he included the value of certain alleged promissory notes and distributed them between himself and Mark without authority under the 2005 Will. The court additionally found that Louis Jr. failed in his duty to avoid conflicts of interest, in his duty to use ordinary skill and prudence, in his duty to exercise discretionary powers reasonably, and in his duty to file or otherwise deliver to interested parties, within nine months of his appointment, an inventory of estate assets that included a full and true value of the decedent’s interest in every item listed in the inventory. In reaching its decision, the the Supreme Court concluded that the District Court relied on substantial credible evidence. Though the Court disfavors removing a personal representative, the District Court has broad discretion in its decision to remove a personal representative, and the Court concluded that the District Court did not abuse that discretion when it removed Louis Jr. for cause. View "Estate of Hannum" on Justia Law

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Petitioners brought an original proceeding to the Supreme Court to challenge the validity of Initiative 166. They requested the Court rule that the Attorney General and Secretary of State did not comply with their responsibilities under law when they failed to bar I-166 from appearing on the general election ballot. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Attorney General and Secretary of State acted in compliance with their duties under law, and that the initiative met all statutory requirements. Accordingly, the Court denied the petition. View "Montanans Opposed to I-166 v. Bullock" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff-Appellant Charles Fellows appealed a district court's order that dismissed his complaint. Plaintiff owned a water right in Spring Creek. He claimed that the flow of the creek was for many years recharged by water seeping from the natural channel of the Teton River. He claimed that the practice of diverting water from the natural channel of the Teton implemented by the district court's water commissioner on the Teton adversely affected the water available to satisfy his water right in Spring Creek. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court held that Plaintiff lacked standing to bring an action as a dissatisfied water user unless he could prove a hydrological connection between Spring Creek and the Teton River. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Plaintiff's factual allegations and his request for a declaratory ruling were sufficient to invoke the district court's power to issue a ruling on the issue of connectivity. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Fellows v. Water Commissioner et al" on Justia Law

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Defendant Kingsley Ariegwe appealed a district court's denial of his petition for postconviction relief. Defendant virtually met a fifteen-year-old female in an internet chat room. After chatting, the two telephone one another, and eventually met in person. Allegedly a sexual encounter occurred at that in-person meeting. Shortly thereafter, the fifteen-year-old told a friend that she had sex with a 32-year-old man. Unknown to either girls, the phone conversation was inadvertently recorded on an answering machine at the friend's house. The tape of the conversation was preserved, and was at issue in this appeal. Defendant was charged with sexual intercourse without consent, attempted sexual intercourse without consent, and unlawful transactions with children. In his opening statement at trial, Defendant told the jury about the taped conversation and implied that the jury would get to listen to the recording. However, defense counsel never offered the tape into evidence. He later noted the omission in his closing statement. Defendant appealed his conviction. The district court determined that Defendant was not prejudiced by counsel's failure to introduce the tape recording into evidence. On appeal to the Supreme Court ,Defendant argued he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in denying Defendant's petition for postconviction relief. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's judgment and dismissed Defendant's application for relief. View "Ariegwe v. Montana" on Justia Law